Why France is increasing its nuclear arsenal and how it could replace US as Europe's security guarantor

The system of nuclear deterrence in Europe could undergo fundamental changes in the coming years.

Europeans' declining trust in US security guarantees is pushing them to look for alternative ways to ensure nuclear deterrence.

Above all, it is about the French "nuclear umbrella".

Several European countries have expressed readiness to join the French project, while some are even discussing the possibility of launching their own nuclear programmes.

Read more in the article by Mariana Budjeryn of Harvard University, who explained to European Pravda whether new nuclear-armed states could emerge in Europe and what consequences this might have: Europe’s new nuclear shield: how EU is seeking a replacement for the US 'umbrella'". 

France’s updated nuclear strategy could allow the deployment of French nuclear weapons on the territory of several European countries. French President Emmanuel Macron has specifically mentioned the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece and Germany.

A similar precedent already exists in Europe: US nuclear weapons are stationed in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Türkiye.

We heard a joint statement from Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz saying that the new French nuclear strategy does not replace US extended deterrence but complements and strengthens it.

However, it is clear that this is happening because European countries no longer feel confident that American deterrence will remain in place.

Accordingly, Europe is returning to the idea of strategic autonomy.

Although France’s nuclear deterrent is numerically smaller than that of the United States, and therefore cannot fully replace the American approach to deterrence in Europe, it could still prove quite effective.

France could create its own European deterrence system that would not replicate the American one but would be built on somewhat different principles.

First and foremost, it would rely on the adversary’s understanding that French nuclear forces can always guarantee a "second strike" - a retaliatory nuclear attack.

Even in the event of a Russian nuclear strike, France would still retain certain nuclear forces, particularly those on submarines, that would likely survive a first strike and then retaliate.

At the same time, there is a risk that Macron’s plans will remain only plans if the next French presidential election is won, for example, by National Front leader Marine Le Pen.

A situation in which US security guarantees appear unreliable while the cost of a nuclear program is not excessively high could lead to the complete collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation system.

At present, it is very difficult to predict whether, if Ukraine moves toward EU membership, French nuclear deterrence would extend to the country. However, even the presence of French and British military contingents in Ukraine would serve as an additional deterrent factor.

Meanwhile, the key problem with the United Kingdom’s nuclear potential is that the British nuclear programme and deterrence capability are closely tied to the United States.

In Germany, the question of acquiring its own nuclear weapons is raised only at a marginal level, although the country could theoretically implement its own nuclear programme independently. A similar situation exists in Sweden.

In Poland, by contrast, the topic of possessing its own nuclear weapons has begun to be discussed at a high political level. However, Poland’s nuclear industry is underdeveloped. It does not even have its own nuclear power plants.

For now, what we see in Poland are intentions to join the extended nuclear mission of the United States or France to become a host country for their deterrent forces.

A scenario in which the European Union develops its own nuclear weapons programme appears unlikely, at least in the short to medium term.