How Brussels can overcome the abuse of the veto right in admitting new EU members

The EU’s current enlargement policy is increasingly balancing between legal formalities and political blackmail. If the European Union wants to maintain its appeal and geopolitical influence, it must rethink the role of unanimity and introduce effective mechanisms that would prevent its abuse in future rounds of enlargement.

Read more in the article by Liubov Akulenko and Mariia Holubytska of the Ukrainian Centre for European Policy: Enlargement without the veto right: how the EU can regulate the accession of new members.

The authors draw attention to one proposal by analysts Steven Blockmans and Butrint Berisha, who suggest creating a Dispute Resolution Mechanism in the Enlargement Process (EDRM).

This mechanism would direct disputes between EU member states and candidate countries into an arbitration framework with clearly defined timelines.

"Issues falling within the scope of the acquis would be handled by the European Commission as part of the negotiation process, while foreign policy or identity-related disputes would be referred to independent arbitration or mediation bodies – such as the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Council of Europe (through the Venice Commission), or the OSCE (through the High Commissioner on National Minorities)," explain Akulenko and Holubytska.

Ideally, they note, this mechanism should be formally approved by the EU Council. However, if that proves politically impossible, it could be adopted as an internal document endorsed by a majority of member states.

Such an arrangement would raise the political cost for any actor deviating from the new rules of good neighbourly conduct.

While the idea of establishing this mechanism is timely and important, the Ukrainian Centre for European Policy warns that it is not without challenges.

Without a clear institutional framework and guarantees of impartiality, the EDRM could risk becoming not a de-escalation tool, but another arena for political competition.

"Therefore, the key task is not merely to create the mechanism itself, but to ensure its institutional autonomy, procedural transparency and accountability to EU political bodies strictly within their mandates. Only under these conditions can the EDRM become an effective and legitimate instrument within the EU enlargement policy," the experts emphasise.

To further limit the practice of member states abusing their veto power to advance national political or historical demands, Blockmans and Berisha propose reforming the EU Council’s decision-making procedures, specifically, by gradually shifting toward an enhanced qualified majority voting model.

Under this system, instead of the standard threshold for qualified majority voting (15 member states representing around two-thirds of the EU population), the new approach would require the support of 20 member states representing at least 72% of the EU population.

This higher threshold would create an additional safeguard against narrow political majorities pushing through sensitive decisions without genuine consensus, while still maintaining flexibility and predictability in the enlargement process.

Both approaches are complementary in their shared goal: to depoliticise bilateral disputes and enhance the predictability of the EU enlargement process.

At the same time, the EU should strengthen its preventive diplomacy, using early warning tools and structured dialogue to identify latent conflicts before they escalate into political blockages.