How EU responded to Serbia's judicial reform rollback and why it is a lesson for Ukraine

Last year, the Serbian authorities reversed reforms in several sectors, including the independence of the judiciary. After financial assistance was frozen, Belgrade took several steps back: it repealed controversial provisions affecting the judicial system, agreed to certain, though imperfect, electoral reforms, appointed members of the independent media regulator and began aligning more frequently with the EU’s common foreign policy decisions.

The European Commission praised Belgrade for returning to the path of reform and recommended that EU member states encourage Serbia by opening the third negotiation cluster. However, several capitals responded with a clear "no".

The reform rollback damaged trust in Serbia so severely that simply repealing anti-European laws is no longer enough. Increasingly, other demands are also being voiced.

Read more about Serbia’s experience, which should serve as a lesson for Kyiv, in the article by Sergiy Sydorenko, European Pravda editor: Serbia’s Mindich: What is blocking the road to the EU: How reform rollbacks halted the opening of new clusters.

Serbia was granted EU candidate status in 2012 and opened accession negotiations in 2014. It signed its Association Agreement with the EU only in 2013 after applying for membership.

The accession process was structured differently back then than it is today.

For example, the term "cluster", familiar to Ukrainians, did not yet exist. Negotiations with Serbia were conducted across 34 chapters, which could be opened in any order. So far, Serbia and the EU have opened 22 chapters. Negotiations on two of them have been completed, meaning Serbia has fulfilled all EU accession requirements in those areas.

However, closing additional chapters is now impossible because the accession methodology has changed.

No chapter can be closed until there is a positive assessment of the fundamental chapters (through the report known as the IBAR – a term Ukraine is also likely to hear frequently in the future). Serbia is still far from obtaining a positive IBAR assessment.

Likewise, no new chapter can be opened if reforms are being rolled back.

The current Serbian government faced serious domestic political challenges after the 2024 tragedy in Novi Sad, where the collapse of a newly constructed railway station canopy killed 14 people. Many Serbians believe corruption in the construction process was the root cause of the disaster.

Mass student protests followed, fueled by the fact that Novi Sad has a large student population.

The government's response was an attempt to tighten control. In January 2026, Serbia’s National Assembly passed, and the president quickly signed, a package of legislation that became known as the "Mrdić laws", named after their formal sponsor, Uglješa Mrdić, a lawmaker from the ruling party.

For the EU, the Mrdić Laws were not merely the last straw – they were the final barrel.

The EU warned Belgrade that it risked losing €1.5 billion in funding. Sweden officially warned that it would suspend part of its bilateral assistance. There were undoubtedly less public signals as well.

As soon as Belgrade decided to amend the Mrdić Laws, Brussels proposed giving Serbia a renewed push on its path towards EU membership.

The European Commission concluded that the time had come to open the third negotiation cluster.

However, while the Commission was prepared to overlook Belgrade’s reluctant reversal of its attack on judicial independence, many EU capitals were not. During informal discussions on Serbia’s case, eight member states firmly opposed opening the cluster: Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić argues that the real issue is sanctions against Russia. The sanctions issue falls under the sixth negotiation cluster. Imposing sanctions on Russia remains a red line for Vučić, and he repeatedly emphasises this.

In reality, the root of Serbia’s problems lies in its anti-reform policies and attacks on democracy. However, the sanctions issue has become a convenient pretext and justification for the failure of Serbia’s EU accession negotiations. Vučić has already begun telling the Serbian public that the country should instead look to other international partners.