Why Moldova has a real chance to de-occupy Transnistria

The current government in Chișinău is preparing for the unification of Moldova.

So far, there is only indirect evidence of this – but notably, when it comes to money (investment planning, etc.), Chișinău is calculating scenarios in which the central government will soon control both banks of the Dniester River.

The authorities refrain from making public statements about it for now.

What is of utmost importance is that the business elite in Transnistria is not resisting unification and may even become its driving force. The winter of 2025–26 is expected to further cement the irreversibility of this process.

Read more about why Chișinău now has hope for solving the 35-year-old Transnistrian problem in the article by Sergiy Sydorenko, European Pravda's editor: Transnistria faces de-occupation: why there are grounds to expect Moldova’s rapid reunification.

In Chișinău, officials are seriously discussing steps to take if Transnistrian reintegration becomes a practical matter. Recently, ruling party MP and head of the European integration committee Ina Coșeru admitted in an interview with EuroPravda that the government had prepared a plan for Transnistria’s integration, though the document is not public.

In fact, what is happening around Transnistria now, and what should bring it under Chișinău’s control, is not fundamentally unexpected. European Pravda described this year’s scenario and the reasons behind it in a detailed article published a year ago: Forcible reintegration of Moldova.

The only thing that could not be predicted with certainty was when exactly this scenario would begin. But Russia triggered it on 1 January 2025, when gas transit through Ukrainian territory ended.

For the occupation authorities, the most painful blow was that without gas, the entire regional economy collapsed. The halt of Russian gas assistance wiped out Transnistria’s budget.

The Kremlin used the energy crisis to pressure Moldova’s pro-European government. It didn’t matter that "its own" people in Transnistria were freezing. What mattered was that higher energy prices in Chișinău fueled public discontent.

In February, the Kremlin agreed to resume free gas deliveries to the occupied region – through intermediaries. But in much smaller volumes and only on the condition that electricity generated from it would not be supplied to Moldova (so that pressure on Chișinău remained).

Moscow expected this to help pro-Russian forces win Moldova’s elections, but as has recently become clear, it did not work.

In addition, Chișinău gained a new leverage point after Ukraine stopped Russian gas transit through its territory as of 1 January.

With Ukrainian transit closed, gas can now reach Transnistria only through Moldovan territory – and Chișinău decided to use this to its advantage. Within several packages of agreements, it presented Tiraspol with a set of political and economic conditions.

In previous months, both sides engaged in imitation, but after the parliamentary elections in early October, Moldova reminded Tiraspol of its right to impose restrictions.

The current "gas crisis," which began in Tiraspol on 1 October, is still mild.

But the question of how to survive the winter and what surprises the heating season may bring remains unanswered. The risk of a possible blockade from Moldova will make Tiraspol more willing to compromise.

Moreover, Transnistria’s "chief businessman" Viktor Gușan may also facilitate Moldova’s reunification.

He now faces an obvious choice. Either Gușan helps Russia keep the region in its sphere of influence, continuing on the current trajectory toward inevitable catastrophe – most likely losing everything in the end. Or he strikes a deal with Chișinău, under which Sheriff loses part of its assets as illegally privatized but retains some of its empire, becoming a legitimate, respected businessman in a unified Republic of Moldova that is moving toward European Union membership.