How migration issues became mainstream in Poland and what it means for Ukrainians

Over the past decade, Poland has transformed from a migrant-sending country into a migrant-receiving one faster than any other Western nation.

Poland holds the EU record for the percentage of migrants arriving specifically for work purposes (rather than for study or family reunification). Among Ukrainian citizens, over 85% of "pre-war" migrants and around 70% of refugees are employed.

Moreover, Ukrainians contribute more to Poland’s budget through taxes and social contributions than the total amount spent on all types of state aid for them.

Yet, this fact is no longer mentioned by presidential candidates, even within the economic logic of managing migration.

Read more about Poland’s election campaign and how candidates are exploiting the migration issue for personal gain in the column by Olena Babakova, a journalist from Warsaw: To work and pay taxes, but nothing more: what Ukrainians should expect in Poland after the election.

The columnist notes that migration restriction has become a mainstream political stance in Poland.

She recalls how even the self-declared liberal candidate from the ruling Civic Platform, Rafał Trzaskowski, stated in late January that he would demand parliament limit the "800 plus" child benefit for Ukrainian refugee women who do not work or pay taxes in Poland.

Prime Minister Donald Tusk supported his candidate and promised: if Trzaskowski is elected, parliament will pass this initiative.

Although this change would affect only a relatively small group of refugees (up to 25%), Babakova argues it would hit the most vulnerable the hardest. She also emphasises that the "800 plus" programme is not assistance for adults – it’s for children, who have no control over their parents' employment status.

The only presidential candidate who loudly opposed this idea was Sejm Speaker Szymon Hołownia. Babakova notes that his failure in the first round may serve as a warning to others. This is what happens when you go against the mainstream.

After all, a CBOS poll published in April this year showed that 69% of Poles believe immigrants overly burden the country’s welfare system. Unsurprisingly, 88% support limiting the "800 plus" benefit.

The second major fear among Poles, Babakova points out, is the rise in crime allegedly linked to the arrival of foreigners.

According to her, 66% of respondents fear this. This is the narrative that Tusk and Trzaskowski have begun to echo.

In February, they launched a public campaign, complete with video recordings and social media coverage, of the deportations of foreign nationals convicted of crimes in Poland.

Trzaskowski now promises to implement Poland’s migration policy with EU funding.

"The previous government let in hundreds of thousands of migrants and drafted a refugee strategy that was underdeveloped. Now we’re fixing it," said the candidate, who until recently had criticised pushbacks and racism.

Meanwhile, Karol Nawrocki, the candidate backed by the former ruling Law and Justice party (PiS), has adopted nearly all of the far-right rhetoric, particularly focusing on protecting Poland’s western borders, and appealing to PiS voters’ anti-German sentiments.

Mobilising the electorate around migration is not a uniquely Polish tactic in 2024. This is now common political practice in Germany, the UK and the US, where even center-left parties pledge to expel illegal migrants and tighten border controls in an attempt to win over populist voters.

Poland has done this before. PiS won the 2015 parliamentary elections largely by stoking fears over the possible relocation of Syrian refugees.

"But what sets this Polish campaign apart," writes Babakova, "is that it seems Polish politicians have definitively abandoned the idea of viewing migration through the lens of human rights."