What Ukraine must do on its path to EU to avoid war with Eastern European farmers

Farmers’ protests, blocked borders, spilled grain – these images have long been etched in the memory of both Poles and Ukrainians.

Although Warsaw has been, and remains, one of Kyiv’s main allies in the war with Russia, agriculture has become the source of the sharpest disputes.

Yet, as shown in an analytical report by the Stefan Batory Foundation Podzielone plony (Divided Harvests), Ukraine’s accession to the EU will not necessarily mean a trade war in the agricultural sector.

Read more about the differences between the agricultural sectors of Ukraine and Poland and how Ukraine’s agriculture could be adjusted for a "peaceful" European integration in the article by Sławomir Kalinowski of the Institute of Rural and Agricultural Development of the Polish Academy of Sciences: The harvest of discord: is there a compromise in the agrarian dispute between Ukraine and Poland.

Agriculture in Poland and Ukraine is much more than dry statistical data. It is part of culture, historical memory and an important element of national security. It is no surprise, then, that this sector evokes much stronger emotions than other areas of the economy.

When, in 2023, Polish farmers blocked border crossings and trucks carrying Ukrainian grain were stuck in kilometer-long queues, social media was flooded with images of spilled grain.

For Poles, this was a traditional symbol of protest. For Ukrainians, however, it was an outrage against something sacred. A society still burdened by the memory of the Holodomor cannot accept that the destruction of wheat may be used as a political tool.

But the cause of the conflict is not only the price of wheat.

At its core lies the clash of two different models of agricultural development.

The Polish model is based on small, mostly family-owned farms, reinforced by a powerful processing sector and the export of high value-added products.

Ukraine’s sector, in contrast, is concentrated in the hands of large agro-holdings, oriented toward mass production of raw materials for the global market.

In 2004, Poland, through reforms and EU accession, gained access to European funds and markets, launching a wave of investment, including in agriculture.

While Poland invested in meatpacking plants, dairies and fruit and vegetable processing facilities that supply ready-made products to foreign markets, Ukraine still largely exports grain and seeds.

It is like two branches of the same tree: one spreading wide, producing new shoots, the other stretching upward without a developed crown. Now these two models must meet on a common market.

The current asymmetry – with Ukraine selling raw materials and Poland selling finished products – benefits Warsaw. But after Ukraine joins the EU, Poles fear, it could gradually disappear, as Ukrainian companies gain access to European funds and begin investing in processing.

Yet everything will depend on who in Ukraine benefits from EU funding.

If subsidies and investments go mainly to agro-holdings, corporations will win, while millions of small farms will be left behind.

The situation could be further worsened by land market liberalisation in Ukraine, which, without transparent rules, risks concentrating ownership in the hands of oligarchs or foreign corporations. This would only deepen inequality.

Thus, Ukraine’s EU integration could lead to falling prices and hurt farmers in Poland, Romania or Lithuania. Without protective mechanisms, protests like those in 2023 may return on a much larger scale.

The authors of the Batory Foundation report emphasise: the future may follow one of four scenarios.

In the most optimistic scenario, Poland and Ukraine will find a way to complement each other, rather than compete.