How Orbán and Erdoğan used Russia's war against Ukraine to tighten their grip on power
Authoritarian regimes consolidated power by sharpening their methods of control, from electoral engineering and digital surveillance to legal and institutional manipulation.
In today’s increasingly multipolar world, the rise of regional geopolitical conflicts has been a boon for competitive authoritarian systems, which hold elections but tilt the political playing field in their favour.
A prime example is Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, which helped boost the domestic legitimacy of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the run-up to pivotal elections.
Read more in the column by Senem Aydın-Düzgit of Sabancı University (Istanbul): The best time for autocracies: how Orbán and Erdoğan benefited from the war in Ukraine.
The author recalls that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine came just over a month before Hungary’s parliamentary election on 3 April 2022. Orbán hammered home the message that only he could keep Hungary safe.
"Bombarded by pro-government media, many Hungarians came to see Orbán as the guarantor of peace – even opposition supporters feared that a change of government might drag Hungary into the conflict," Aydın-Düzgit writes.
Orbán also leveraged the war in Brussels, threatening to block European Union efforts to help Ukraine unless the European Commission released frozen funds for Hungary. At home, he framed this as a triumph over European elites eager to spend "Hungarian money on Ukrainians."
Pro-government media echoed the Kremlin narrative, blaming EU sanctions – not Russia’s invasion – for Hungary’s economic troubles, and framed Orbán’s long-standing ties with Putin as proof of his ability to secure cheap energy, whereas electing the opposition could mean shortages. Orbán’s Fidesz-led coalition won two-thirds of the seats, retaining its parliamentary supermajority and consolidating his grip on power.
Similar dynamics played out in Türkiye.
In the run-up to the presidential election in May 2023, Erdoğan emphasised his personal diplomacy in the Ukraine war, highlighting the Black Sea grain deal.
Economically, Erdoğan exploited Türkiye’s refusal to adopt Western sanctions: trade with Russia surged; Russian tourists and firms arrived in the country with cash to spend; and the Kremlin allowed Türkiye to defer millions of dollars in gas payments.
"All this helped ease the economic pressures stemming from Erdoğan’s unorthodox policies and enabled him to portray himself as indispensable to Türkiye’s prosperity," Aydın-Düzgit notes.
She concludes that political developments in Hungary and Türkiye in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine hold three lessons.
First, international crises do not necessarily expose an authoritarian regime’s vulnerabilities.
Second, public attitudes are important: The absence of strong anti-Russian sentiment in both Hungary and Türkiye allowed Orbán and Erdoğan, respectively, to frame cooperation with the Kremlin as pragmatic rather than traitorous.
Lastly, the actors involved in regional geopolitical conflicts matter. Putin’s willingness to provide economic concessions, financial transfers and propaganda support helped Orbán and Erdoğan weather domestic challenges.
As the world shifts toward multipolarity, and middle powers gain greater influence, regional conflicts will probably multiply. If the shockwaves from the Ukraine war are any indicator, these crises are more likely to strengthen autocrats than to weaken them.
This article originally appeared on Project Syndicate and is republished with permission from the copyright holder.