How Zelenskyy undermined Ukraine's path to EU membership and what happens next

A law signed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Tuesday evening which dismantles the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), has dealt a body blow to the country’s European integration process.

Brussels tried to prevent it up until the very last moment.

EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos even called Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka personally to warn of the consequences – although he was no doubt aware of them already. EU experts agree: in recent days, Ukraine has come dangerously close to killing off its chances of launching meaningful accession talks with the EU – indeed, it may already have crossed that line.

Kyiv’s counterargument is that the pause in the EU accession process is the EU’s fault, not Ukraine’s. According to this view, Ukraine met all its obligations but hit a wall in the form of Hungary’s veto. The irony is, however, that in July, Ukraine had a real chance of breaking through that wall.

Brussels had been prepared for a tectonic shift in the accession process.

In fact, EU leaders had been planning to sideline Orbán and get round his veto.

A date had even been set to open the first negotiating cluster.

Then came a flood of negative news stories from Ukraine: attacks on the Bureau of Economic Security (BEB), the politically motivated prosecution of activist Vitalii Shabunin, and a government reshuffle that removed the EU integration team.

In view of this, exactly one week ago Kyiv received word that readiness for the alternative plan had been postponed until the autumn. But European Pravda sources emphasise that this wasn’t a "punishment" by the EU for backsliding on early reforms. The picture is more complicated than that. The primary reason for the delay was a lack of readiness within the EU itself, although the developments around the BES undeniably played a role.

Still, all of that pales in comparison to the events of this past week.

President Zelenskyy, fully aware of the progress made within the EU, not only continued but intensified the attack on reforms.

The dismantling of the independence of NABU and SAPO crossed the EU’s red lines. At this point, the presence or absence of Hungary’s veto no longer matters. Ukraine has done the dirty work itself instead of Viktor Orbán.

Promises to the EU

Close observers of the statements made by senior European officials about Ukraine’s path to EU membership may have noticed an important shift in tone regarding the pace of accession talks.

Towards the end of 2024 and beginning of 2025, Brussels and several other member states were talking openly about their aim to open all six negotiating clusters with Ukraine by the end of the year. This would have been an unprecedented pace for the EU bureaucracy, the like of which has not been seen with any other country in recent decades. Even ahead of the major enlargement of  2004, when the EU’s structure was simpler and the obligations for candidates far fewer, the preparatory phase took longer than that.

Still, given Ukraine’s unique importance and role, Brussels made a political choice to openly set this ambitious goal. Six months ago, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen began publicly reiterating this commitment.

Last spring, that promise had to be dropped from public rhetoric. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán began blocking Ukraine’s EU progress, making it the centrepiece of his election campaign. The European Commission realised the problem was very real and that there were no clear ways to get round it.

Brussels even began to talk about decoupling the Ukraine-Moldova pair so that Moldova would not be held hostage by Hungary’s veto. Von der Leyen and several Ukraine-friendly countries opposed the move and managed to block it. Later, a hybrid Plan B emerged, but it never gained Kyiv’s approval, as it didn’t foresee the formal start of accession talks, only a simulation.

The process seemed to have reached a deadlock. For many in Europe, it was hard to grasp that Orbán wasn’t seeking concessions from Ukraine – the blockade was an end in itself, part of his domestic political strategy. But with the end of Poland’s presidency of the Council of the EU (Warsaw chaired the Council in the first half of 2025), things began to change.

Suddenly, the EU started talking about opening "all the clusters" by the end of 2025 again.

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda was the first to make this claim, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in The Hague. Then came similar signals from the European Commission, von der Leyen, and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos. Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna also stated that Hungary could not block the start of accession talks.

Back then, these statements were criticised in Ukraine as unrealistic, unprofessional and out of touch. But in fact, these officials were referring to a specific plan – one that had been prepared and coordinated with key players, the details of which were intentionally kept confidential.

How they planned to sideline Orbán

The European Commission, the president of the European Council and several key member states had agreed on a plan to bypass Hungary’s veto, and in a rather unexpected way.

The idea of simply disregarding Hungary’s vote (in other words, forcing Orbán to "step out for a coffee") was rejected. Several countries, including some of Ukraine’s close allies, saw this as an unacceptable precedent that could have had implications far beyond the case of Ukraine, potentially undermining the principle of unanimity within the EU.

Instead, Denmark and the European Commission leadership proposed not holding a vote at all. The idea was that the EU presidency would apply to the European Commission and cite both the Commission’s position and the conclusion of the June EU summit that Ukraine had fulfilled all the necessary criteria.

Then the European Commission would simply announce the start of accession negotiations with Ukraine as if all the formalities had been met.

To prepare at least some legal basis for this step, the president of the European Council formally requested a legal opinion from the Commission, according to one source. This position can be summarised as follows: the EU’s founding treaties do not require unanimous approval for intermediate technical steps such as opening negotiation clusters. Therefore the European Commission is entitled to proceed on its own initiative, especially since the member states had delegated such authority by opening talks with Ukraine in June 2024.

Formal closure of the negotiations and the approval of specific terms, however, would still require unanimous consent.

Several European Pravda sources acknowledged that the plan was "legally flawed". But Orbán would have no immediate legal tools to stop it.

Hungary will certainly sue the Commission in the EU Court of Justice, and it will probably win," one European official told European Pravda over a week ago, at a time when optimism still reigned in Brussels. "But that will take about three years. By then, Orbán may no longer be in power, and Ukraine will have significantly advanced in the accession process and maybe even joined the EU."

Indeed, under EU Court rules, the effect of a ruling is not suspended even if it is appealed.

However, Brussels’ legal position in such a case would be rather shaky. That is because in June 2021, the EU Council adopted what is known as the Negotiating Framework – the document that governs the conduct of negotiations with Ukraine. The Negotiating Framework explicitly states that unanimous votes are required to open clusters and outlines a special procedure for opening the Fundamentals cluster.

It’s true that Orbán had exhausted nearly everyone’s patience to the point where many in the EU would have been willing to turn a blind eye. But that didn’t make the plan legally watertight. It still required significant political audacity from the Danes and the Commission. Ultimately, that audacity materialised.

According to European Pravda’s information, the initial high-level discussion of this idea took place in The Hague during the NATO summit, where President Zelenskyy held separate meetings with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and top EU officials. It was following these talks, sources in Brussels say, that European Commission lawyers began preparing the legal framework for the move.

Exactly one week later, on 3 July, Zelenskyy travelled to Denmark on a separate visit. The trip had no publicly visible outcomes: its real purpose was to hold private negotiations on Plan B.

Finally, the last round of talks with the European Commission and European Council leadership took place in Rome on 10 July. It was immediately after this that Commissioner Věra Jourová made a statement expressing her confidence – ignoring Orbán’s veto – that all the chapters in Ukraine’s accession talks would be opened.

The date was agreed upon at that meeting too: the opening of the first negotiating cluster was due to take place in Brussels on 18 July, on the sidelines of a meeting of the EU General Affairs Council.

Moldova was informed of the arrangement as well. Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister Cristina Gherasimov was reported to be not particularly thrilled about the idea, but she agreed to go along with it. She and Olha Stefanishyna were expected to travel together to Brussels for the ceremony.

What went wrong

So Zelenskyy was aware of this unique opportunity and had been personally involved in discussions about it since the end of June. Yet the events that began to unfold after those agreements were reached left the Europeans asking WTF? What is going on?

In July, Ukraine’s government blatantly violated the law by rejecting the candidate who had been selected to head the Bureau of Economic Security (BEB) through a transparent, EU-supported procedure backed by international experts. On 9 July, the government overturned the results of the selection process, and there is every reason to believe this disruption was sanctioned by Bankova – the President’s Office.

On 11 July, law enforcement carried out raids and searches without a court warrant at the home of Vitalii Shabunin, a prominent critic of the President’s Office. The next day saw the absurdity of the mother of a fallen Hero of Ukraine, pilot Andrii "Juice" Pilshchykov, being subjected to searches purely because Shabunin had briefly stayed at her home.

On 14 July, it was announced that Olha Stefanishyna would be stepping down, which further undermined the prospects of opening EU negotiations. And while her expected successor Taras Kachka has no reputational baggage, the replacement of a negotiator from Ukraine at such a sensitive moment provides a strong argument for halting the process, especially when the decision itself was still in limbo.

So why do all this? That question remains unanswered.

It’s possible that several processes just happened to coincide in time (for example, the decision on BEB had a previously set deadline of 10 July). The government reshuffle was also unlikely to have been deliberately timed to clash with the EU presidency.

But it’s also possible that the President’s Office felt untouchable, assuming that Brussels would refrain from any open criticism at such a critical time no matter what.

And that calculation proved accurate. The EU has remained silent.

However, it has become clear that the anticipated breakthrough won't happen either.

According to European Pravda’s information, Denmark simply refrained from putting forward the proposal that had seemingly been agreed upon. The issue of the extent to which Moldova and Ukraine are prepared for the start of accession talks wasn’t even on the agenda for the 18 July meeting.

Several European Pravda sources maintain that the main obstacles to progress were internal EU dynamics.

Although there had been plans to open accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova without a formal vote, Brussels was eager to avoid any key EU member state publicly challenging or disputing the move. At the same time, some member states believed the decision needed more work and should be postponed until September. "I must admit that not all efforts were made to secure the consent of key countries," one source acknowledged.

There was another complicating factor:

the preparations for the 18 July decision were being made in secret – specifically hidden from Hungary.

Of course Budapest would have figured it out from the agenda ahead of the meeting, but EU officials were trying to delay that moment for as long as possible to give Orbán minimal time to mount an attack on already fragile EU unity. Support from other member states was being sought bilaterally, and the plan was deliberately kept out of the public eye. For that reason, European Pravda also chose not to report on the breakthrough being planned in Brussels.

But Budapest will definitely know about it now, and after the attacks on Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions, the whole plan is now irrelevant.

Notably, in her final interview as deputy prime minister, Olha Stefanishyna confirmed that the 18 July plan had indeed existed. She placed the responsibility for its failure largely on the EU and suggested that it had also contributed to her stepping down. "We made every effort, did everything possible. But eventually it became clear that the decision wouldn’t happen. I believe this episode helped the president make the final decision (…) to redirect my efforts toward US relations," she explained.

However, the information European Pravda has seen does not support her version of events. As of 14 July, the day Zelenskyy’s decision to replace Ukraine’s chief EU negotiator was made public, sources in Brussels were still optimistic, saying good progress was being made and there was every reason to expect a diplomatic win, namely the opening of the first negotiating cluster, despite the BEB controversy.

Red line? Crossed!

For those closely following Ukraine’s reformers and civil society voices, it may have seemed like all the red lines had been crossed weeks ago and that the BEB scandal was the final straw for Ukraine’s Western allies.

But that doesn’t seem to be the case.

Surprisingly, the EU took a rather tolerant view of the Bureau of Economic Security (BES) situation. As European Pravda has previously detailed, European representatives avoided taking any clear position on the issue at the Rome conference, even going so far as to censor a photo of EU Commissioner Marta Kos holding a fairly neutral poster in support of the BEB.

Several diplomatic sources later confirmed this. "For us, the BEB is not a red-line issue. The situation is ambiguous," one European source told EP. The US, under the new administration, has shown no real interest in the matter either. The G7 ambassadors have yet to issue any statement on the developments around the BEB.

In stark contrast, the response to the attack on NABU and SAPO has been radically different.

"The BEB issue is not a red line. The dismantling of anti-corruption institutions absolutely is. Absolutely," another European official emphasised.

Even the EU’s public reaction has been unusually harsh by recent standards – including from Commissioner Kos herself.

Behind closed doors, the tone was even harsher.

European Pravda has learned about the content of talks between Kos and new Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Taras Kachka regarding the restriction of the powers of Ukraineʼs anti-corruption agencies.

Kos informed Kachka that the European Commission is firm in its conclusions regarding Law 12414. The law not only undermines the independence of NABU and SAPO; it also contradicts the commitments set out in the Roadmaps that Kyiv and Brussels agreed on in preparation for membership negotiations. In addition, Kos said, the European Union views the passing of the law as a setback in implementing the seven European Commission recommendations that were a condition for Ukraine's candidate status.

Up until now, the EU had only officially acknowledged a setback in Georgia's candidate reforms. Brussels put a freeze on cooperation with Georgia within the accession process in response to the anti-democratic turn Tbilisi has taken.

"This step will have serious consequences for the entire negotiation process regarding Ukraine's accession to the EU. Some member states have already expressed the opinion that it would have been better not to rush into opening the first cluster," Kos warned.

All the other EU sources European Pravda spoke to before the law was signed had come to the same conclusion: if Volodymyr Zelenskyy signs the law (which he has now done), he is also signing off on the suspension of Ukraine's EU accession process.

The screening of the last cluster may be completed, but meaningful membership negotiations will be impossible.

What other consequences will there be?

Even amid the current strong private backlash, we should not expect a harsh public reaction from the EU that would reflect the level of frustration felt by many Ukrainians.

The EU continues to operate under a de facto moratorium on publicly criticising Ukraine. And even these developments haven’t lifted it. "Even after the adoption and signing of the law, there will be no immediate consequences," one EU diplomat admitted to EP on Monday morning, before immediately adding: "That doesn’t mean there won’t be long-term consequences."

Until recently, Ukraine’s accession process was the EU’s most powerful leverage. Brussels had made enlargement a strategic priority in Ukraine’s case, creating special fast-track procedures that allowed the country to speed through the technical phases despite the sluggish progress of reforms in 2023-2024. Simultaneous screening of all chapters, preparations for rapid cluster openings, technical support…

But the EU expected reciprocal progress from Kyiv, and progress had indeed been made. But that now seems to be in the past.

Following President Zelenskyy’s recent decisions, some in Europe now believe that "EU accession is no longer a priority for Ukraine". Several Kyiv-based European officials have expressed that view to EP in recent days. Those monitoring the situation from EU capitals tend to be even more sceptical.

That’s why the EU is preparing to apply pressure through other means – particularly financial ones.

Kyiv has received its first unofficial warnings.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has warned Kyiv that undermining the anti-corruption agencies will negatively affect defence investments in Ukraine and funding for reconstruction. The OECD has also explained what steps Kyiv must take to resolve the crisis.

EU officials have also been reminding Ukraine about its budget gap, which must be filled through borrowing. "We in the EU are willing to help you find money. But think: how many creditors will be eager to lend to a country that’s dismantling its anti-corruption infrastructure?" Still, it’s unclear whether Bankova takes these messages seriously. Officials there are used to the EU making threats and not acting decisively. After all, Ukraine’s stability and defence capability remain a priority for the EU itself.

One thing is clear: there is no threat to Ukraine’s visa-free regime, at least for now.

In peacetime, this could have been the EU’s primary pressure point. The creation of an independent NABU and SAPO was one of the key conditions for Ukraine’s visa liberalisation roadmap. But in the current wartime circumstances, when open borders are a humanitarian necessity and the EU has no desire to punish ordinary Ukrainians for their government's blunders, this issue is highly unlikely to resurface. Ukraine will not be downgraded to the current status of Georgia, where visa-free travel is now genuinely at risk.

What is almost certain, though, is that Ukraine will fall behind Moldova. Due to Kyiv’s actions, the decoupling of Moldova from Ukraine in the accession process is becoming inevitable. Moldova is now expected to begin accession talks while Ukraine’s dialogue remains frozen.

And the blame for that will rest entirely with Kyiv – with the MPs who passed the law dismantling NABU and SAPO’s independence, and with President Zelenskyy, who signed it and has publicly defended it.

Sergiy Sydorenko,

Editor, European Pravda