EU Defence commissioner on why Russia may attack NATO and Ukraine as key to Europe's security
For the first time in EU history, we have a European Defence Commissioner. The position is held by Andrius Kubilius, a Lithuanian politician and former prime minister who is a long-time friend of Ukraine.
Kubilius believes EU membership for Ukraine is a key element in building a self-sufficient European security system, whatever shape it may ultimately take. Because defence is no longer a theoretical issue. Protection against Russia has become a practical necessity: Kubilius is among those who believe a future attack on the EU by Putin is a very real threat.
European states are preparing to provide more weapons to Ukraine’s Armed Forces, strengthening both Ukraine’s defence industry and their own, and are braced for dramatic developments.
The commissioner spoke about all this in an interview with Sergiy Sydorenko, European Pravda's editor, during his visit to Kyiv: titled *EU Defense Commissioner: European Defence Commissioner: "An attack on an EU and NATO member is a very real threat."
When it comes to predictions, I pay attention to what the intelligence services say, not politicians. The intelligence services of Germany, Denmark and others are saying that Russia could be ready to attack us (or, as some call it, "to test Article 5") before 2030.
And the reason is that Russia will have the capacity to launch an attack because they have switched to a war economy and they are producing a lot, and more importantly, they won't be able to switch back.
If a peace or a ceasefire is established in Ukraine, they will continue to produce and stockpile an amount of weapons which would eventually allow them to start a new aggression.
We consider a new war a very realistic scenario.
To counter this, the EU is taking several steps:
First, the EU needs to take care of what we call hard-core defence or conventional defence: weapons, weapons systems and so on.
Second: we need to have the financial means to fund all of that. This comes with the ReArm Europe plan, which envisages an additional €800 billion to be spent on defence by EU member states.
Third: in June, we will pass some very important legislation: the Defence Simplification Omnibus. This is about removing the bureaucratic obstacles which undoubtedly exist so that defence industries are able to expand their production.
Fourth: we are also working with innovative industries on how to modernise our defence industry. We need to be ready not only for the wars of today, but also the wars of tomorrow.
Fifth, also very important: in the autumn, we are bringing out a communication on military mobility. This is about our readiness to quickly move military means in case of need.
And last but not least: we are preparing, together with the member states, a much more concrete list of flagship projects where we need to concentrate our efforts. For example, air defence systems for the whole of Europe, with a special focus on systems which are called strategic enablers, including AWACS or satellite intelligence data systems, because here we are heavily dependent on American services.
Kubilius emphasised that EU is going to decrease its dependence on the US. That is what we are planning, but not in an angry way – as part of a natural division of responsibility.
Two major processes are now unfolding: Ukraine's aspiration to join the EU and Europe’s determination to become capable of defending itself. Because we need to realise that in 10 years' time, the Americans will be forced to shift their attention to the IndoPacific.
So Ukraine is becoming part of this European security architecture, and Ukraine – with its experience, with its military force, the strongest on this European continent, with its developed defence industry – will play a crucial role within that architecture.
Kubilius added that European defence industry leaders are increasingly recognising the value of learning from Ukraine.