Time for accession talks: the EU must not use Orbán's veto to punish Ukraine

, 26 August 2025, 13:00 - Editorial Board

This article is an Editorial. That means it is published on behalf of the entire editorial team and reflects the collective position of all European Pravda journalists. We reserve this format for truly exceptional cases. This piece is also addressed to the governments of EU member states, which are now at a crossroads in defining their policy on Ukraine.

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Over the past month and a half, Ukraine’s path towards EU membership has seen dramatic changes, leaving a handful of winners (both inside and outside the EU) and a far greater number who have lost ground. Ukrainians have, without a doubt, ended up among the latter group.

Indeed, up until early July, the European Commission had continued to emphasise that Ukraine would open all the clusters in the accession talks by the end of 2025 and Hungary’s veto would not stand in the way. Brussels made no secret of the fact that it was working on several Plan B options to get round the Hungarian veto, because the start of negotiations was a matter of exceptional importance.

Since mid-July, all such talk has evaporated.

The reason for Brussels’ loss of ambition is well known. Trust in Ukraine was badly damaged by Kyiv’s attempt to undermine its anti-corruption institutions. And although the Ukrainian authorities were quick to repeal the relevant laws, this only stopped the relationship from collapsing; it did not restore the previous level of trust.

Given this situation, the temptation for the European Union is to choose the simplest strategy: to refrain from making any decisions on Ukraine’s path towards EU membership for some time – not to rush, to observe how reforms were going and wait until the Ukrainian government had done enough to rebuild trust. This would also enable them not to worry about Hungary’s veto, which isn’t going anywhere.

But if this strategy prevails, it will be a huge mistake for Europe.

We are certain that, its present passivity notwithstanding, the EU cares about Ukraine.

But there is no better way to push forward European reforms in Ukraine than to open the first negotiation clusters for Ukraine (and Moldova alongside it). And conversely, there is no worse option for Ukraine’s European future than for the EU to use recent events as a pretext for a pause in its rapprochement with Kyiv.

A pause that would only be perceived as punishment for Ukraine.

Hungary’s blockade may be a convenient explanation for the EU’s shift of position, but it’s an unconvincing one. Viktor Orbán’s veto existed in early July as well, yet back then, one EU official after another was declaring their intention to open all the clusters and looking for ways to do this. The difference between the EU’s actions and positions then and now is all too obvious.


This is not about clusters. It’s about reforms

As European Pravda – together with other civil society organisations and think tanks working on Ukraine-EU rapprochement – has consistently emphasised, we understand that the essence of European integration is not about the country's status, but about the transformations that are changing Ukraine.

The opening of negotiation clusters – above all the first (Fundamentals) and the second (Internal Market) – is necessary not so that we can boast about making progress in our talks with the EU, but for the carrying out of reforms.

Yes, we know that in theory the list of the changes required could be drawn up without starting accession talks. But politically, it does not work that way.

Ukraine has repeatedly proven its ability to succeed in implementing ambitious reform programmes, even when many, including in EU capitals, did not believe such changes were possible. This was the case when Ukraine fulfilled the requirements for visa liberalisation. It was also the case when we implemented the "seven steps" that came with candidate status.

And each time, we had an EU-approved list of reforms and we understood what the objective was.

It is worth stressing that in those cases, Kyiv’s compliance with the list was no guarantee that Ukraine would immediately receive the "carrot" once the agreed plan was implemented. Each time, the final step also required a political decision from the EU member states – and this is what lies ahead for us on the path to accession.

Moreover, with both the candidate steps and the visa-free plan, Brussels did not give Kyiv an exhaustive list of reforms from the start – it added to the list in the most sensitive areas during the process. This is also exactly what lies ahead for Ukraine in the accession talks, especially in the Fundamentals cluster.

But it is only after receiving an agenda of reforms agreed with Europe that Kyiv will be able to demonstrate real success in carrying them out. Civil society will be able to monitor progress and demand accountability. Political players, including parliament and the government, will gain the drive and the need to meet deadlines.

To achieve such success again, we need to open negotiations – above all on the Fundamentals cluster. We need to receive EU-approved roadmaps on the rule of law, democratic institutions, and other key areas.

And our European partners need to understand that there is no better way of stimulating reforms in Ukraine than accession negotiations.

Courage, not punishment

The editorial board of European Pravda is aware that Brussels is also being urged not to rush into opening clusters. This piece is meant to show that there is another view, and that view is well grounded.

A pause offers no advantages in terms of turning Ukraine into a European state. On the contrary, it carries risks. The EU’s reluctance to take this step does not bring a single European reform in Ukraine any closer. It will have the opposite effect.

Moreover, it undermines the merit-based approach. Ukraine (and likewise Moldova) has met the requirements for opening the Fundamentals cluster. This has been officially confirmed by the European Commission. All the member states except Hungary have agreed with this. That fact did not change during the events of July. Ultimately, those harmful legislative changes were reversed by Ukraine's parliament.

And the only reason why at least the first cluster has not yet been opened is Hungary’s veto.

This veto is fundamentally different from the requirements that were placed on EU candidate countries in the past. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has shown that he is not interested in dialogue. He seeks to deprive Ukraine of its European future at any cost.

Let’s be honest: to a large extent, this is Russia’s veto being implemented through Hungary.

If the EU remains content with the status quo, it means that Orbán is being rewarded for his actions. It means he can continue his policy of blackmail, because that policy works.

Such tactics pose a threat to the entire European Union. That is why the EU must show political courage, break the taboo on discussing how to get round Orbán and Putin’s veto, and give the long-awaited impetus to reforms in Ukraine.

The EU has repeatedly proven its ability to find creative solutions. The uniqueness of this moment, which justifies exceptional measures, is obvious.

In a week’s time, on the evening of 1 September, the European affairs ministers of all the member states will gather in Copenhagen for informal talks, including on EU enlargement. Two weeks later, on 16 September, the ministers will meet in Brussels to adopt legal decisions.

Failure to launch accession talks would be a victory not only for Orbán, but also for Putin. Orbán and Putin did not initiate the EU’s policy shift on Ukraine, but they are the main beneficiaries of it.

That is why the European Union must find the courage to adjust its policy and take the long-awaited decision to open negotiations on the first clusters – a decision that will drive European reforms in Ukraine and Moldova and keep our countries aligned on the path to EU membership.

Editorial Board of European Pravda