Why Gazprom lost competition to EU companies and it's not only about politics
In March, as the Polish energy major’s market capitalization surpassed that of Russia’s leading state-owned energy giant for the first time.
It is no longer just a refinery with gas stations, but an integrated conglomerate controlling everything from upstream operations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf to refineries, power generation, and hydrogen projects.
Read more to understand why the Polish giant is showing remarkable growth compared to Russia’s Gazprom and Hungary’s MOL in the article by Project Syndicate contributor Sławomir Sierakowski’s article: Gazprom srinks to the level of a retail chain. How conflict with the EU undermined the Russian business giant.
The Gazprom-MOL-Orlen triptych reveals three different political-economic models.
Gazprom represents imperialist populism. It sold gas like a drug dealer, and the market valued it as a state within a state, which worked in its favor until it didn’t.
Its diminished market value has nothing to do with the size of its reserves, but with the Russian state’s utter lack of credibility as a supplier.
Gazprom is a textbook case of geopolitics sinking a company that once seemed indestructible.
Gazprom’s market capitalization has fallen to just $38.8 billion, roughly on par with an average European supermarket chain.
MOL represents transactional populism.
Rather than building an empire, it lives shrewdly off political hooliganism: exploiting loopholes in sanctions, balancing between Europe and Russia, and circumventing rules and regulations.
Much like the Hungarian government under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, MOL has been "hitchhiking" between East and West for years. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it took advantage of the situation by purchasing cheaper Russian oil via the Druzhba pipeline, which it processed in its own refineries and then sold as "Hungarian" fuel on the European market.
Formally, this was permissible because the EU had granted exemptions to several landlocked countries, including Hungary. But politically, MOL was operating in a gray zone.
Considered in isolation, this bet may have paid off in the short term, given that the company’s market capitalization has roughly doubled since 2021. But when compared to Orlen’s fivefold growth, MOL’s valuation is far from impressive, nor does it speak well for the Hungarian "in the EU, but against the EU" development model.
Finally, Orlen represents European-style market liberalism. It is state-owned and thus exposed to potential politicization (as happened under PiS), but it respects the EU legal order and the supervision of EU institutions.
Notably, the market has rewarded Orlen not for its imperial ambitions but for its diversification and demonstrated ability to operate within European rules. Its LNG contracts with the US and Qatar, access to Norwegian deposits, and gas interconnections with Lithuania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic have transformed Poland from a Gazprom customer into a regional energy-security hub.
With yet another war-driven energy shock emanating from the Middle East, the company’s outlook has continued to improve.
The differences are visible not only in the companies’ respective valuations but also in their home countries’ economic trajectories.
In 2025, Poland recorded economic growth of over 3%, alongside relatively stable investment levels and a gradual decline in inflation. Meanwhile, Hungary flirted with recession, and Russia has suffered from years of high inflation, a sharp decline in investment, and an outflow of human capital.
Under Putin, Russians have no choice about their future. But Hungarians do.
Like Polish voters three years ago, they will soon decide whether what they have is what they want.