Since Orbán has gone, Ukraine’s EU accession is entering a new phase – and a new risk

For years, the politics around Ukraine’s EU accession was dominated by a single question: could the process be blocked?

With the end of Viktor Orbán’s era, the ability of leaders like him to obstruct collective decisions has diminished. That phase now appears to be drawing to a close. Although the political approach of Bulgaria’s next government remains to be seen, it does not carry the same track record of obstruction that defined Orbán’s Hungary.

The political path towards accession is becoming clearer.

But this does not make Ukraine’s membership more secure.

It changes the nature of the challenge.

The key question is no longer whether accession can be politically endorsed in the European Union. It is whether it can be made economically and socially sustainable – both for Ukraine and for existing member states.

If it cannot, the risk is not a formal rejection of Ukraine’s membership. The more likely scenario is a gradual process of delay, fragmentation and proceduralisation – an accession path that remains open in principle but becomes increasingly difficult to complete in practice. The experience of the Western Balkans shows how such dynamics can turn enlargement into a prolonged and uncertain process, eroding credibility on both sides.

For Ukraine, this is not an abstract institutional issue. The way integration is managed will shape patterns of growth, inequality and regional development for years to come.

EU integration has always created winners and losers.

In Ukraine’s case, the scale will be larger than in previous enlargements. Integration will reshape agriculture, industrial development, energy systems and regional economies. The long-term benefits are significant. But the short-term pressures will be uneven and, in many cases, politically sensitive.

This is where the current model of enlargement is weakest.

The EU still approaches accession as a sequence: rule adoption first, political decision later, economic adjustment afterwards. That approach is no longer adequate.

The economic consequences of integration are already visible – in both Ukraine and EU member states. Farmers, industrial producers and regional actors can see where pressures will emerge. Yet there is still no coordinated framework to manage these effects early.

This creates risks on both sides.

Within the EU, governments may delay or complicate accession because they lack tools to manage domestic adjustment. The result may not be a formal rejection, but a gradual slowing down of the process.

Within Ukraine, the risks are equally serious. If integration proceeds without managing its economic consequences, it may increase regional disparities and social inequalities. Over time, this can weaken support for integration itself and create space for political actors who mobilise economic grievances.

In other words, the challenge is shifting from politics to governance.

What matters now is whether integration is structured in a way that produces broadly shared benefits.

This requires a different approach.

Instead of treating accession, reconstruction, investment and sectoral integration as separate processes, they need to be connected. This points to the need for a dedicated coordination mechanism linking EU institutions, member states and Ukrainian actors during the accession process – an idea that has begun to emerge in recent policy discussions.

Integration has to be managed before accession, not after it.

In practical terms, this means aligning regulatory reforms, investment decisions and sectoral development strategies. It also means embedding Ukraine progressively into European supply chains, infrastructure networks and energy systems during the accession process.

The goal is not to eliminate the costs of integration. That is neither possible nor desirable. The goal is to make these costs manageable and to ensure that the benefits become visible early enough to sustain support.

This is particularly important for Ukraine.

The success of integration will depend not only on meeting formal criteria, but on whether it delivers tangible improvements across regions and sectors.

If integration creates visible opportunities – in industry, infrastructure, energy and regional development – it can strengthen support for the European path. If it does not, it risks becoming a source of tension.

This is why economic coordination is not a secondary issue. It is central to the success of accession.

Ukraine’s EU membership is no longer only a question of political will. It is a question of whether the process can be governed in a way that is balanced, predictable and broadly beneficial.

The window for making that happen is now.

by Laszlo Bruszt,
CEU Democracy Institute,

for European Pravda