Why Azerbaijan has taken a harder line towards Russia and how Moscow can respond

Relations between Baku and Moscow are gradually deteriorating. The latest episode was Azerbaijan’s decision to place three Russian propagandists – Semyon Uralov, Ivan Knyazev and Alexei Chadayev – on a wanted list. The reason was their broadcasts, in which the Azerbaijani side saw calls for the violent overthrow of the government, violations of the country’s territorial integrity and physical reprisals against members of its leadership.

Following this, the Russian ambassador was summoned to Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moscow, in response, distanced itself from the statements made by those involved in the case, saying that they did not represent Russia’s official position.

Thus, the partial normalisation achieved after the crisis surrounding the downing of an Azerbaijani aircraft over Grozny by Russian forces in 2024 failed to restore political trust between the two countries.

Read more about the crisis in relations between Baku and Moscow, its real causes and its possible consequences in the article by Serhii Danylov of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies: Russia is losing its influence: how Baku is changing the rules in its relations with Moscow and why Russia is avoiding conflict. 

If one analyses official and semi-official rhetoric, the current escalation is not viewed simply as a dispute over several propaganda broadcasts.

The turning point in relations was the crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines aircraft on 25 December 2024.

Moscow’s behaviour after the disaster was perceived in Azerbaijan as evidence that Russia still expects a special kind of relationship with the states of the former Soviet Union. In this model, public accountability on Russia’s part is considered unacceptable.

The events of 2025 reinforced this perception.

Azerbaijani analysts link these developments to the gradual decline of Russian influence in the South Caucasus. In their interpretation, Moscow is resorting to informational, diaspora-related and economic pressure at a time when its traditional political levers have become weaker.

Over the past five years, Russia’s position in the South Caucasus itself has changed.

Until 2020, Moscow remained the main external mediator in the Karabakh conflict. Its military presence in Armenia, its relations with Azerbaijan and its role in the negotiation process gave it the ability to influence both sides.

The peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan is reducing Russia’s opportunities and influence.

The liberation of Karabakh has allowed Azerbaijan to position itself as a "middle power" – a force capable of acting independently in the South Caucasus region.

The military outcome changed the balance of power with Armenia. Energy ties with Europe remain an important economic resource. Trans-Caspian routes have increased Azerbaijan’s importance for Central Asia, Türkiye and the EU. Relations with China have also become more significant.

Baku is trying to maintain working relationships with several centers of power and avoid dependence on any single one of them.

Russia remains important within this system, but it no longer occupies an exceptional position.

Azerbaijani commentators explain Baku’s tough response to the Russian propagandists as a necessity to make Moscow understand that its pressure is not working. Any statements made by Russian propagandists, they argue, must receive an appropriate response.

This strategy carries risks. Russia can still create problems for Azerbaijani businesses, labour migrants and diaspora structures.

Therefore, a complete rupture is not in Baku’s interests.

Moscow also has reasons to avoid such a scenario.

For this reason, the most likely outcome remains a prolonged period of unstable but functional relations.