"Plan B" for Ukraine's EU accession: how Brussels is preparing to overcome Hungary's veto

Hungary's pro-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has long been a source of problems for Ukraine. Now the situation is critical. In less than a year, elections are set to be held in Hungary. The ruling Fidesz party has launched its campaign, built around Ukraine. Hungarian state propaganda is promoting the narrative that Ukraine’s accession to the EU will destroy the Hungarian state. So Orbán, who is blocking Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU, is the only one who can "save" Hungary.

Any EU enlargement decisions, even technical ones, require consensus. Hungary's veto has derailed the planned start of accession talks, and Orbán can block Ukraine for as long as he wants.

To counter this, Brussels is discussing a "Plan B" that bypasses Hungary.

The first legal steps within this plan were already taken by Ukraine and the EU last week, although both sides prefer not to speak about them publicly.

However, the main part of "Plan B," which Brussels refers to as "parallel negotiations," still lies ahead. It will likely begin only in August or September, once all efforts to persuade Orbán are exhausted.

This plan is far from perfect, and some European Pravda sources even call it dangerous. For instance, there is no certainty that after isolating Hungary, the remaining 26 EU countries will stay on Ukraine’s side. There is also the risk that Hungary could mount a legal challenge to the process in court. And most importantly, "parallel negotiations" would not have the same legal implications as a standard accession process. Therefore, many diplomats, both in Ukraine and the EU, are currently sceptical about the idea.

However, if Hungary maintains its veto, this "Plan B" might become the necessary fallback solution.

European Pravda spoke with more than ten officials from the EU, member states and Ukraine and reveals the details, challenges and advantages of this "Plan B" on the road to the EU.

Is the key in Hungary’s hands?

On 9 May, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas visited the Ukrainian city of Lviv. Responding to a question from European Pravda, she acknowledged that the EU is preparing for a continued Hungarian veto and is working on a plan to bypass it. "The EU is working on plan B in case plan A fails, but I will not disclose it. The process is still underway", she stated.

This contradicts the official position of Brussels and several European capitals, where the line is: EU enlargement follows the principle of unanimity, and there is no room for compromise. "There's no Plan B for unanimity", a diplomat from one of the EU’s key member states told EP firmly. "Under EU treaties, negotiations for accession to the European Union require clear and unequivocal support from all 27 EU member states for every key step in the process."

"Some technical processes or discussions may take place," added a representative from another European country, "but from a legal standpoint, they mean nothing.

In Brussels, it is clearly understood that the final decision will be made in Budapest and nowhere else."

Still, both Kallas and her opponents could both be right at the same time.

The European Commission sees a way to bypass Hungary but believes it can be done without undermining the authority of the member states.

According to two European Pravda sources, the idea of "Plan B" originated in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations. Initially, Ukraine rejected the idea because it had serious flaws. Later, on the initiative of one of the EU member states, the proposal was revised. It is now under discussion, though not yet approved.

A rescue plan for Ukraine's European integration

"Plan B" can only be activated once it becomes clear to everyone that Orbán will not back down and will continue to block Ukraine’s path to the EU at least until the Hungarian elections in April 2026. If this continues, the EU is leaning toward breaking the Ukraine–Moldova "package" and starting accession negotiations with Moldova only.

The reason is Moldova’s parliamentary elections in September. If Moldova remains blocked, it would guarantee a defeat for the ruling PAS party, which has built its campaign around the promise of rapid EU accession. EU countries are keen to help Moldova retain its pro-European government.

However, this scenario would be catastrophic for Ukraine.

Moldova’s swift move toward EU accession while Ukraine remains blocked would not only frustrate Ukrainians. It would send a message that "Brussels has decided to leave Ukraine behind." This narrative would be amplified by sceptics and Russian propagandists. It would further stall reforms in Ukraine and could even reverse some of them, ultimately setting the country back even more in its accession process.

The circle would become vicious.

Brussels understands that to prevent such consequences, it needs to offer Ukraine compensation.

This is how "Plan B" has emerged.

The idea is to use the flexibility within EU law to approve all possible technical and legal steps without Hungary’s consent. And in areas where unanimity is required, the 26 EU member states would conduct "parallel negotiations" with Ukraine, ideally synchronised with Moldova’s negotiations, in order to maintain the appearance that the countries are still progressing as a package.

Without Hungary, formal accession talks with Ukraine cannot be opened. However, it is possible to issue an official statement signed by the 26 EU states declaring that Ukraine has completed its preparatory work and that the entire EU, except Hungary, is ready to conduct negotiations with Kyiv on the respective chapters.

Similar statements could be made at other stages of the negotiation process.

The EU even has the authority to convene Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGCs) with Ukraine. These are working bodies whose decisions are pivotal in the enlargement process. The negotiation framework approved by the EU does not grant Hungary veto power over convening IGCs.

However, in Ukraine’s case, these conferences would not be able to make legally binding decisions, only political ones.

Why would Ukraine agree to this if it has no legal consequences?

The idea is that, eventually (when Hungary's leadership comes to its senses, or the Orbán regime is removed) Ukraine would be able to quickly catch up.

After all, the core of EU integration is reforms.

Holding "parallel negotiations" would allow Ukraine to have an EU-endorsed plan of priority reforms, even if Hungary is not involved, and to push these reforms through parliament.

It would also help counter the arguments of Eurosceptics.

First steps under "Plan B"

It is important to stress: this plan has serious flaws. Therefore, it can only be implemented if Orbán's veto remains in place and leads to the separation of Ukraine and Moldova on the negotiation track.

However, preparatory steps for this plan have begun.

On 14 May, the Ukrainian government approved three "roadmaps", covering the rule of law, public administration reform and the functioning of democratic institutions. The following day, these documents were sent to Brussels and Warsaw (as Poland currently holds the EU Presidency). Moldova took the exact same steps.

This move contradicts EU enlargement procedures. Before taking this step, Kyiv should have received a written invitation from the EU Council outlining the established criteria (this has been the procedure for all other candidates – Serbia, for example).

Hungary has been blocking this invitation for several months.

So Kyiv agreed with Brussels: since we cannot overcome the Hungarian veto, we will pretend it doesn't exist.

To reinforce Ukraine’s position, the Polish Presidency confirmed it does not object to such a procedural deviation. On 14 May, Poland’s Minister for EU Affairs, Adam Szłapka, arrived in Kyiv and publicly confirmed that "Ukraine is technically ready to open the first cluster", and that Hungary’s veto is the only remaining obstacle.

There are still several more stages that can proceed while ignoring Orbán’s position. For example, the European Commission plans to prepare an Opening Benchmark Assessment Report. But all of this remains technical and preparatory.

No legal decisions will be made. "Plan B" has its limits.

Hidden dangers of "Plan B"

Although the idea of "parallel negotiations" came from the European Commission, it is now met with scepticism by many in Brussels who view the idea of negotiating without Hungary as too revolutionary.

Moreover, the EU is still trying to persuade Orbán to put aside his objections at the upcoming EU summit on 26–27 June. This means there is still hope for "Plan A." Kyiv also holds onto this hope.

"The possibility of continuing negotiations with Ukraine with the approval of 26 rather than 27 member states seems unconvincing", explained an EU diplomat from one of the key member states. "Such a scheme lacks practical meaning. Unanimous support is needed."

However, European Pravda’s assessment differs. In our article on political processes in Hungary, we argued that Viktor Orbán is unlikely to lift his veto before the Hungarian elections.

If the Hungarian blockade persists, the EU will most likely have to return to "Plan B". There are simply no alternatives. Doing nothing and leaving Ukraine’s negotiation process frozen is certainly not the best option.

But it's necessary to be aware of this scenario’s flaws.

One significant problem is that it’s not guaranteed that "Plan B" will isolate Hungary and that the remaining 26 states will uniformly back Kyiv.

The Ukraine–Hungary dispute is not unique in Europe. North Macedonia, another candidate country, remains blocked due to a conflict with Bulgaria. Would Bulgaria be willing to create a precedent and undermine its own veto? Will similar concerns arise among other EU members? Would Austria agree to a special procedure for Ukraine, but not for Macedonia, which it traditionally supports?

Overcoming this will require delicate diplomacy, not only from Ukraine but also from Ursula von der Leyen.

The second, lesser danger is that Hungary will almost certainly challenge the "parallel negotiations" in court. However, the EU Court works slowly, and a decision issued in a few years may be too late, even if the court finds a violation.

The third danger: "Plan B" assumes that Orbán’s regime will eventually lose power in Hungary. But what if it doesn’t?

It’s entirely possible that Orbán wins the 2026 Hungarian elections and continues blocking Ukraine. "Plan B" does not offer a solution in this scenario.

And finally, the fourth issue – not a problem, but a challenge Ukraine must recognise – is that even if a democratic government wins in Hungary, the dispute over ethnic Hungarian minorities in western Ukraine will not disappear. Hungarian society, and therefore any future Hungarian government, will continue to demand its resolution.

This is a reality Ukraine must accept: the road to EU membership lies in compromise on this issue.

There is no "Plan B" here.

The key is having a government in Budapest that is interested in dialogue. Not one that blocks Ukraine’s path to the EU to serve the political ambitions of the Hungarian prime minister and satisfy his Russian partner. Sadly, that is the current reality.

Sergiy Sydorenko, Tetiana Vysotska (from Brussels)

European Pravda