Why EU is preparing sanctions against Georgia and what problems this could create for Tbilisi

The Georgian government is facing yet another serious challenge – the country could be subjected to European Union sanctions.

According to Reuters and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the EU’s 20th sanctions package, which Brussels hopes to finalise by the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, includes restrictions targeting Georgia’s Black Sea port of Kulevi.

Read more about why the EU may impose sanctions on the Georgian port and what problems this could create for Georgia inthe article by Amiran Khevtsuriani of the Georgian-Ukrainian Center (Tbilisi), and Yurii Panchenko, European Pravda's editor: Punishing Tbilisi: what consequences EU sanctions against Georgia could have. 

The Kulevi oil terminal is located on the Black Sea coast between Poti and Anaklia, in the Khobi municipality, and is owned by Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR.

The terminal has been operating for decades, dating back to the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze. However, at the end of 2025, an oil refinery began operations there, increasing the terminal’s regional significance.

It became known late last year that Russian oil had started arriving at the Kulevi terminal.

According to the Russian investigative outlet Proekt, the founder and main owner of Georgia’s first oil refinery, which began importing Russian oil, is businesswoman Maka Asatiani. Her son reportedly conducted joint business in Russia with the son of Vladimir Alexeyev, the First Deputy Chief of Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), who was shot in Moscow on 6 February.

In addition, on 5 February, the Georgian outlet iFact reported that the oil tanker Silvari, part of Russia’s "shadow fleet," entered Georgia’s territorial waters for the first time in late January. According to the outlet, the tanker delivered about 32,000 tons of oil and petroleum products to the port.

Under the draft 20th EU sanctions package, the Georgian port is allegedly being used for the maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products produced in Russia, or carried by Russian tankers using "irregular and high-risk schemes." The document states that such practices undermine the effectiveness of sanctions and may be used to circumvent Western restrictions.

If the Kulevi terminal is added to the sanctions list, the port’s operations would not be completely blocked. However, financial transactions and cooperation with European companies would become significantly more complicated.

As usual, the Georgian Dream government has categorically denied the accusations and expressed readiness to provide Brussels with detailed explanations.

In recent years, the ruling Georgian Dream party has severely damaged relations with the EU. It is now difficult to imagine a real improvement in ties without a change of power in Tbilisi.

So why is the Georgian government reacting so painfully to the EU’s sanctions plans? Is it only because of the potential economic impact? Not quite.

If Georgia is added to the EU sanctions list for facilitating Russia’s circumvention of energy sanctions, this could also affect relations with the United States and not in the way Georgian Dream would prefer.

The Trump administration reacts very sharply to third countries’ energy cooperation with Russia. Therefore, instead of hopes for resetting relations with Washington "from a clean slate," there is a growing likelihood that the United States could adopt its own sanctions package against Georgia.

And that is precisely the scenario Georgian Dream is trying to avoid at all costs.