Is the Polish government ready to reconcile with Ukraine and who is opposing it?
Last weekend, many expected another escalation in relations between Ukraine and Poland, especially since official Kyiv had publicly warned about this possibility.
However, these negative expectations did not materialise.
At the same time, 11 July provided an opportunity to assess how different Polish political parties plan to play the "Ukrainian card" in the 2027 parliamentary elections.
Read more about the challenges awaiting Ukrainian-Polish relations in the article by Yurii Panchenko, co-founder of European Pravda: The Polish government is taking a step towards Ukraine. How the anniversary of Volhynia did not become a date of new escalation.
As expected, supporters of de-escalation included representatives of the governing camp.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated that "memory cannot be used as a tool of hatred".
However, one should not expect that the prime minister will avoid actions that Kyiv may perceive as unfriendly. It is enough to recall the inclusion in the European Parliament resolution on Ukraine of an amendment placing responsibility on Kyiv for "unnecessary and unprovoked escalation" of relations with Poland.
It should be remembered that Poland’s current government is a coalition government, so not only Tusk’s position and that of his party matter.
A separate point worth noting is the visit to Ukraine by Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. He was the only Polish top-level politician who travelled to Ukraine on 11 July. The deputy prime minister took part in commemorative events in the Volhynian town of Olyka.
Kosiniak-Kamysz is the leader of the Polish People’s Party – the most right-wing political force in the current governing coalition.
He is also known for statements that are often perceived as anti-Ukrainian.
His rhetoric regarding Ukraine is usually harsher than Donald Tusk’s. However, on 11 July, Kosiniak-Kamysz avoided statements unacceptable to Ukraine.
The biggest intrigue on 11 July concerned the messages delivered by President Karol Nawrocki.
He travelled to the small village of Radruż in the Subcarpathian Voivodeship, located right next to the Ukrainian border. This choice of location was highly symbolic.
Radruż was also a place where cases of Poles being killed by Ukrainians in 1944-1946 were recorded. At the same time, however, the village is known for the fact that at that time the majority of its inhabitants were Ukrainians, who were deported in 1947 as part of Operation Vistula. This year’s commemorative events were ultimately held in a former Orthodox church, which after the deportation of Ukrainians was converted into a Catholic church.
Among other things, Karol Nawrocki rejected the idea that significant violations of Ukrainians’ rights took place in Poland in the middle of the 20th century.
Under these circumstances, the choice of location appeared more like a deliberate provocation – an attempt to provoke a reaction from Ukraine and gain support among far-right voters.
But if such a provocation had been planned, Nawrocki clearly softened it and did not impose any public conditions on Ukraine or President Zelenskyy.
It is likely that the presidents of Ukraine and Poland did agree on certain steps toward de-escalating relations during their talks held on 8 July on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara.
On 11 July, the Ukrainian president announced the start of new exhumation works at sites of possible Polish burials.
Thus, the unexpectedly "reconciliatory" commemoration of the Volhynia anniversary in 2026 shows that this path has not been rejected by other key political players either. However, the "Ukrainian card" remains a very attractive trump card in the political struggle for votes in a heated Polish society, meaning it will certainly be used during the 2027 elections.