How Orbán built a propaganda empire in Hungary and why it may not save him

There is now a distinct possibility that Hungary’s main opposition party, Tisza, will defeat Viktor Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party in the country’s parliamentary elections on April 12.

This has prompted Tisza’s leader, Péter Magyar, to promise that if his party wins, one of its first acts in government will be to suspend the license of the Media Services and Support Trust Fund (MTVA), the state body that finances and oversees public-media assets. Pulling the plug on the pro-Orbán MTVA is long overdue.

Read more about Orbán’s propaganda shield in Hungary and who might break through it in the column by Hungarian journalist Ákos Tóth: Bad news for Orbán: how several media outlets could determine the outcome of elections in Hungary.

For more than 15 years, Orbán’s government has steadily erected barriers to objective reporting and tightened its grip on the media ecosystem. 

"Through a combination of hostile takeovers, pressure campaigns, and interference with regulators like the National Media and Infocommunications Authority, it has fundamentally altered public discourse," Ákos Tóth writes.

As a result, the Hungarian journalist adds, 80% of the country’s news outlets have become pro-government mouthpieces, including formerly independent publications such as Origo and Index.

"During this campaign, character assassination and geopolitical fearmongering have featured prominently. In a desperate bid to shore up support for Orbán, Hungarian public media are currently portraying him as the sole guarantor of peace in "times of war," the author notes.

Another of the state’s main narratives is that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has supposedly hatched a "master plan" with the European Commission to "dethrone" Orbán and install Magyar as a puppet.

Moreover, domestic "scandals" are manufactured to support the regime’s central claim: that the opposition is out of touch with Hungarians and funded by foreign interests.

Last August, Index published a document that it claimed was a Tisza plan proposing a 33% tax rate. Even though Tisza promptly denied the veracity of the report, the story dominated the political agenda for months. 

These domestic smears are intended to sow doubt among the electorate and are subsequently linked to broader geopolitical grievances.

For example, the regime recently stopped two cash-in-transit vehicles during a routine transfer from Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank to the State Savings Bank of Ukraine.

Within minutes, pro-government outlets framed the incident as evidence of "dirty money" flowing through the country to support a foreign-controlled political opposition. 

By invoking national security in its partisan propaganda, the government reinforces the idea that dissent is synonymous with treason.

"There are, however, signs that the regime’s information monopoly is beginning to fracture. A small number of independent newsrooms have managed to pierce the government’s propaganda shield, despite being under constant political pressure and largely starved of advertising revenue," Tóth notes.

Investigative outlets like Direkt36, Telex, and 444.hu, which have survived for years on the doggedness of their staff and the support of their readers, have chipped away at the wall of misinformation with their persistent reporting on corruption and the regime’s ties to the Kremlin.

"This spells trouble for Orbán in April’s elections. Ultimately, the independent journalism that Orbán has sought to tame – but never fully muzzled – could be his government’s undoing," the Hungarian journalist concludes.