What risks does the political crisis in Romania pose for Ukraine?

On 6 May, consultations on forming a new governing coalition began in Bucharest.

The political crisis there is in full swing. The day before, parliament dismissed the pro-European and Ukraine-friendly government of Ilie Bolojan. Notably, the no-confidence initiative was launched by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) – a member of the ruling coalition and currently the largest force in the Romanian parliament.

Its key ally became the anti-Western and Eurosceptic Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). It is currently Romania’s most popular party, supported by 34% of voters.

Speaking to European Pravda, Romanian politics expert Serhii Herasymchuk explained how Romania’s political crisis could develop further and how dangerous it may become for relations between Ukraine and Romania. Read more in the article: Support for Ukraine or a "new Orbán": what Ukraine should expect from Romania's government change.

The most critical scenario for Ukraine would be early parliamentary elections in Romania because AUR would be highly likely to win them.

Lawmakers have two attempts and two months to form a coalition and agree on a new prime minister.

If AUR becomes the largest faction in parliament, its political pull will increase significantly. In that case, one of the other parties might decide to ignore its own taboo against cooperating with the far-right.

In other words, it could join AUR in a coalition.

If, however, parliament manages to form any majority without AUR and the current parliament survives, the situation would be less critical.

In that case, the level of danger would be more "yellow" than "red", meaning moderate risk. It would likely be a situational alliance, implying constant bargaining and political trade-offs.

But support for Ukraine could also become part of those negotiations.

In any case, there will be no ideal outcome for Ukraine.

The main threat for Ukraine is a scenario in which AUR comes to power – whether through coalition deals within the current parliament or through snap elections.

That would mean the end of Romania’s support for Ukraine. AUR representatives have repeatedly promised exactly that.

It would also mean constant bargaining at the EU level whenever sanctions against Russia are discussed.

Romania could also begin exploiting the issue of national minorities again – something previous governments had largely refrained from doing for years.

Problems would emerge for regional cooperation as well, particularly for the trilateral Ukraine-Romania-Moldova format known as the "Odesa Triangle" – a highly practical and useful framework in areas such as energy and infrastructure. For AUR, Ukraine is considered unfriendly, while Moldova is not even seen as a truly independent state.

In essence, Romania could take the place that Viktor Orbán occupied until recently.

Romania’s president has said he will not allow the formation of an anti-European coalition, arguing that the country’s pro-Western course is enshrined in the constitution and that he is its guarantor.

Such statements from Nicușor Dan are understandable: he came to office on a wave of pro-European sentiment and is interested in forming a coalition government without AUR.

Therefore, Dan will pressure all members of the collapsed coalition to rebuild it.

But there is no guarantee he will succeed.

One possible scenario is a minority government, in which the Social Democrats leave the coalition but continue supporting some legislation. At the same time, on sensitive issues, such as cuts to social benefits or pensions or raising VAT, they would refuse to participate, allowing them to preserve their image in the eyes of their voters.