How Poland's foreign minister threatens Russia and what lies behind it

The prevailing view in Poland’s political mainstream is that Russia poses a long-term threat and that Poland must be prepared to defend itself in real terms.

Most Polish politicians explain why Russia should be feared.

One figure stands out in this mainstream: Poland’s foreign minister, who openly voices views that have already taken shape in Poland’s public and political debate. He also speaks more explicitly about issues that Europe has generally preferred to address with caution.

Read more about the distinctive features of Radosław Sikorski’s rhetoric towards Russia and why he has chosen this approach in the article by Taras Myshlyaiev of the NGO International Diplomatic Alliance: A signal to Moscow: what lies behind Sikorski’s tough rhetoric and what Poland wants from its allies.

On 23 September, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski addressed Russian representatives at a meeting of the UN Security Council: "You can kill a lot of people but you cannot win." 

According to Sikorski, Poland’s economy is now only about half the size of Russia’s, the European economy is ten times larger, and the combined economies of NATO member states are approximately 25 times larger than Russia’s.

Particularly telling was Sikorski’s clarification that this advantage would remain enormous even without the United States.

He emphasises that Russia must consider not only the cost of a potential failure on the battlefield, but also the consequences it would itself face in retaliation.

The Polish minister acknowledges that Russia is dangerous, but argues that it should not interpret the West’s fear of escalation as proof that the West will retreat under any circumstances.

There are, however, genuine reasons for doubt.

For example, in early September, former Polish Defence Minister Mariusz Błaszczak was asked whether Polish soldiers should assist Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia in the event of Russian aggression. He replied that Polish soldiers should defend Poland.

Yet, in a September poll conducted by IBRiS, 77.8% of Poles said that Poland should help Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the event of Russian aggression.

Article 5 of the NATO treaty is indeed not an automatic order for all NATO armies to enter a war simultaneously and in the same way. It obliges each ally to assist an attacked member state, but individual countries determine the specific form that assistance will take. This could include participation in combat operations, but the requirements of the North Atlantic Treaty are not limited to that.

When Sikorski says "we", he does not mean Poland acting alone and going to war with Russia. He means NATO, or, more precisely, the European component of the Alliance.

Warsaw appears to operate on the assumption that a joint response to major Russian aggression is a given, and publicly reinforces this interpretation of allied commitments. In doing so, it makes any future retreat from this approach politically more difficult for its allies. Sikorski is not simply describing NATO as it exists today; he is presenting the version of the Alliance that Poland needs.

Moscow itself has long employed the language of threats.

Previously, Vladimir Putin’s aide Nikolai Patrushev threatened that, in the event of a direct military conflict, Polish statehood could cease to exist within a matter of days. The purpose of this statement was less to describe a specific military scenario than to convince Poles that even contemplating resistance could come at a catastrophic cost.

Sikorski is effectively turning this logic around. If Russia seeks to deter Poland by instilling fear of the consequences of retaliation, Warsaw is increasingly reminding Moscow openly that escalation would carry a price for Russia as well.

Warsaw is demonstrating its political willingness to act, while some other allies leave more room for strategic ambiguity.

And Russia is increasingly being viewed as a threat that cannot be neutralised through caution alone.