International criminal justice under pressure: why Ukraine cannot afford to stand aside

International criminal justice is often perceived as an established part of the global order: international courts exist, prosecutors investigate crimes, judges issue arrest warrants, and states are expected to cooperate in enforcing their decisions.

Yet this system did not emerge on its own and has never been guaranteed.

Justice has never been, and still is not, flawless.

International criminal justice is even less so.

The International Criminal Court has been criticised for its slow pace, selectivity, uneven attention to different conflicts, dependence on state cooperation, and inability to enforce its own decisions independently.

Some of these criticisms are entirely justified. The Court needs to become more efficient, transparent, and consistent.

It must better explain its decisions, respond more quickly to the needs of victims, and demonstrate that it is capable of delivering not only symbolic but also tangible results.

Today, however, the problem runs much deeper.

Increasingly, the issue under dispute is no longer the quality of the work of a particular institution, but the very right of an independent international court to investigate the gravest international crimes.

Political pressure exerted by individual states on an independent international court creates a dangerous precedent.

If one state can punish judges for decisions that do not align with its political interests, why should another state not do the same tomorrow?

If international jurisdiction is recognised only so long as it is directed against one's adversaries, then this is no longer justice but a system of selective approval.

An institution's true strength is revealed in times of crisis

International criminal justice emerged precisely because national justice systems were unable to respond to crimes whose scale extended beyond the borders of a single state.

From the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals to the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the international community repeatedly created new mechanisms in the aftermath of tragedies that required an international response.

The International Criminal Court became the first permanent institution established to ensure that accountability for the gravest international crimes would no longer depend on the need to create a new tribunal each time.

At the heart of the Rome Statute lies a simple yet profoundly important principle: individuals must be held accountable for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.

High office, military rank, or a state's nuclear status should not automatically guarantee impunity.

At the same time, the ICC was never intended to replace national institutions or assume their functions.

The primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting international crimes rests with states themselves.

The International Criminal Court intervenes only where a state is unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out an investigation or prosecution.

This is why the ICC is not an alternative to national justice but rather its complement and a safeguard that the gravest international crimes will not go unpunished even when a national system proves incapable of fulfilling its responsibilities.

These principles are now facing one of their greatest tests.

At the same time, external political pressure is not the only challenge the Court has faced in recent times.

An equally serious challenge has been the internal crisis involving the now former Prosecutor Karim Khan. Recently, the Assembly of States Parties decided to terminate his mandate on the grounds of serious misconduct.

Undoubtedly, this episode will be used by those who have long sought to discredit the Court. It will be presented as evidence of the institution's moral crisis and its inability to judge the conduct of others.

Yet this situation also demonstrates something else.

The strength of institutions is not reflected in the absence of crises. No system can guarantee that all of its representatives will always act impeccably.

The real test begins when wrongdoing involves a person vested with authority, influence, and a high international office.

The situation was not covered up. It was examined and concluded with a decision. This is not an argument for dismantling the ICC.

On the contrary, it demonstrates that the system is capable of applying the principle of accountability to its own officials.

Supporting international criminal justice does not mean defending a particular official under all circumstances. A court established to hold others accountable cannot expect public trust if it is incapable of ensuring accountability within its own system.

At the same time, an individual's misconduct should not become a verdict on the very idea of international justice. Institutional shortcomings are grounds for improvement, not for destruction.

How Ukraine should respond

Ukraine is now one of the states whose experience will largely shape the future development of international criminal justice. Our voice in the discussion on the future of the ICC carries particular weight. And it must be heard loudly.

For Ukraine, protecting the ICC and international criminal justice is not merely a matter of principle but also one of practical importance. After all, it is Ukrainian victims who will be the first to feel the consequences of their weakening.

Following the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, Ukraine twice made use of the mechanism provided under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, recognising the Court's jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory.

As a result, the investigation of international crimes began long before the full-scale invasion and became the product of many years of work by Ukrainian law enforcement authorities, human rights organisations, journalists, victims, and international partners.

With the Rome Statute entering into force for Ukraine on 1 January 2025, our country became a full State Party to the ICC system.

This means not only greater opportunities but also greater responsibility. Ukraine can no longer support international criminal justice only when it concerns Russian officials. It must consistently defend the very principle of the independence of international courts.

We have every right to criticise ICC decisions, disagree with their legal reasoning, the pace of investigations, procedural approaches, or the Prosecutor's priorities.

But such criticism must remain constructive. It is impossible to defend the authority of the Court in some cases while undermining it in others.

From our own experience, we know that the greatest challenge facing the ICC lies not only in the quality of its decisions but also in its ability to ensure their enforcement.

Enforcement remains the weakest point of international criminal justice. The Court has no police force of its own. It cannot independently arrest suspects or bring them to The Hague. It depends on the cooperation of states.

The arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin was an important decision by the Court.

However, subsequent developments demonstrated the gap between the legal force of that decision and the political willingness of certain states to enforce it. Putin's visit to Mongolia in September 2024, followed by his visit to Tajikistan in October 2025, showed just how vulnerable the system remains when states refuse to comply with their international obligations.

An arrest warrant that can be ignored without immediate practical consequences gradually loses its deterrent effect. Even more dangerous is the message this sends to future suspects: that political influence, a system of alliances, or military power may prove to be more reliable protection than international law.

For this reason, it is not enough for Ukraine merely to call on the Court to issue new arrest warrants.

It is equally important to raise the issue of the consequences of non-compliance with those warrants, the role of the Assembly of States Parties, and mechanisms for the collective support of the Court. Without this, international criminal justice risks becoming a system of decisions with only limited practical effect.

We can no longer remain a state that turns to international justice solely for protection. As a full State Party to the Rome Statute, we must be among those who shape the future of this system, defend its independence, and insist on the implementation of its decisions.

The alternative to international justice is impunity. By defending the independence of international criminal justice, Ukraine is defending its own right to justice, the right of victims to be heard, and the right to call a crime a crime, regardless of who committed it.

In essence, Ukraine has become the state through which the viability of the entire system is being tested. If it proves incapable of ensuring an independent investigation into the gravest international crimes committed in the largest armed conflict in Europe since the Second World War, this will inevitably cast doubt on its ability to fulfil that mission in the future as well.

This is precisely why safeguarding the independence of international criminal justice is a matter of preserving the international legal order built on the principle of accountability.

If that principle is undermined today, it will be far more difficult to restore tomorrow. That is why the Ukrainian voice in the discussion on the future of the ICC matters far beyond the borders of Ukraine.

Publications in the Expert Opinion section are not editorial articles and solely reflect the author's point of view