Ukrainian ambassador: "Germany understands we need our people back to rebuild the country"

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Germany has consistently been Ukraine’s second biggest supporter, behind only the United States. This year, with shifting priorities in the White House, Berlin is likely to become the number one donor.

Moreover, it's not just the amount of German support that is growing every year: the quality is changing too. Ambassador Oleksii Makeiev highlights the stages Germany has gone through in realising how best to support Ukraine’s armed forces, reminding us that just three and a half years ago, the German government famously offered Ukraine 5,000 helmets. In light of that, the changes that have since taken place resemble something of a quantum leap. Ukraine is hopeful that under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Germany will once again pleasantly surprise us.

We caught up with Ambassador Makeiev in Kyiv during the annual meeting of Ukrainian ambassadors on Friday to discuss Ukraine’s expectations and demands, new air defence systems, including Patriots, and even a "competition" between German drones and iPhones.

This interview also touches on Germany’s evolving NATO policy, whether Merz really doesn't expect Ukraine to join the EU before 2034, and the new rules for Ukrainian citizens currently living in Germany.

"They can be called true supporters of Ukraine"

We’re approaching the 100-day mark of Chancellor Merz’s term. What has changed for Ukraine since the new German government took office?

The atmosphere and the vocabulary used have changed dramatically.

By the atmosphere I mean the government, partners, your contacts, the chancellor, ministers – they now treat you with openness. There’s a word in German, "aufgeschlossen", which means being open to everything, receptive to information, and willing to build closer relationships with partners.

That word "aufgeschlossen" really describes the current dynamic between the president and the chancellor, between ministers, and in my own contacts.

So even those who remained in their positions have become more open? For example, the defence minister didn’t change with the new government.

Boris Pistorius, a great friend of Ukraine, has been aufgeschlossen ever since he took office. So the shift in the Ministry of Defence actually started two years ago.

How has the vocabulary changed? Has it become more direct or freer?

I’ve sometimes played around with the concept of Germany’s "word of the year".

Each year, their main dictionary, Duden, selects a "word of the year" and an "anti-word". In 2022, for instance, the word was Zeitenwende [a term used by Scholz to describe a turning point, the fundamental shift in Germany’s worldview and policy toward Ukraine, Russia and arms supplies since the full-scale invasion – European Pravda].

I told the Germans: in 2022, your word was Zeitenwende; in 2023 it was Krisenmodus ("crisis mode"); and in 2024 it was Ampel-Aus ("traffic light off", referring to the end of the social democrat/liberal/green "traffic light coalition" in the German government from 2021 to 2024).

But why, I asked, have you Germans never focused on your leadership?

Why has that never featured in your top words of the year?

It wasn’t until the end of last year, during the campaign for this year’s elections, that we started to hear the word Führungsrolle ("leadership role") from Friedrich Merz, then still just a candidate for chancellor.

When I talk about a shift in vocabulary, I mean that we are finally hearing the German leadership talk about Germany’s role as a leader – in Europe, in the world, and regarding Ukraine.

Frankly, many in Ukraine expected a lot more from Merz. So far, there is little sign of German leadership when it comes to pushing for reform in Ukraine or bold decisions within the EU. Do you actually feel that leadership you were hoping for in Berlin?

That’s a question for the German side, whether they see themselves as leaders. But I understand that Ukraine’s critical tone likely stems from disappointment over the Taurus missiles. Indeed, when Merz was opposition leader, he promised immediate delivery; once he became chancellor, things didn’t pan out.

That said, I don’t believe there is any other area, beyond that issue, where we could accuse Germany of being inflexible when change from the previous government was needed.

Let’s look at the progress made since then.

For example, there has been a shift in Germany’s position on Ukraine and NATO. Previously, only Annalena Baerbock said membership for Ukraine was a possibility – now it’s the official position of the entire coalition. For the first time we’ve seen a statement about Ukraine’s NATO membership come from the Germans during a NATO-Ukraine Council meeting. Their statements are already going slightly further than NATO’s own wording.

Or take this: I’m currently discussing with colleagues in the Defence Ministry and the German defence industry how they can incorporate the tactical and strategic lessons learned by the Ukrainian Armed Forces into planning for the Bundeswehr and NATO. Our goal here is even deeper integration with them.

And there is already an atmosphere that allows us to speak about much deeper processes than before.

Is Merz personally in favour of Ukraine joining NATO?

There is no reason to doubt that.

Yes, there are different opinions within the coalition parties. But the Chancellor himself, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul (both from the Christian Democrats) and two key figures from the Social Democrats, Finance Minister and Vice Chancellor Lars Klingbeil and Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, are all staunch supporters, partners and friends of Ukraine. I consider them my personal friends.

… and supporters of NATO membership for Ukraine?

I have not heard Lars explicitly say so in public.

But when it comes to being supporters of Ukraine, they all undoubtedly are.

Can we expect that when the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership returns to practical discussion, we won’t see a repeat of 2023 when Germany (along with the US) slowed down the process? Is Germany now ready to stop being a brake on Ukraine’s path to NATO?

There are other obstacles in the world right now. But as Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany, I’ll answer briefly: I’ll be working on it.

"The 5,000 helmets were ‘stage zero’ of German aid"

Where else do you see changes that signal leadership?

Take Ramstein, for example [the Ukraine Defence Contact Group – ed.]. After the US stepped away from that format, Germany picked it up. Minister Pistorius took the initiative and said: now we and the British will coordinate it.

Another example is the air defence coalition.

The Germans have always been active there. Let me remind you: Germany handed over three Patriot systems to the Ukrainian Armed Forces – no other country has given us that many – and continues to supply spare parts, additional launchers and missiles. Now Germany is also ready to purchase more systems from the US and bring other countries together to buy even more.

Germany has also shown leadership by scrapping the cap on defence spending, which also applies to aid for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The government has now submitted the draft budget for 2025, which includes €8.3 billion in military aid for Ukraine. In previous years, the government proposed €4 billion, which was later increased during the parliamentary budget process. Now, the initial budget already includes €8.3 billion for 2025 and €8.5 billion each for 2026 and 2027.

Another sign of leadership: Germany has joined the "Danish model" of support for Ukraine’s defence.

Under this government, Germany has signed its first direct contract with a Ukrainian manufacturer to purchase drones for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. These specific drones are not produced in Germany at all, and Ukraine's production process is much faster.

Overall, Germany’s military aid has gone through several stages:

Stage zero – the famous "5,000 helmets" from early 2022.

Stage one – known in German as Ringtausch, or "circular exchange", which I consider the anti-word of 2022 (a term with a negative connotation). In this phase, Germany provided its own modern equipment to other countries, which then sent Soviet-era gear to Ukraine. For example, Marders went to Greece in exchange for BMP-1s.

Stage two – Germany started directly supplying military equipment from its own stocks to the Ukrainian army. That is how we received Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers, MARS multiple rocket launchers, Dingo armoured vehicles, later Marders and Leopards, plus a huge number of artillery shells and missiles.

This stage is now over. The Bundeswehr is no longer willing to part with anything, and frankly, stockpiles are depleted everywhere.

Then came stage three: manufacturing for Ukraine. This is ongoing. For example, IRIS-T air defence systems continue to be produced. Seven have already arrived, and more are on the way. Then there are the several hundred armoured vehicles from FFG, wheeled howitzers and reconnaissance drones from Quantum-Systems (which are now being produced in Ukraine), and so on.

We are now entering the next stage: placing orders to purchase German-funded weapons for the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Ukrainian manufacturers, as well as joint production. For this, joint ventures have been established between key German and Ukrainian companies.

I really hope that in the future, we will move to the next step: joint manufacturing on German soil as well.

Could joint production include long-range missiles, not just drones? Could we eventually get Taurus missiles, just not in the form of direct deliveries?

Actually, there are several Ukrainian products that surpass Tauruses in range, though perhaps not in effectiveness. But all of that is part of ongoing discussions.

We have already brought Ukrainian and German manufacturers together. And it was very important to witness the CEOs of companies, including those that produce long-range weapons, engage in practical conversations like "How about we take this component from you, and you add that part from us?"

So I really hope new alliances between Ukrainian and German defence companies will emerge in terms of long-range strike capability, and all the priorities set by the president – interceptor drones, long-range drones and FPV drones.

To wrap up the subject of air defence, how many more German-manufactured IRIS-T systems are we expecting, specifically the medium-range systems?

We’ve ordered 18 IRIS-T SLM systems in total – first 12, then another 4, and then 2 more. We’ve received 7 so far.

I want to emphasise: each system includes three SLM launchers (medium-range) and two SLS launchers (short-range). It’s a single integrated system.

However, only Patriots can reliably intercept ballistic missiles. Yes, there have been reports of IRIS-Ts intercepting a ballistic missile, but they weren’t designed for that purpose.

So regarding Patriots: how many are we expecting to receive through German support?

That number is currently changing. We initially asked Germany to purchase two systems for us from the US. After the Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting, it was publicly announced that our partners were trying to source five systems. But in reality, we need ten or more.

The figure of 5 or 10 systems refers to the total pool of European countries stepping up to help Ukraine. I believe it will eventually become clear who has contributed funding and how much. Primarily, it’s about placing orders – that is, producing new systems. However, it’s also possible that some countries will agree to hand over existing systems sooner and then receive replacements from future production.

"We shouldn’t expect Germany to turn a blind eye to corruption"

Is it fair to say that along with Germany’s leadership and decisiveness in supplying weapons, we are now seeing more caution from Berlin when it comes to Ukraine’s EU accession?

I don’t see this caution. What do you mean exactly?

Recently, Merz said in a speech he gave in the Bundestag on the EU budget that he does not see the need to include Ukraine’s accession in the multi-year financial framework through 2034. For Ukraine, that doesn’t sound particularly optimistic.

That is a signal that I, as ambassador, will need to clarify as soon as I return to Berlin from Kyiv.

I very much hope Friedrich Merz did not mean to suggest – and I’m sure he didn’t – that Ukraine won’t have joined the EU by 2034, or that Germany does not see Ukraine as a member by then. That would be completely out of character for the current government.

A merit-based approach, one grounded in actual achievements, remains the cornerstone of Germany’s policy on this issue. Moreover, Germany has clearly stated that it is taking on a leadership role in guiding Ukraine towards EU membership and coordinating this effort with our partners. This includes helping to overcome obstacles such as vetoes from other countries. They are actively engaging with us and are open to our requests.

There is speculation that Germany also sees internal obstacles coming from Ukraine. For instance, the passage of Law 12414 this week (hopefully it will be repealed next week) has reportedly triggered serious concern in Berlin. Is it true that these issues matter greatly to Germany?

To paraphrase a well-known phrase: "I can’t speak for all of the EU…" But clearly, anti-corruption and the rule of law are fundamental pillars of the European Union. These values are not up for debate.

And that applies to Berlin as well.

When you take on a leadership role in supporting Ukraine on this path, as Germany is doing, it’s unrealistic to expect that basic issues like these would be overlooked.

As for Ukraine’s path toward the EU, I’m placing a lot of hope in the new initiative that President Zelenskyy and Chancellor Merz agreed on in Berlin. This involves the revival of Ukrainian-German intergovernmental consultations. Germany only maintains this format with selected countries – such as France, Poland and Japan.

We will work to ensure that European integration is at the heart of all bilateral cooperation.

And most importantly, Ukraine doesn’t want to be just a recipient of aid. We have things to offer Germany. For example, they have established a Ministry of Digital Affairs and are eager to digitalise, and we definitely have expertise to share in that area.

Or take the combat experience of our military, which we’ve already discussed. Our tactical know-how and operational capabilities are already being gradually incorporated into the German armed forces.

German defence companies are becoming more competitive thanks to their work in Ukraine. For example, the drone manufacturer Quantum-Systems, which has now fully localised its production in Ukraine, is also doing R&D here, constantly adapting its models to frontline needs. They release updates more frequently than Apple updates its iPhone firmware, because the need is real. And this represents a radically new model for how the defence industry operates.

These are both reconnaissance and strike drones.

"Germany doesn’t want to keep all Ukrainians forever"

Finally, a question about Ukrainian refugees – those who received temporary protection in Germany. The EU has announced that next year’s extension of temporary protection status will be the last, and that after that, member states will individually determine the status of the Ukrainian citizens in their territory. What kinds of policy changes is Berlin considering?

Let me stress: this does not apply to 2026. For now, the extension remains in place.

As for what happens beyond that, debates inside Germany are fuelled by broader political disputes over migration, and right-wing forces are actively exploiting this topic. So we should expect changes.

First and foremost: changes in the system of social benefits, both in terms of amounts and regulation. Germany wants to modernise the Bürgergeld system, which provides financial support for those in need or out of work.

There is also the process of integration into the labour market. The number of Ukrainians who have started working while under protection in Germany is growing. It has been three and a half years. During this time, many children have learned the language and are integrating into German society.

For Ukraine as a state, it is crucial to maintain ties with our people who are now in Germany. We are talking about a very large number of people. According to the latest figures from the federal government, 1,216,000 Ukrainians currently hold temporary protection status in Germany.

Does Berlin understand that unless people return to Ukraine, there can be no real talk of reconstruction or building a prosperous country?

Absolutely. That’s precisely why Berlin supported the idea of creating Unity Hubs. I hope we don’t lose sight of this idea during the restructuring of the Ukrainian government.

Will Germany help Ukrainians make the decision to return to Ukraine? Is this being discussed?

Yes, absolutely.

Of course Germany is interested in having Ukrainians contribute to its labour market, both skilled and unskilled workers. They are also interested in those who receive German support integrating into society.

But they also understand that Ukraine needs its people too.

That is why Germany is also providing funding for retraining and education programmes for internally displaced persons inside Ukraine. They recognise that reconstruction requires people on the ground.

It is not the case that Germany wants to integrate everyone and then just send those who fail to integrate back. No, they absolutely understand our desire for qualified professionals – those who may now be working in Germany in their fields – to return to Ukraine with their experience and German language skills and work in their homeland. This is also in the interest of the German companies that will enter Ukraine and participate in reconstruction projects.

One last question. At the end of last year, there were reports that you would be completing your term and returning to Ukraine. Has that idea progressed?

Today is the last day of the annual Ukrainian ambassadors’ conference.

The instruction I have received from Ukraine’s leadership is to continue working in Berlin. So tomorrow, I will return to Germany.

Sergiy Sydorenko,

Editor, European Pravda