Why Zelenskyy went to Russia-friendly Serbia and what Ukraine and Serbia got out of it

, 10 August 2026, 14:00 - Anton Filippov

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Serbia last week.

The course of the visit showed that it was important to both leaders.

And there are good reasons to believe that both sides achieved what they had set out to accomplish.

Read more about what the visit meant for Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the article by European Pravda co-founder Yurii Panchenko: Shells for EU: Why Zelenskyy went to Serbia and what both sides got out of it.

Despite Serbia’s unprecedentedly close ties with Russia, President Aleksandar Vučić has maintained close contacts and cooperation with Kyiv.

More recently, these contacts have become increasingly public. Last year, Vučić traveled to Odesa for the Ukraine-Southeast Europe summit. In July this year, he visited Kyiv to attend a similar event.

And although Serbia declined to sign the declarations issued at both summits, which condemned Russian aggression and called for the full and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops and military equipment from all Ukrainian territory, the increasingly close contacts between the Serbian authorities and Kyiv are clearly irritating the Kremlin.

There have also been a number of other publicly reported visits. Ukrainian parliament speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk traveled to Belgrade, followed by then-Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Taras Kachka. Against this backdrop, Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Serbia was a logical continuation of the effort to bring the two countries closer together.

The question still remains: why did Volodymyr Zelenskyy need this visit?

The official agenda included mutual support for EU membership, Serbia’s participation in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction and economic cooperation.

Ukraine and Serbia have also resumed negotiations on a free-trade agreement and plan to conclude them by the beginning of next year. But this is hardly an issue that required discussion at the highest political level.

For Kyiv, the visit was important for at least two reasons.

First and foremost, it was a psychological blow to Russia.

Also, Zelenskyy’s visit to Armenia in June – a country that until recently was one of Russia’s most loyal allies – was seen in Moscow as a demonstration of Russia’s sharply declining influence in the South Caucasus.

Likewise, the current visit to Belgrade demonstrates the erosion of Russian influence in the Western Balkans.

But another reason is more important: weapons talks.

Serbia produces ammunition for Soviet-caliber weapons, which is in very short supply in Europe. Such ammunition was particularly important to Kyiv during the first years of the war.

Now, however, demand for it has risen again following the new Bulgarian government’s announcement that it would suspend military aid to Ukraine.

One of the key objectives of the visit, therefore, was to secure guarantees from the Serbian authorities that the current arrangement for selling ammunition would remain in place and, if necessary, that supplies could be increased.

On issues related to the status of Kosovo, Vučić did not receive anything new. Zelenskyy essentially reiterated Ukraine’s long-standing position recognising Serbia’s territorial integrity.

Belgrade, meanwhile, hopes that Zelenskyy’s visit will help improve its relations with the EU, which are critically important to Vučić.

For years, Serbian authorities were shielded from harsh EU criticism and financial sanctions by President Vučić’s close friend, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. But following the change of government in Hungary, Serbia has faced a tougher stance from Brussels. This has resulted in the freezing of financial assistance.

That is why the Serbian authorities are now seeking to improve relations with the EU. Zelenskyy’s visit gives them an argument that, despite refusing to impose sanctions on Russia, Serbia is still acting within the broader European policy of supporting Ukraine.