Full EU benchmarks for Ukraine: what Kyiv must do to join
Preparations for Ukraine’s future accession to the European Union are ongoing on multiple tracks simultaneously. Although Viktor Orbán has made opposition to Ukraine one of his key campaign trump cards, over the past six months, Ukraine has moved markedly closer to possible accession, not due to progress in meeting membership criteria, but as a result of political dynamics.
The idea that Ukraine will inevitably join the EU has long been dominant in Europe, and now there is growing recognition that the accession process must be faster than usual.
In December 2025, Ukraine and the EU launched substantive accession negotiations, bypassing Orbán, currently covering three of the six negotiation clusters – Fundamentals, Internal Market and External Relations.
Technical work on these clusters is already underway. Ukraine has received critically important documents from the EU. They describe in detail the list of requirements that Ukraine must fulfil to be ready for accession. The EU will use these documents to verify whether Kyiv has met the accession requirements.
European Pravda publishes the list of these criteria.
These documents are not public, but we are convinced that society should know the main tasks Ukraine faces on the path to membership.
This also allows society to demand and monitor the implementation of the plan, as well as draw conclusions about who is blocking Ukraine's progress towards membership, which parties are not providing votes for laws that are conditions for Ukraine’s EU accession and so on.
Even if the EU changes the rules and makes a political decision regarding Ukraine’s membership, these criteria will remain relevant. Some of them, like Fundamentals, will have to be fulfilled before accession, even under the fastest scenario.
"Lviv" criteria for Ukraine
Back in Lviv, the Danish EU Presidency handed the Ukrainian government a list of criteria, agreed with other EU countries, that Ukraine must fulfil to meet accession requirements. However, the exact content of the document has not yet been made public.
In Lviv, the European Union made a revolutionary decision for itself: realising that before the elections in Hungary Viktor Orbán would under no circumstances lift his veto on decisions regarding Ukraine’s accession negotiations, the other 26 EU member states, together with the European Commission and under the leadership of Denmark, which at the time held the EU Council Presidency, initiated substantive negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova without waiting for Hungarian approval.
This decision is sometimes called the "Lviv format," and in Brussels jargon it has been referred to as Frontloading. It means that Ukraine receives all the data that candidate countries would normally get during accession negotiations and then moves on to consultations with the European Commission, which effectively mirror the official negotiation process.
The most valuable document the EU handed to Ukraine is the Benchmarks.
Most people have probably heard that under the EU’s traditional accession process, a candidate country must implement all EU law in its national legislation and that is indeed true (and represents an enormous amount of work). But in practice, it’s a bit simpler. The EU will check whether this work has been done based on a limited set of criteria.
These are called closing benchmarks.
For areas of critical importance to the EU, such as the rule of law, anti-corruption and human rights, interim benchmarks are applied. This allows the EU to retain the flexibility to define additional final requirements if needed. For example, if developments in the justice system require further changes that cannot be anticipated at the moment.
The document handed to Ukraine in Lviv contains both interim and final criteria.
The EU was still cautious about such "revolutionary" actions for itself back then, so the list was handed to Ukraine in a clever way. It was read aloud at an offsite EU Council meeting in Lviv by the Danish Minister for European Affairs, Marie Bjerre (i.e., the representative of the presiding country). The day before, the document had been handed to Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Taras Kachka in the form of "speech notes."
In terms of boldness, the approach was modest, but in essence, Ukraine received everything it wanted.
Afterwards, the European Union gained more courage and went further.
The EU listed criteria across three clusters (numbers 1, 2 and 6). Criteria for the other three clusters (No. 3 on competition, No. 4 on transport, energy and environment, No. 5 on agriculture) are currently being defined by the European Commission together with member states.
The process is underway, and details are emerging
Of course, the start of accession negotiations was needed not just as a symbol but to move along the negotiation track and advance towards membership.
This process is now happening. EU Council bodies are working with the criteria and with Ukraine’s enlargement portfolio, European Pravda sources in Ukrainian and European institutions confirm. The European Commission is also conducting "explanatory briefings" for Ukraine on behalf of the member states, discussing exactly what the EU expects from Ukraine for each criterion.
Within this process, Ukraine has received a new document in 202 – or, more precisely, a series of documents for each negotiation chapter. The European Commission and the EU Council have "unpacked" and detailed the list of criteria and established their classification.
Each criterion has been assigned a number, which Brussels will now use for official assessment – first internally, then publicly. For example, criterion IBM 23.3.3 (negotiation chapter 23, Interim Benchmark 3, measure 3) declares that Ukraine’s success on the "quality of the judiciary system" criterion (23.3) will be assessed, in particular, on whether Ukraine implements the "Bar Reform". Criterion CB 5.3 (chapter 5, Closing Benchmark 3) requires that Ukraine have a reliable record of transparent public procurement (and here Ukraine can already boast some achievements).
A positive EU assessment must be obtained for all indicators.
Assigning numbers to all criteria may seem like a bureaucratic detail, but in reality, this is a very important stage. It shows that evaluating Ukraine’s progress (what is called the accession negotiations) has reached the level of the European "deep state" and has become a working process.
You’ve probably heard that the EU is now talking about the possibility of rapid accession for Ukraine.
This deserves special attention.
A potential swift EU accession of Ukraine, possibly as early as 2027 and intended as part of a "peace process", does not remove the need to fulfil the criteria. The EU may postpone them or turn "preconditions" into "postconditions," but Ukraine cannot avoid meeting them.
In addition, a number of requirements in the first cluster, Fundamentals, covering areas such as the rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights and so on, will have to be fulfilled before accession even under the fastest scenario, according to European Pravda sources involved in negotiations on a new scheme for Ukraine.
Therefore, we are publishing a detailed EU breakdown of these issues, which form the list of the most critical reforms on the path to membership – those without which even a "political accession" (allowing Ukraine to relatively quickly complete the political steps towards membership) will not be possible.
For your reference, here is the list of criteria for Chapter 23 – Judiciary and Fundamental Rights.
Also included are the criteria for Chapter 24 – Justice, Freedom and Security.
What’s next?
Implementing these reforms is, without exaggeration, an existential necessity for Ukraine.
It is no doubt that there is no "third way" for Ukraine. The option of integration towards the East has long been clearly unacceptable both for politicians and for citizens. What has now become clear is that EU accession is not only about the economy, it is also an essential security guarantee for Ukraine.
The EU is taking unprecedented steps to open a fast track for Ukraine, but it must be a path for both sides. It is up to Ukraine to determine when it completes its part of the work and whether it can meet these criteria as quickly as possible.
Now that the EU has established a clear set of criteria and begun monitoring them, there is no excuse to claim ignorance about what needs to be done. This applies to all branches of government, especially to parliament, which has become the weakest link in implementing reforms.
The list of criteria implies the need to adopt several laws. And most importantly: these laws must receive EU approval. Therefore, if Ukraine wants the process to be truly fast and effective, these issues must be addressed already at the drafting stage – a responsibility that lies primarily with the government.
Reforms are required across the board – from overhauling the judiciary and strengthening anti-corruption efforts to safeguarding human rights. Once martial law ends, Ukraine must fully restore the functioning of its democratic institutions. The requirements are realistic and acknowledge that wartime conditions may necessitate certain restrictions. But war cannot serve as a blanket excuse. On this point, the EU’s criteria leave no room for ambiguity.
Sergiy Sydorenko,
Editor, European Pravda
DOCUMENT LINKS:
List of criteria for clusters 1, 2, 6.
Detailed criteria for Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights)
Detailed criteria for Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security)