Why Russia still cooperates with Europeans in the nuclear sector and how it can be stopped
Russia remains a full participant in sensitive scientific and technological projects – as though this involvement were detached from the war, sanctions and security risks it creates. The Russian state-owned corporation Rosatom continues to participate in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) programmes, including Infrastructure Review (INIR) missions.
Formally, it acts as an independent expert; in practice, it operates as a company promoting its own technologies, standards and financial models. This approach creates an obvious conflict of interest that European institutions prefer not to acknowledge.
Read more about how Russia continues to cooperate with Europeans in the nuclear sector and how this can be countered in the article by Olena Lapenko of DiXi Group: The unpeaceful atom: why Europe still plays by Russia's rules in nuclear sector.
Even more alarming is the situation surrounding ITER, a flagship international initiative funded by Euratom that envisages the construction of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor in France.
Despite Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, russia has not only retained its status as a full participant in the project but has also strengthened its role in supplying critical components, including elements of superconducting magnet systems, parts of the vacuum vessel and certain diagnostic and engineering systems of the reactor.
As a result, ITER has effectively become a sanctions exception that operates in the interests of the aggressor state.
The core problem lies in Russia’s access to advanced technologies, materials and scientific developments, some of which have dual-use potential.
This access is enabled by the full participation of Russian scientific and industrial institutions in the development of critical reactor components, as well as by the privileges and immunities regime of the international organisation, which de facto reduces the effectiveness of sanctions oversight.
Such institutional integration calls into question the peaceful nature of this cooperation – especially as russia continues nuclear blackmail, shells Ukrainian nuclear power plants, and openly disregards international law.
Arguments about the "impossibility" of restricting cooperation with Russia are unconvincing when assessed in the context of war, sanctions and security risks.
The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) is not a legal analogue of ITER – these projects differ in contractual frameworks, governance models and decision-making mechanisms.
However, the CERN example is important for another reason: it demonstrates that a political decision to terminate cooperation with an aggressor state can be made even in the field of large-scale international science.
This precedent shows that the primary constraint is not legal architecture but the willingness of institutions to assume political responsibility.
The European Union’s sanctions policy in the nuclear sector can hardly be described as consistent. While declaring restrictions on russia’s access to critical technologies, the EU simultaneously maintains sanctions exemptions for certain international research projects in the field of peaceful nuclear energy. In practice, this allows deep technological interaction to continue.
International scientific cooperation is possible only if fundamental principles of international law, security and ethics are respected. When a state systematically violates these principles, its participation in projects such as ITER should at the very least be the subject of open political debate, rather than remaining unquestioned.
The issue of Russia’s participation in international nuclear projects is a test of the consistency of European policy. It requires not simple answers but open political discussion that takes into account security risks, sanctions commitments and the long-term consequences for international science itself.