Former NATO Secretary General on Europe’s "space gap" in defence

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine showed Europeans that they cannot take their security for granted or rely on others for critical functions.

Yet the European Union is doing exactly that by allowing itself to fall behind in the new space race.

Yet for too long, European ambitions in space have fallen short of what our security demands.

Read more the column by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former NATO Secretary General (2009–2014): A dangerous dependence on the US: how the EU's lag in the space race threatens its security.

Rasmussen emphasises that the first step is to break the taboo on defence investment in space.

The European Commission’s inclusion of a Space Shield in its EuropeanDefence – Readiness 2030 plan is a step in the right direction, but we must go further.

To that end, we need a European-level policy to drive growth in our space industry.

"What we do have, however, are promising space startups that need new funding and the right policy environment to encourage growth in the sector," Rasmussen notes.

The second priority is to ensure that we can act independently in space, just as we must on land, in the air and at sea.

The former NATO chief warns that Europe must secure these capabilities for itself, either through European companies or those willing to invest in Europe’s value chains. Failure to do so would be a profound mistake.

He proposes creating a joint Nordic satellite constellation for surveillance and secure communications.

"By pooling defence investment and private-sector expertise across the Nordic countries, we could spread costs, strengthen our collective defence and boost our space industries," Rasmussen explains.

The third priority is to defend our markets and lead the way on protecting low Earth orbit and the sovereignty it provides.

According to Rasmussen, such rapid overcrowding – driven primarily by mega constellations of satellites from a handful of US companies – is an overlooked threat to national security, sovereignty, and our ability to secure safe access to space.

"When these low-orbit satellites break apart, their debris circulates at speeds eight times faster than a bullet, increasing the risks of Kessler Syndrome: spiraling debris-creating collisions that eventually render low Earth orbit inaccessible," he warns.

Equally concerning is the growing number of satellites laying claim to finite radio spectrum, the invisible signal highway connecting satellites to Earth. If left unaddressed, the shortage of spectrum and the signal interference from mega constellations will threaten Europe’s ability to maintain the critical security, observation, and communications services that space access enables.

Rasmussen argues that the EU must protect our markets from those who use space irresponsibly, and – building on the EU Space Act – we must work with like-minded countries to champion new national rules that will ensure space remains accessible to future generations.

John F. Kennedy once said of America’s moonshot that we do these things "not because they are easy, but because they are hard." Europe must now do them because they are urgent and necessary.