More dangerous than communists: how La France Insoumise became a problem for Ukraine

France’s far left is not the favourite for the Élysée in 2027.

But it can shape parliamentary majorities and coalition red lines.

For Ukraine, the question is not "left or right", but which left sets the terms.

When La France Insoumise speaks about arms deliveries, it rarely starts with what Ukraine needs on the front.

It starts with what France must avoid: escalation without democratic vote, and arms deliveries that could "provoke" the aggressor state.

On peace, the Left prioritises negotiations and a new European security architecture, and it often, if not always, rejects Ukraine’s NATO membership.

The logic is: non-alignment, distrust of NATO, and a constant focus on escalation risks.

Ukrainian voices have criticised Western calls for "peace" that float above occupation and coercion.

They warn that de-escalation slogans can end up meaning a ceasefire that freezes the war on Moscow’s terms, even when presented as humanitarian. In France, Politics calls it "moral abstraction".

France’s far left may not decide the war alone, but it shapes what France is willing to sustain: wether on weapons policy, sanctions pressure, or Europe’s ability to hold a common line.

Fortunately, there are other political forces on the left flank, including ones that are clearly pro-Ukrainian. However, they have not been able to fully block the far-left’s discourse, which is far from friendly towards Ukraine.

The state as a shield

To understand French politics, it helps to treat the left less as a party family and more as a reflex.

When living standards slips, when hospitals are under pressure, when a reform threatens pensions or benefits, the left’s answer remains the same: the state should step in. It should absorb risk. It should organise solidarity.

In France, these ideas are not marginal. Across much of the political spectrum, there is a deep assumption that some things are not up for negotiation: pensions should remain protected, healthcare should stay broadly accessible, school should be free, and the Republic should reduce inequality rather than accept it as normal.

The left’s identity comes from claiming ownership of that promise.

Its idea of the state is shaped by two traditions. One is republican, inherited from the Revolution: citizens are equal, and the state should defend the general interest.

The other is socialist, rooted in labour movements and trade-union politics: markets do not reduce inequality on their own, so the state must correct it.

Sécurité sociale, pensions, and public services are part of national identity. And it is why, even today, the left’s most consistent message is protection: purchasing power, hospitals, schools, local services, and the promise that the Republic can still act as a shield.

The parties fight over almost everything else. But on the social state, they share the same basic promise, even if they disagree on how to keep it.

For decades, the Socialist Party was the left’s centre of gravity, and the center of French politics as well.

After years in office and a broader loss of credibility, the Socialists stopped being the default choice for left voters. Some drifted into Macron’s centre. Many stopped voting. Others moved to the radical poles.

That is where Mélenchon’s movement stepped in. La France Insoumise offers what the old governing left no longer sells well: a clear story, a clear enemy, and a promise of rupture.

It speaks about protection, inequality, and elites. It builds power as an opposition force, through Parliament, media battles, and mobilisation.

But the system still forces blocs. The two-round electoral logic punishes parties that run alone.

That is why NUPES coalition in 2022 and the New Popular Front in 2024 formed so quickly. They were deals to survive the election, not ideological unions.

The result is a left without a shared centre.

It comes together mainly to block the far right, but it stays divided on strategy and, especially, on foreign policy.

In Parliament, La France Insoumise is louder and often sets the tone. The Socialists are nearly as numerous, and they often try to ancho the bloc in a more balanced posture, including on Ukraine.

Strong enough to influence policy

The French far left does not enter 2027 as a front-runner. In several IFOP scenarios published in autumn 2025, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, one of the most prominent figures in the French leftist movement, is measured at around 12–13% in the first round, far behind the leading right-wing and centrist figures.

Under the Fifth Republic constitution, foreign policy is mostly shaped by the President. But Ukraine policy is not made by the Élysée alone. It must pass through budgets, parliamentary majorities, and the political climate that determines what a government can sustain and defend to the public over time.

In March 2024, when the National Assembly voted on the France–Ukraine security agreement, the government’s party won comfortably.

But the left split, with Socialists and Greens voting in favour while La France Insoumise and the Communist-anchored group voted against.

Inside the French National assembly, La France Insoumise is the main left-radical force, with 71 MPs.

It usually operates by using opposition across Parliament, the media, and street politics. The Communist Party, while representing less than 3% at the French National Assembly, is still well-organised and institutionally rooted.

The Socialist Party is also prominent in the Assembly, even though more discreet. They hold 69 MPs, almost the same size as La France insoumise’s.

Fortunately for Ukraine, La France Insoumise and the Communists face a strong counterweight.

The Socialists and the Greens are closer to the pro-European mainstream and have generally taken a firmer line on supporting Ukraine.

Inside the National Assembly today, La France Insoumise and the Socialist group are almost the same size.

On Ukraine, where La France Insoumise talks about risks, the PS talks about deterrence. That creates a constant tug of war over the bloc’s tone and its limits.

La France Insoumise puts the emphasis on restraint. It condemns Russia’s invasion and accepts that Ukraine must be helped, including with equipment. But it repeatedly insists on parliamentary control and frames the central risk as escalation, or co belligerence.

Even when it supports helping Ukraine, it tends to frame that support through what France must avoid.

The Socialists treat the war as a European security issue. In their own statements, the party frames Russia’s war as an assault on European security and backs sustained support for Ukraine, tougher pressure on Moscow, and the use of frozen Russian assets as part of the response, alongside sanctions and long-term reconstruction.

On Ukraine, the Communists lean towards ceasefire priority and escalation warnings. When the French debate shifts to troop deployment scenarios, the Communists have publicly rejected the idea, warning against a slide into direct confrontation and arguing that any deployment would require an international mandate. They also often bring in democracy, rule of law and labour-rights criticism of Kyiv.

Who supports Ukraine and to what extent?

La France Insoumise 

Mélenchon’s party condemns Russia’s invasion and accepts that Ukraine should be supported, including with weapons.

But its priority is control and restraint. It would push for tighter parliamentary oversight of arms deliveries and keep returning to the risk of "co-belligerence" and escalation.

On sanctions, it backs pressure on Moscow in principle, yet becomes resistant when Ukraine support is presented as part of a wider NATO-centred security turn or a "rearmament" agenda. La France Insoumise supports "non-alignment",

rejects Ukraine’s NATO accession, and tends to favour negotiation,

with a clear suspicion of steps that look like informal security guarantees.

The Socialists (and allies)

The Socialist line is more direct. It frames the war as a core European security issue and treats support for Ukraine as a long-term commitment, not an exceptional crisis.

In power, The Socialist figures would be the most likely on the left to defend sustained military and financial aid, tougher pressure on Russia, and clearer backing for using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine’s recovery.

They are also generally more comfortable with France working within a NATO-compatible framework, even when they argue for stronger European autonomy.

The Greens

The Greens usually sit closer to the Socialists than to La France Insoumise on Ukraine.

They tend to argue for steady support and for keeping EU pressure on Russia credible over time. In government, they would likely back continued aid, a firm sanctions posture, and use all the EU tools that can be used.

Their limit is their political weight: they can push a coalition towards consistency, but they rarely get to set the overall tone on their own.

The Communists 

They condemn Russian aggression, but its reflex is "de-escalation first".

It is strongly opposed to troop deployment scenarios and tends to favour UN or broader international formats over anything linked to NATO logic.

On sanctions and the wider economic line, it often filters policy through social costs and bloc politics.

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If the left wins the Elysée through a coalition, Ukraine policy becomes a bargaining problem.

The social-democratic and Green wings would agree on support for Kyiv and a stronger EU security posture. But the radical pole would likely seeks to limit its political support: less NATO framing, delays, narrower definitions of "support", and constant pressure to trade Ukraine files for domestic priorities.

Fortunately for Ukraine, nothing in today’s polling suggests an easy far-left path to the Élysée.

But France is politically fragmented, and the next parliamentary majority may again depend on coalitions, that is where the far left’s leverage sits.

It may not win the presidency, but it can still shape what a future government is willing to sustain on weapons, sanctions, and the language of European security.

Charlotte Guillou-Clerc

Journalist (France)