How PiS and Nawrocki are courting the far-right and what threats this could pose

This could even undermine the broad national consensus on the need to counter the Russian threat.

Read more about the tectonic shifts on Poland’s political right amid the ongoing power struggle, and the potential consequences of these changes in the article by Taras Myshlyaiev of the NGO International Diplomatic Alliance: Friends of the Kremlin at the doorstep: how the power struggle in Poland is undermining unity in countering Russia.

The leader of Poland’s largest opposition party, Law and Justice (PiS), Jarosław Kaczyński, attempted to use the Independence March to demonstrate political unity on the right and reaffirm his own leadership.

However, the march revealed just how limited his ability to set the agenda for the entire right-wing camp has become.

Supporters of various right-wing movements gathered in Warsaw, but their leaders marched separately.

Meanwhile, Polish President Karol Nawrocki walked near the front of the procession. One of the event’s key political figures remained Krzysztof Bosak, Deputy Marshal of the Sejm and leader of the National Movement – a political movement that has co-organised the Independence March for many years and was one of the founding forces behind the Confederation.

Kaczyński’s own reaction was particularly telling.

Rather than dictating the terms of cooperation as he once did, he called for efforts to persuade the "three Confederations" (Kaczyński considers Bosak’s and Mentzen’s Confederations to be two separate political forces, while the third is Grzegorz Braun’s Confederation of the Polish Crown) to form a joint electoral list not only for the Senate but also for the Sejm.

In doing so, he effectively acknowledged that PiS’s return to power would depend on reaching agreements with political rivals who no longer regard him as the undisputed leader.

President Nawrocki, who was originally nominated as a presidential candidate by Kaczyński’s party, is meanwhile gradually building an alternative mechanism for consolidating the right.

His political advantage lies in his ability to maintain relationships with several competing right-wing groups without demanding that they submit to PiS.

And this is about more than symbolic leadership. According to Onet, a proposed presidential Senate pact would allocate just 17 electoral districts to PiS, even though the party currently holds 31 Senate seats. Another dozen or so districts could go to candidates backed by Nawrocki. This would represent a redistribution of political influence in favour of the president’s own political camp.

Opinion polls confirm that structural changes are underway.

Thus, although Kaczyński still leads the largest right-wing party, he is increasingly losing control over the right as a broader political force. Nawrocki could emerge as its coordinator, while the Confederations are gaining the ability to set the terms of cooperation independently.

As recently as early 2026, Jarosław Kaczyński flatly ruled out an alliance with Grzegorz Braun. In June, he said he would rather remain out of power than form a coalition with him. He described Braun as dangerous to Poland, particularly because of the Russian connections of those around him.

Yet just a few months later, the very party Kaczyński had wanted to leave on the political sidelines began to be considered a potential participant in a future right-wing governing majority.

Kaczyński’s weakening leadership and the potential benefits of an alliance with Braun are already forcing Poland’s right-wing camp to reconsider its previous red lines.

The next challenge, therefore, concerns not merely party alliances but the state’s ability to maintain a consistent security policy, regardless of who controls its institutions.

Which political principles are politicians prepared to abandon in pursuit of power, and will national security remain the one red line they dare not cross?