For the far-right, but not for their values: how and why Polish youth vote

Poland’s 2025 presidential election revealed several unexpected shifts in public opinion. One of them was the large share of young voters who supported far-right candidates – in particular, election winner Karol Nawrocki and the leader of Confederation, Sławomir Mentzen, whose ideology many left-leaning Poles consider close to Nazism.

These politicians are also known for initiatives aimed at restricting the rights of Ukrainians in Poland.

Paradoxically, just two years ago young people leaned toward supporting the main opponents of these politicians – the Civic Coalition led by Donald Tusk.

Why did preferences change so sharply? The Stefan Batory Foundation sought the answer through a study of Polish youth’s political attitudes. New Eastern Europe – a partner of European Pravda in the MOST consortium – spoke with the study’s author, sociologist Paweł Marczewski, who heads research at ideaForum.

Given how important Poland’s opinion (and thus Polish voters’ choices) is for Ukraine, we translated and published the sociologist’s key explanations in the first person.

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Youth: a minority that wants to influence the country

It is true that young voters are not the largest cohort in Poland’s electorate. And their share will only decline in the coming years. Yet, our research – and recent election campaigns – show that this group has become increasingly aware of its position. Young people recognise that, because they are outnumbered, they must mobilise if they want their voices heard.

We saw this clearly in the last presidential election. Youth turnout in both rounds exceeded 70 per cent – even higher than in the 2023 parliamentary elections.

So, although they are not the most numerous, young voters are politically engaged. We wanted to understand their political preferences for a few reasons. First, they offer a glimpse into the future of Polish politics. We saw them in large numbers at campaign rallies, and we know their views will help shape Poland’s political landscape.

Second, we wanted to learn about their motivation. If their numbers cannot decide an election result, why are they so determined to vote? Do they use voting to make their voices heard?

Finally, we wanted to find out where this group stands today, that is almost two years after the 2023 parliamentary elections [where there was also an increase in youth activity. – EP] when their mobilisation was said to have contributed to the election outcome.

Thus, we asked: are young people satisfied with politics? Or have they become disillusioned? And if they are disappointed, what effect does it have on them? Are they demobilised or are they looking for new political alternatives?

It turned out that young people largely moved away from those they had supported in the previous elections.

How Polish youth turned away from Tusk’s party

Many remember the "black protests" of 2016–2022 against Poland’s restrictive abortion laws. They were dominated by young women.

Today, we are seeing images of a very different Polish youth – at anti-immigration demonstrations, mobilising around a completely different issue. Has something fundamentally changed in this age group?

In my view, the support that young voters showed for the centrist Civic Coalition was an exception. Even back then, research showed that many young people were radical – on both the right and the left. After the black protests that you mentioned, many expected a triumph for the left. Instead, the centrist Civic Coalition had managed to convince young voters that it represented a new quality in politics. For those who had protested against the abortion restrictions, Donald Tusk’s promise to liberalise the law – unprecedented for him – was a powerful message. Today many young people admit that they feel betrayed.

They believe the government has abandoned the issues that were most important to them. This only reinforces my belief that their earlier support for the Civic Coalition was an exception.

We also need to remember that young people consume politics differently.

They get much of their information from social media – especially fast-moving platforms like TikTok.

This is why politicians such as Sławomir Mentzen from the far-right Confederation have become so popular among them. He offers something "new" – or at least he looks like he does. And he is very active on TikTok. Thus, when these young voters saw that the government, and especially the Civic Coalition, failed to deliver this new quality, they began searching again.

The results of the first round of the presidential election in May 2025 illustrated this change among young voters perfectly: a clear majority of youth refused to vote for candidates associated with the two main parties that have dominated Polish politics for decades.

Supporting a fascist does not necessarily mean fascism

Many of Mentzen’s supporters are not even traditionally right-wing.

For them, he simply represents an alternative to mainstream politics.

In our in-depth interviews, they told us that they see him as "uncompromised" – he has not held high office, has not been tainted by political scandals, and is not controlled by a major party.

This sense of novelty matters enormously to young voters. Their motivation is often very straightforward: they neither want Tusk nor Jarosław Kaczyński (the leader of the right-wing nationalist Law and Justice party – Ed.). They want someone new.

They feel that those who have ruled for years have grown complacent and indifferent to their concerns – and that is why they look elsewhere.

This dynamic has been present for quite some time, and it is not going away.

One focus group participant, for example, admitted she was worried about Mentzen’s anti-abortion stance. But she also reasoned that as president, he would have no power to change the abortion law – so she simply dismissed that part of his platform.

This pragmatic approach is common among his young voters.

Young people feel ignored by mainstream politicians. Meanwhile, there are politicians who speak directly to this frustration – and Mentzen is one of them. So is Adrian Zandberg from the Left party, who also performed strongly among young voters.

His success reinforces the point: what matters most to the youth is novelty and authenticity. In fact, authenticity is key. Many young voters explicitly reject anyone who has already been prime minister, minister, or president. They simply don’t trust established political figures.

That is why even Karol Nawrocki, despite being backed by Law and Justice, managed to win their support in the second round of the presidential election.

For these voters, Nawrocki appeared as an independent candidate, who contrasted sharply with Rafał Trzaskowski – someone they saw as the quintessential insider: the mayor of Warsaw and deputy chairman of Tusk’s Civic Platform.

They want politicians who will actually improve their everyday lives. Many of them complain that mainstream politics is consumed by endless party battles while ignoring practical issues.

Housing is at the top of their list. They believe that neither the current nor previous governments have done enough to ensure affordable housing.

This is a cross-cutting issue. While right-leaning voters may be less interested in large-scale social housing projects, they still view access to affordable housing as essential.

Another major issue is education – and this is where Mentzen wins their hearts. For many young people, school is their first direct contact with the state, and their verdict is negative. They see schools as outdated, poorly preparing them for the labour market or for life in a modern society.

Instead of inspiring or equipping them with practical tools, schools reinforce a sense of stagnation. Mentzen’s libertarian message – less state, more individual freedom – is appealing precisely because it speaks to this frustration. Several interviewees even told us that they only felt relief once they had graduated from high school.

University students tend to be more optimistic, largely because they combine study with work and enjoy greater independence.

But the image of secondary education remains bleak. Beyond education, young people are anxious about the cost of living and their future job prospects.

These day-to-day concerns often outweigh broader ideological questions – and in many cases, they are even more pronounced than among older voters.

Many young people are willing to back a candidate even if they disagree with parts of his or her platform. What unites them is their rejection of the old political order, and their search for something, or someone, new.

Poland has the highest gap – 23 percentage points – between younger people (ages 18-39) and older people (40+) who say that religion plays an important role in their lives.

Some say Poland’s secularisation among the youth is the fastest in Europe.

In fact, it might be the fastest in the world. Meanwhile, among older generations, this process is far slower. In this sense, there is a kind of generational community: those who lean to the right or are drawn to figures like Sławomir Mentzen share this sense of "youth identity" with their peers on the left, such as supporters of Adrian Zandberg.

The war with Ukraine and attitudes toward Ukrainian migrants

For them, war is an abstract concept, something they know only from family stories, if at all.

This does not mean they are indifferent. If you talk to them for longer, they will acknowledge that the war is close to Poland, and that we are on NATO and the EU’s border. But at the same time, they recognise the security guarantees that come with our membership in these organisations.

They also see that Russia has not been able to simply overrun Ukraine. That realisation calms them somewhat. Migration, however, is different. The presence of Ukrainian migrants affects their daily lives – in schools, in the labour market, even in local communities.

This is something they experience directly. Many young people are sceptical of official statistics on the number of Ukrainians in Poland because they feel their presence everywhere. This perception – that their everyday reality is changing – is what drives anxiety. Sometimes it’s fear of job competition; sometimes it’s anger over perceived preferential treatment of Ukrainians.

As a result, willingness to help Ukrainians among the young is noticeably lower. But this is not necessarily rooted in xenophobia. It is often the result of their own economic and social insecurities.

Interestingly, people from the Middle East, South Asia, or Latin America are far less visible to young Poles. With Ukrainians – many of them students – young people have daily contact in schools, on the streets, in shops, even at the doctor’s office.

Other migrant groups, however, are much smaller and more dispersed, so their presence is not perceived in the same way.

Overall, migration is seen as a source of anxiety.

But when it comes to non-Ukrainian migrants, young people’s attitudes do not differ significantly from those of the wider population.

The Ukrainian case is unique because it touches their daily lives directly.

Compiled from an interview with Paweł Marczewski – sociologist and head of research at ideaForum of the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw.

Interview by Iwona Reichardt, deputy editor-in-chief of New Eastern Europe.

Originally published in New Eastern Europe as part of the MOST – Media Organisations for Stronger Transnational Journalism partnership, a Journalism Partnership funded by the Creative Europe programme that supports independent media specialising in international reporting