Silence of Podgorica: how Montenegrins fight against Ukraine with impunity

For some time now, videos and social media posts featuring men apparently from Montenegro serving in Russian military formations have been appearing in my feeds.

They wear Russian military uniforms, carry weapons, and display Serbian, Russian, and, somewhat surprisingly, Montenegrin flags on their uniforms.

In one photograph, a group of masked and armed men pose beside a sign reading "Donetsk".

Two of them have Montenegrin flags on their uniforms.

Their videos offer glimpses into everyday life. They talk about their military assignments, families, jobs, and connections to Montenegro.

Some discuss inquiries from people interested in joining the fighting. They seem remarkably open about their activities, showing their faces, weapons, and surroundings.

Their posts combined Serbian nationalist symbolism with support for Russia's war, presenting military service on Russia's side as part of a broader ideological commitment.

This was not unfamiliar rhetoric. Serbian ultranationalist movements have promoted precisely this understanding of the war for years.

Without government's response 

On 23 September, I raised the issue in my regular column for the Montenegrin news portal Cafe del Montenegro (CdM). Rather than identifying individuals, I asked whether our security institutions knew who these people were, whether they were Montenegrin citizens, and whether anyone was investigating their activities.

One of the most relevant earlier reports appeared in the Montenegrin newspaper Vijesti in July 2025. According to Montenegro's National Security Agency (ANB), five Montenegrin citizens had fought alongside pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and 2015.

One had been convicted, while the others reportedly had not returned to Montenegro. At the time of the newspaper's inquiry, ANB maintained that it had no confirmed information about Montenegrin citizens fighting in Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.

Yet the material circulating on social media raised questions about whether that assessment still reflected the situation.

My column generated little public discussion, and I saw no significant institutional reaction. Last week, I therefore decided to formally notify Montenegro's judicial and security authorities.

I collected screenshots, video recordings, links to Instagram accounts, and specific posts showing armed men serving in Russian military formations. I submitted the information to the Supreme State Prosecutor's Office, the Special State Prosecutor's Office, the Police Directorate, and the National Security Agency.

I also approached Parliament's Committee on Security and Defense, requesting that it examine the broader institutional response.

My requests were to establish the identities and citizenship of the individuals concerned, investigate their possible participation in Russian military formations, examine indications of recruitment, and preserve relevant digital evidence.

Four days after my submissions, I had received no acknowledgment of receipt, no registration number, and no indication that the information had been formally recorded.

Threats on social media

Meanwhile, the accounts I had been monitoring began deleting their posts.

The photographs and videos that had prompted my investigation disappeared from public view. I cannot establish whether this was connected to my reports or resulted from unrelated decisions by the account holders.

Fortunately, I had preserved copies.

Then something considerably more disturbing occurred.

One of the accounts published images of pro-Ukrainian billboards I had personally designed following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. Those billboards had been displayed at prominent locations across Montenegro for several months, including around Independence Day on 21 May.

The account also published what appeared to be threats against the author of the billboards, accompanied by the display of a machine gun at what appeared to be a military position.

I interpreted this as an indirect threat directed at me.

I cannot establish the author's intentions, but the timing and specific reference to my previous public activities were deeply unsettling.

The irony was difficult to miss. I had reported material suggesting possible participation in Russia's war against Ukraine.

That material subsequently disappeared, while I encountered content I perceived as intimidation. Meanwhile, the institutions I had contacted remained silent.

How mercenaries are being recruited

Montenegro has a complicated relationship with Russia. Historically close cultural and religious ties coexist with its strategic decision to join NATO in 2017, support Ukraine's territorial integrity, and align with European sanctions against Moscow.

The country's political environment nevertheless remains deeply divided over its relationship with Serbia, Russia, NATO and the European Union. Serbian nationalist political organisddations, pro-Russian media and religious and ideological networks sympathetic to Moscow continue to exercise considerable influence.

Within radical Serbian nationalist circles, Russia is portrayed not merely as a foreign ally but as the protector of Orthodox Christianity, Slavic civilisation and Serbian national interests.

Russia's war against Ukraine is frequently presented as a continuation of Serbia's historical confrontation with NATO and the West. In this narrative, fighting for Russia becomes an act of loyalty to a wider national and civilisational cause.

Serbian nationalist ideology has been used to mobilise volunteers for Russia's military campaigns since the beginning of the war in Donbas in 2014.

Appeals to Serbian-Russian brotherhood, the defense of Orthodoxy, resentment over NATO's 1999 intervention, and the unresolved Kosovo question have helped justify participation in a war taking place hundreds of kilometers from the Balkans.

The connection between Serbian nationalist ideology and recruitment is well documented. In October 2025, an investigation by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) exposed recruitment networks operating through Telegram, where experienced Serbian fighters were attracting new volunteers from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The investigation documented offers of military contracts, financial compensation, Russian citizenship and other benefits, alongside appeals to solidarity among Serbs fighting for Russia.

This combination of nationalist ideology, geopolitical resentment, religious identification, and financial incentives has created a recognizable framework for recruitment. It helps explain why people from the Western Balkans might view participation in Russia's war as something more than military employment.

Montenegro is especially exposed to this ideological influence

because Serbian nationalism operates across the border between Serbia and Montenegro through the Serbian Orthodox Church, a dominant religious organisation in the country, as well as through political movements, media and shared nationalist networks.

The accounts I documented displayed precisely this combination of Serbian nationalist identification, pro-Russian military symbolism and connections to Montenegro.

One Instagram biography contained the Russian-language descriptions "Russian Armed Forces" and "contract service," alongside the geographical reference "Budva–Donetsk". Another account published videos discussing inquiries from people interested in joining the fighting and criticising those motivated exclusively by financial compensation.

Montenegro has legislation addressing unlawful participation in foreign armed formations. Article 449b of its Criminal Code, introduced in 2015, also covers recruitment, organization, financing and related activities under the conditions established by law.

Its original adoption came during a period when public concern about foreign fighters was largely focused on Islamist radicalisation and departures to Syria and Iraq.

There is no reason why the authorities should be less attentive when the ideological motivation is Serbian ultranationalism and the destination is Russia's war in Ukraine. The law must be applied consistently, regardless of the political, ethnic or religious narratives invoked by those involved.

What makes the institutional silence particularly frustrating is

that Montenegro's security services have recently demonstrated their ability to act against Russian-linked activities.

On 9 October, Montenegrin authorities detained Mikhail Zvinchuk, a former Russian Defence Ministry press officer and founder of the influential pro-war information network Rybar, along with four other Russian nationals. The authorities subsequently ordered their expulsion on national security grounds.

I intend to continue documenting the available material and seeking answers.

I have preserved the relevant screenshots and recordings and remain prepared to provide them to competent authorities and investigative journalists.

Publications in the Expert Opinion section are not editorial articles and solely reflect the author's point of view