Why Ukraine's EU accession talks could stall and how to prevent it

, 11 June 2026, 14:00 - Anton Filippov

Ukraine's EU accession negotiations are gradually shifting from major political decisions to less visible but far more complex technical work: fulfilling the commitments undertaken as part of the negotiation process. 

One of the most significant milestones at this stage of the accession process is meeting the interim benchmarks.

This entails carrying out a series of reforms in key areas of the rule of law, justice, and public order. These benchmarks were established by the European Union under Chapters 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) of the Fundamentals Cluster.

Read more about what needs to be done, what could obstruct the reforms and who can help implement them in the article by Viktoriia Melnyk and Liubov Akulenko: Outpacing Albania. How Ukraine should meet most critical benchmarks in EU accession negotiations.

The benchmarks carry particular importance. The provisional closure of any other negotiating chapter is contingent upon Ukraine fulfilling the interim benchmarks in Chapters 23 and 24. 

For many EU member states, even those strongly supportive of Ukraine, progress in the rule of law remains a non-negotiable condition.

This reflects both the experience of previous enlargement rounds, when some new EU members were still unable to fully complete rule-of-law reforms years after accession, and the need for Ukraine to convincingly demonstrate real change in the areas of law and justice.

After Montenegro received interim benchmarks from the EU in 2013, it took more than ten years, until June 2024, for the country to receive a positive assessment from the European Commission on the IBAR. 

A range of factors contributed to this: limited political will, frequent changes in governments and negotiating teams, weak institutions, and the broadly and imprecisely formulated nature of the EU-defined benchmarks themselves.

This reflects both the experience of previous enlargement rounds, when some new EU members were still unable to fully complete rule-of-law reforms years after accession, and the need for Ukraine to convincingly demonstrate real change in the areas of law and justice.

European politicians need persuasive arguments for their voters and colleagues.

Albania has shown a different trajectory.

The Fundamentals Cluster was opened in October 2024, and in May 2026 the EU Council confirmed that Albania had generally fulfilled the interim benchmarks under this cluster. The country completed this stage in less than two years.

That is why the Ukrainian Centre for European Policy, together with its partners, has prepared a study on how Ukraine should meet the interim benchmarks under Chapters 23 and 24. Its aim is to convert the benchmarks set by the European Commission into a detailed and practical implementation plan.

The implementation of the interim benchmarks must be confirmed in a separate European Commission report – the Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR). Based on this assessment, the EU Member States will make a key political decision regarding the country's further advancement in the accession negotiations.

The candidate country must not only align its legislation with EU law, but also apply these norms within existing public institutions, or even establish new ones.

The aim of such reforms is to demonstrate that progress in the fields of the rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights, security, and border management goes beyond legislative changes and results in tangible, lasting improvements to the functioning of the state.

Ukraine must implement measures in several major areas: judicial reform; anti-corruption policy, protection of fundamental human rights, migration policy, reform of law enforcement institutions.

If the governing structures of these bodies are not formed in a timely manner, this may halt nearly all personnel processes in the judicial system, including judicial selection, qualification assessments, disciplinary procedures, and dismissals, thereby effectively blocking the implementation of the relevant benchmarks.

The task of the non-governmental sector is to work in a structured way with both government and society to prevent these risks from slowing down reforms and the negotiation process.

A distinct role in the implementation of the interim benchmarks falls to the Verkhovna Rada. All areas will require considerable legislative effort, with parliamentary involvement needed, depending on the sector, for between 25% and 70% of measures.