Why Putin was forced to make concessions to Aliyev

The meeting between Ilham Aliyev and Vladimir Putin on 9 October in Dushanbe was far more than a protocol event. It became a headline story for major international media outlets, which saw it as Moscow’s reluctant acknowledgment of a new reality in its relations with Azerbaijan.

This dialogue, which followed a period of deep erosion in bilateral ties, revealed what could be described as Putin’s "backpedaling," a step once unimaginable and now clear evidence of Russia’s rapidly declining influence in the South Caucasus.

The crisis that led to the need for such a meeting had a specific cause – the downing of an Azerbaijani plane last year by a Russian air-defence system.

Rad more about Putin’s concessions and why the Russian ruler had to make them in the article by Serhii Danylov of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies: Putin’s apology: why Russia conceded to Azerbaijan and what consequences it will have.

The format of the meeting in Dushanbe was highly symbolic. The protocol details, to which the Azerbaijani side attaches great importance, were meticulously planned.

Unlike previous meetings, where Putin received guests at his own residence, this one took place in the presidential palace, in the same room where the Russian leader himself had been hosted the day before.

Moreover, both leaders entered the room together – a key protocol gesture signaling equality, not subordination.

At the very start of the conversation, Putin immediately addressed the plane crash, underscoring its central importance in the bilateral crisis.

Baku’s expectations were clear: admission of guilt, an apology, compensation and punishment of those responsible.

Putin admitted that the crash was caused by fragments from a Pantsir missile that detonated just ten meters away. He also announced that "everything will be done as required in such situations," and that those involved would be punished, suggesting that a decision on the matter had already been made.

Thus, Azerbaijan achieved an interim victory, securing acknowledgment of Russia’s responsibility.

Interestingly, Russian pro-war (Z) channels reacted to Putin’s statements with surprise and discontent – a fact that, according to observers, serves as the clearest proof that Baku received more than mere "symbolic" regret.

The Kremlin’s backtrack is a direct result of strategic necessity. Russia, bogged down in its increasingly costly war against Ukraine, is losing the ability to maneuver effectively.

Meanwhile, Moscow must redefine its role in a transformed South Caucasus, where new dynamics are emerging: peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, reopening of transport routes, and even the weakening, perhaps collapse, of Iran.

Russia is now compelled to rebuild its relationship with Azerbaijan on the basis of mutual respect, rather than imperial hierarchy.

However, the Kremlin’s need for a "reset" with Baku stems not only from a sense of lost regional control.

Another crucial motivation for Putin is the North-South Transport Corridor project, designed to reduce Russia’s dependence on the unstable Baltic and Black Sea routes.

Moscow urgently seeks access to Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. To achieve this, Russia must cooperate with Azerbaijan, even at the cost of abandoning its long-held imperial pretensions.

Incidentally, could the construction of railway lines along this corridor be an indicator of Russia’s military preparations in the Baltic region, much like the Nord Stream pipelines once foreshadowed the war against Ukraine?

That said, this formal "reconciliation" between Putin and Aliyev is unlikely to restore the previous level of cooperation between their countries.