Will Russia lose influence over Moldova's most "obedient" region, and what signals its failure?

, 19 November 2026, 08:30 - Anton Filippov
Last weekend, an event that might seem relatively minor took place in Moldova: the Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit held elections for its leadership. The elections are still ongoing, with a second round yet to come to decide the region’s leader and most of the seats in its local assembly.

Paradoxically, however, this regional event also has geopolitical significance.

The reason is that Gagauzia is a stronghold of Russian influence in Moldova. Support for the Kremlin here is even significantly higher than in Transnistria.

Yet the first round of voting showed that Moscow’s traditional tools for influencing elections in Moldova have stopped working – even in the region most loyal to the Kremlin. The Kremlin-backed candidate came second, securing just 24.2% of the vote (compared with 38.4% for the frontrunner).

Read more in the article by Sergiy Sydorenko, European Pravda's editor: A slap in the face from Moldova: how the Gagauzia elections exposed the failure of the Kremlin’s old tactics.

Gagauz Yeri is a small autonomous region within the unitary state of Moldova. This is something of a paradox in itself, but it is how things developed in the early 1990s, under pressure from Russia and forces loyal to it. One could also recall the unitary state of Ukraine, which likewise ended up with the Autonomous Republic of Crimea within its borders.

The first round of elections exposed the failure of Kremlin political strategists, who had chosen an extremely poor candidate: Fedor Gagauz.

There is little doubt that the Russians selected Gagauz purely because of his surname. He simply has no other notable advantages.

His failure in the first round demonstrated that the network used to buy votes in elections is losing its effectiveness. Several key candidates backed by Ilan Șor also performed poorly in the elections to the local parliament. Some of them did not even make it into the second round.

Ilan Șor is a fugitive Moldovan oligarch who lives in Moscow and serves as a Russian influence agent in Moldovan politics.

Nevertheless, Gagauzia has not ceased to be pro-Russian, and Fedor Gagauz still has a chance of winning the second round.

There is an interesting coincidence: both candidates who made it into the second round of the election for Gagauzia’s Bashkan (governor) have backgrounds in law enforcement.

Before entering politics, Fedor Gagauz served as the region’s interior minister in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, Alexandru Stoianoglo was the region’s prosecutor. He continued working in the prosecution service afterwards and even served as Moldova’s Prosecutor General for a period.

The first-round frontrunner, Stoianoglo, received 14 percentage points more than Gagauz, winning 38.4% of the vote.

For many people in the region, Stoianoglo is considered "too pro-Western".

The authorities in Chisinau are now pinning considerable hopes on Stoianoglo winning.

First, this would help resolve the prolonged crisis in relations between Gagauzia and Moldova’s central government.

Second, the definitive defeat of the Russian-backed candidate would demonstrate that Russia’s influence – and its money – can no longer determine the outcome of elections in Moldova.