Why Zelenskyy has not yet been stripped of the Polish state order and who is losing in the scandal
The deterioration of relations between Ukraine and Poland has now continued for a second week. However, developments in recent days reveal an important shift.
Namely, Warsaw’s hardline and uncompromising stance towards Kyiv, and its refusal to seek compromise, is gradually becoming a problem for the Polish side itself.
Read more about the current state of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the article by Yurii Panchenko, European Pravda's co-founder: The White Eagle trap: how threats against Zelenskyy backfired on Poland’s president.
On 8 June, the Chapter of the Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state distinction, considered a request from Polish President Karol Nawrocki to revoke the award previously granted to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The proposed punishment was prompted by Kyiv’s decision to grant one of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units the honorary title "Named After the Heroes of the UPA" (the Ukrainian Insurgent Army).
The move by Zelenskyy triggered a wave of outrage in Poland, temporarily uniting even bitter political rivals. Public opinion was similarly aligned. Only a handful of cultural figures and intellectuals dared to argue that the Polish reaction was excessive.
Yet, somewhat unexpectedly, the Chapter’s meeting ended without any specific consequences. Moreover, the Polish presidential office declined to publish the body’s conclusions, stating only that President Nawrocki would "make a decision at the appropriate time".
8 June also saw the first statements from Polish politicians that could be interpreted as an attempt to de-escalate tensions with Ukraine.
For example, former Speaker of the Sejm Szymon Hołownia argued that stripping the president of a country fighting for its independence of Poland’s highest honour would damage Poland more than it would harm Zelenskyy.
The events of 8 June demonstrated that many in Poland were not prepared for the conflict with Ukraine to escalate this far.
One possible explanation is that the strong rhetoric from both President Nawrocki and his staff was based on the assumption that Ukraine would quickly back down and reverse the decision concerning the military unit’s honorary name. Such a retreat would have allowed the Polish president to claim a symbolic "victory over the Banderites".
However, Kyiv has strong reasons for refusing to do so.
Such a concession might solve the immediate dispute, but it would create far greater problems in the future. In essence, it would legitimise Warsaw’s right to shape and revise Ukraine’s historical narrative, demanding that Ukrainian history be presented in a form most acceptable to Poland. For Kyiv, this is unacceptable.
Zelenskyy’s reported decision to move the operating base for his presidential aircraft from the Polish city of Rzeszów to Chișinău further signals that Ukraine is unwilling to yield under pressure.
At the same time, the root causes of the crisis remain unresolved.
The anti-Ukrainian rhetoric that has dominated parts of the Polish media in recent days suggests that public demand for the "punishment of ungrateful Ukrainians" remains strong. As a result, there are good reasons to expect that Ukraine-related issues will become one of the central themes of Poland’s 2027 parliamentary elections, just as they were during the 2025 presidential campaign.
Meanwhile, recent statements by Polish politicians reveal a new concern regarding Ukraine. Above all, there is growing anxiety that Kyiv’s dependence on Polish support has significantly decreased.
As a result, the effectiveness of threats to limit or suspend assistance has diminished sharply. If Poland were to reduce support, countries in Western and Northern Europe could likely compensate without major difficulty.
In addition, a prolonged crisis in bilateral relations casts doubt on promises by Polish politicians to secure especially favorable conditions for Polish businesses participating in Ukraine’s reconstruction.
At the same time, it strengthens fears that Ukraine’s foreign policy will become increasingly oriented towards Berlin rather than Warsaw.
Under these circumstances, a confrontation with Ukraine that was expected to generate substantial political dividends has instead become something of a trap for Karol Nawrocki. Rather than producing a clear political victory, the dispute now risks exposing Poland’s diminishing leverage over Kyiv while creating new diplomatic and economic costs for Warsaw itself.