The unpeaceful atom: why Europe still plays by Russia's rules in nuclear sector

Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has definitively shattered the notion that business, particularly in the energy and financial sectors, can exist "outside politics." Yet in the realm of large-scale international science, this illusion remains surprisingly resilient.

Ukraine’s Western partners frequently speak about strategic autonomy and energy security, and they have indeed broken – or are still in the process of breaking – their dependence on Russian gas and oil. At the same time, in the nuclear sphere, the aggressor state remains a full participant in sensitive scientific and technological projects – as though this involvement were detached from the war, sanctions and security risks it creates.

The Russian state-owned corporation Rosatom continues to participate in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) programmes,

including Infrastructure Review (INIR) missions. Formally, it acts as an independent expert; in practice, it operates as a company promoting its own technologies, standards and financial models. This approach creates an obvious conflict of interest that European institutions prefer not to acknowledge.

The consequences of this practice are entirely predictable. Countries that host INIR missions involving russian experts often later become Rosatom customers.

The cases of Egypt, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan illustrate how expert presence transforms into a mechanism of geopolitical expansion. Alongside reactor construction, these states become locked into long-term dependence on Russian fuel supplies, servicing and maintenance, and credit financing.

Sanctions exception for Rosatom

Even more alarming is the situation surrounding ITER, a flagship international initiative funded by Euratom that envisages the construction of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor in France.

Despite Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, russia has not only retained its status as a full participant in the project but has also strengthened its role in supplying critical components, including elements of superconducting magnet systems, parts of the vacuum vessel and certain diagnostic and engineering systems of the reactor.

As a result, ITER has effectively become a sanctions exception that operates in the interests of the aggressor state.

The core problem lies in Russia’s access to advanced technologies, materials and scientific developments, some of which have dual-use potential.

This access is enabled by the full participation of Russian scientific and industrial institutions in the development of critical reactor components, as well as by the privileges and immunities regime of the international organisation, which de facto reduces the effectiveness of sanctions oversight.

Ultimately, this creates a scientific and technological foundation that the Russian federation is already using to advance its own nuclear programmes. This includes developments in superconducting materials, magnetic and cryogenic systems, technologies for controlling complex physical processes and engineering solutions for operation under extreme temperatures and radiation loads.

A significant share of this work is carried out with the involvement of russian state research centers and institutes within the Rosatom system, including institutions affiliated with the Kurchatov Institute. These entities simultaneously perform tasks in the interests of Russia’s defence and strategic security sectors, demonstrating their integration into the defence industry.

Such institutional integration calls into question the peaceful nature of this cooperation – especially as russia continues nuclear blackmail, shells Ukrainian nuclear power plants, and openly disregards international law.

A case where sanctions are effective

Arguments about the "impossibility" of restricting cooperation with Russia are unconvincing when assessed in the context of war, sanctions and security risks.

The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) is not a legal analogue of ITER – these projects differ in contractual frameworks, governance models and decision-making mechanisms.

However, the CERN example is important for another reason: it demonstrates that a political decision to terminate cooperation with an aggressor state can be made even in the field of large-scale international science.

This has been reflected in concrete decisions – from freezing cooperation with russian state institutions to terminating the participation of researchers affiliated with them in key organisational projects. This precedent shows that

the primary constraint is not legal architecture but the willingness of institutions to assume political responsibility.

It is essential to clearly distinguish international scientific cooperation as a mechanism for advancing knowledge from appeals to "scientific neutrality." When a state systematically violates international law, references to neutrality cease to be a sign of prudence and instead amount to ignoring security risks.

The European Union’s sanctions policy in the nuclear sector can hardly be described as consistent. While declaring restrictions on russia’s access to critical technologies, the EU simultaneously maintains sanctions exemptions for certain international research projects in the field of peaceful nuclear energy. In practice, this allows deep technological interaction to continue.

Nuclear energy cannot be viewed outside the political context. It is a domain where trust and security are decisive. It is impossible to speak about defending the international order while allowing a state that is waging a war of aggression – and has turned Europe’s largest nuclear power plant into a military base – to remain a co-architect of global nuclear rules.

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International scientific cooperation is possible only if fundamental principles of international law, security and ethics are respected. When a state systematically violates these principles, its participation in projects such as ITER should at the very least be the subject of open political debate, rather than remaining unquestioned.

The issue of Russia’s participation in international nuclear projects is a test of the consistency of European policy. It requires not simple answers but open political discussion that takes into account security risks, sanctions commitments and the long-term consequences for international science itself.

Europe has demonstrated its ability to make difficult decisions in the case of CERN. Whether it is ready to ask similar questions in the field of nuclear energy remains an open issue.

The answer will determine not only the effectiveness of sanctions but also the level of trust in the idea of responsible international scientific cooperation.

Olena Lapenko,

DiXi Group General Manager for Security and Resilience