Why Poland may refuse EU rearmament loan and what the consequences could be

On 13 February, Poland’s Sejm gave the green light to legislation enabling the country to join the European Union’s SAFE (Security Action for Europe) programme – a move that could unlock tens of billions of euros in low-interest financing for Warsaw’s defence industry.

Yet the vote laid bare a sharp political divide. The bill passed with 236 MPs in favour, but 199 voted against it, while four lawmakers abstained, underscoring how contentious the initiative has become.

Read more about why Poland’s right wing is now opposing and whether a presidential veto is a realistic scenario in the article by international affairs expert Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi and Yurii Panchenko, European Pravda's editor: Unnecessary funds? Why Poland may be left without EU rearmament loans.

The SAFE programme, which in recent weeks has become one of the main topics of political debate in Poland, provides large-scale support for the defence industries of EU member states.

The overall envelope of the scheme stands at €150 billion, with Poland aiming to secure nearly one-third of that sum, €43.7 billion, the largest allocation among EU member states. Prime Minister Donald Tusk has stressed that Warsaw could obtain the funds on unprecedented terms, including a 10-year grace period and repayment stretched over as long as 45 years.

Moreover, at least 80% of the funds obtained under SAFE would go directly to the Polish defence industry, making it not only a security project but also an economic one.

According to Deputy Defence Minister Paweł Bejda, the government has already determined what equipment it intends to order and from where using SAFE funds, though this information remains confidential.

However, even extremely favourable financial terms do not guarantee avoidance of a heated debate in the Sejm and potentially also between the president and the government.

The right-wing opposition, Law and Justice and Confederation Liberty and Independence, opposed the initiative and ultimately did not support the bill during the vote in the lower house of parliament.

This appears somewhat surprising, as just a few months ago representatives of Law and Justice had spoken very positively about SAFE.

For the national-conservative camp, SAFE has become a symbol of a broader trend: the gradual expansion of Brussels’ competences in an area traditionally considered the exclusive prerogative of the state.

Critics of the programme point not only to debt risks but also to a fundamental question: is defence policy becoming yet another sphere of European centralisation?

The leader of Law and Justice, Jarosław Kaczyński, has called on the president to veto the bill. He stresses that the programme has not only a financial but also a political dimension.

Despite the favourable loan terms, Law and Justice sees a risk of political pressure on Poland through EU mechanisms and has linked SAFE to what it describes as a broader plan to strengthen German influence in Europe.

In addition, SAFE was one of three key issues discussed at the latest meeting of Poland’s National Security Council, where President Karol Nawrocki described the initiative as "an enormous debt that the Polish state will be repaying for years."

Thus, a presidential veto is very likely.

After the Sejm vote, Prime Minister Donald Tusk publicly warned the president against blocking the law. He stated directly that vetoing the SAFE programme would be an "irreparable loss" for Poland.

In effect, the head of government has brought the conflict into the public arena, framing the issue starkly: either Poland makes full use of European opportunities to strengthen its defence, or domestic political conflict overrides strategic interests.

Unfortunately, not only Poland’s defence industry but also Warsaw’s continued military support for Kyiv has become hostage to this political struggle.

A scenario in which Poland rapidly increases its military production would clearly benefit Ukraine.

Yet somewhat unexpectedly, the implementation of this scenario has itself become part of Poland’s internal political battle.