Why Ukraine needs Zelenskyy to travel to Gdańsk despite the Polish-Ukrainian crisis

Ukrainian-Polish relations are experiencing their deepest crisis in many years.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki’s decision to "punish" the president of Ukraine by stripping him of the Order of the White Eagle, and the subsequent mass renouncing of Polish state honours by Ukrainian politicians and diplomats, are not the cause of this crisis, merely one of its manifestations.

This is not about awards. We are truly heading towards the abyss.

Some in Warsaw are calling for military supplies to Ukraine to be halted. That is unlikely to happen (at least for now), but at a minimum, Ukraine's accession to the EU is on the line. Yet even that high stake does not mean Kyiv has unlimited room for concessions. There are red lines that the Ukrainian authorities will definitely not cross.

Under these circumstances, Ukraine’s friends in Poland are even more important than usual.

Poland’s political arena is filled with anti-Ukrainian narratives and xenophobia. A Polish minister who attempted to explain to other politicians why Ukraine named a military unit after the Heroes of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) has been harassed and attacked. That said, there are still healthy political forces in Poland. There are politicians who are trying to prevent relations with Ukraine from deteriorating further. Prime Minister Donald Tusk is one of them. So it is vitally important that Kyiv’s actions take account of the interests of those in Poland who continue to stand on the side of common sense.

For now, and precisely for these reasons, the official reaction from Kyiv to Nawrocki’s attack has been broadly correct. The order had to be returned to Warsaw.

But for the very same reasons, President Zelenskyy should travel to Poland this week.

The visit would help Ukraine’s friends – and refusing to go would help anti-Ukrainian politicians.

This article is an Editorial. That means it is published on behalf of the entire editorial team and reflects the collective position of all European Pravda journalists. We reserve this format for truly exceptional cases, particularly when Ukraine finds itself at an important crossroads. Given that the President’s Office is reportedly considering declining to attend the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) in Gdańsk, this is just such a situation.

We will also explain in this article why the European Pravda editorial board believes that the "order-fall" (the return of Polish state decorations by Ukrainian politicians and diplomats) was necessary. It’s particularly important to note that this unprecedented step, taken without any directives or coordination, was undertaken not only by representatives of the current government, but by its opponents as well.

This demonstrates the existence of the red lines mentioned above – red lines that are not obvious to Poland.

Ukraine as a political tool

First, let us address something that Kyiv is acutely aware of and that we at European Pravda have written about many times, but which is important for understanding the current situation.

The "Ukraine question" has long been used as a tool in domestic politics in Poland. The reason is simple: playing against Ukraine brings electoral dividends.

This tendency has evolved into a self-reinforcing spiral.

Opinion polls consistently show that negative attitudes towards Ukrainians predominate in Poland, especially among right-wing voters (who constitute the majority of the electorate), and that this is getting worse. As a result, criticising Ukraine/the UPA/Stepan Bandera has become an obligatory element of almost every right-wing politician’s campaign.

These politicians have no hesitation about playing the Ukraine card, often relying on myths, half-truths or outright lies.

Anti-Ukrainian statements by politicians then normalise this sort of rhetoric and further worsen public attitudes towards Ukrainians. The vicious circle is complete.

It isn’t just the far-right who play this game (you have only to recall the anti-Ukrainian remarks made by the liberal politician Rafał Trzaskowski during the 2025 election campaign).

But when it comes to the Nawrocki-Tusk rivalry, the division of roles is particularly clear.

For Nawrocki, attacks on Ukraine are a tool in his struggle against Donald Tusk.

For example, if Tusk is not sufficiently supportive of criticism of Ukraine by Nawrocki, he can be accused of being "pro-Ukrainian". In Poland today, this accusation is being increasingly used to stigmatise nationally prominent politicians.

The story surrounding the Order of the White Eagle is a perfect example of this dynamic, as European Pravda has previously explained in this article. When Karol Nawrocki signed the decree stripping Volodymyr Zelenskyy of the Order, it wasn’t just punishing his Ukrainian counterpart that was important to him. More significantly, he would need to send the decree to Tusk for countersignature, knowing that the prime minister is opposed to the Ukrainian president being "punished".

Every day that passed without Tusk’s signature gave Nawrocki an opportunity to attack him, accusing him of tolerating the crimes committed in Volhynia in 1943, and so on. This is precisely why Zelenskyy’s decision to return the order to Warsaw was the right one: it removed the political need for Tusk’s signature and minimised the political damage to him.

That said, the decoration did not necessarily have to be sent back via Nova Poshta courier; other channels were available. But politics is rarely devoid of an element of theatre.

Why going to Gdańsk is the necessary next step

However, Zelenskyy’s loss of the decoration is not the end of the story.

The crisis has not gone anywhere. It has only become more acute. And the President’s Office in Kyiv is fully aware of how deep it is. One sign of this is the fact that since early June, Zelenskyy has no longer been using Rzeszów Airport for his foreign trips. During a period of tension between the two countries, it would look odd to be relying on Polish transit and would further underscore Kyiv’s dependence on Poland.

Nevertheless, Zelenskyy had planned to make an exception for the trip to Gdańsk given the importance of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2026) – the annual international forum on Ukraine, which this year has been organised by Poland.

However, after the decoration was withdrawn, Kyiv started to think about cancelling even that exception.

Indeed, over the weekend, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha stated that Zelenskyy might decline to travel to Gdańsk.

In other words, Ukraine could choose to punish Poland in return.

Zelenskyy’s refusal to attend the conference would indeed constitute a form of punishment. It would be highly likely to lead to a lower level of participation by other countries. At present, participation is expected to be at leader level. According to early reports, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen are planning to attend.

Moreover, the worst-case scenario would be if all of Ukraine’s top government officials were to announce that they could not attend, effectively stripping the conference of its purpose.

Poland aspires to international leadership on Ukrainian issues and is frustrated by its inability to fully achieve that goal. Even the milder version of such a response would be a slap in the face of the Polish government from Kyiv.

And "government" is the operative word here.

The Gdańsk conference is a project of the Polish government and Donald Tusk personally. It was Tusk who arranged for top European leaders to attend.

So its disruption or failure would be a failure for Tusk. It would also provide another argument for anti-Ukrainian forces in Warsaw to complain about Kyiv’s "ingratitude", which they would claim is isolating Poland from European discussions on aid to Ukraine.

In addition, Zelenskyy’s refusal to travel to Gdańsk would be perceived in Poland as a sign of Kyiv’s weakness.

Thus, such a response from Kyiv would be the best possible gift for Nawrocki, and it is quite likely that this is exactly what he is hoping for. There is even a view, not without foundation, that derailing the URC may have been one of the motives behind Nawrocki’s decision to sign the White Eagle decree at this particular time.

So should Ukraine really give Nawrocki such a gift?

That is a rhetorical question.

But an important point must be added: decisions regarding Poland should be based on two factors.

The first is Ukraine’s interest: does a given action bring strategic benefit to Ukraine?

The second is the interest of those forces and politicians in Poland that are friendly to Ukraine. If Ukraine acts without considering their position, it will only strengthen anti-Ukrainian forces – and ultimately harm Ukraine itself.

Both of these considerations mean that Zelenskyy should go to Gdańsk and maintain the Polish government’s engagement in Ukrainian affairs. Politics is no place for emotional decisions.

But this also means that despite all of Nawrocki’s outrageous behaviour, Zelenskyy should also seek to meet with him.

Red lines for both sides

As we have mentioned, topics such as the UPA, Bandera and "Ukraine's ingratitude" have long been part of domestic politics in Poland, where Ukraine is treated as an object.

But that does not negate the fact that for Polish voters, the issue of the UPA is indeed highly sensitive.

The reason is that Poland largely lives within a historical myth about the events of the first half of the last century. In the interpretation dear to Nawrocki, the entire right wing and Polish historiography in general, Poland was solely an innocent victim during the interwar period and World War II.

There was no Polish occupation of Ukraine. There were no ethnically motivated crimes by Poles against the Ukrainian population. There was no ethnic cleansing by the Home Army (Armia Krajowa). Instead, the Volhynia tragedy of 1943 is unequivocally identified in Polish historiography as "genocide".

Most Poles deny and do not wish to hear that for Ukrainians, the UPA is a symbol of Ukraine’s struggle for statehood and freedom. It is perceived exclusively through the lens of ethnic crimes.

So while for politicians history is often merely a tool to be used, their voters feel genuinely offended.

The social sensitivity of this issue in Poland has to be understood – and this is precisely what Ukrainian politicians often fail to do.

But at the same time, we must also work to ensure that the Polish public understands the principled nature of Ukraine’s position. In Poland there is a widespread belief that the issue is simply about politicians’ malicious intentions.

The conspiracy theory that Zelenskyy named a unit of the Special Operations Forces after the "Heroes of the UPA" specifically in order to insult Poland, and as part of a larger strategic manoeuvre, is very widespread. This is not a fringe belief. And it appears that Nawrocki did genuinely expect Zelenskyy to reverse that decision. Yet for Ukraine, that would have been an absolute red line and would have meant agreeing to Poland rewriting Ukrainian history.

That is why the mass renouncing of Polish state honours by Ukrainian politicians was not just a gesture: it also carried significant meaning.

This was not done by order of the President’s Office (as indicated by the lack of synchronisation: two days passed between the decision of Sybiha, who was the first, and former ambassador to Poland Vasyl Zvarych, who is currently the latest to return an award). It’s also important to note that all the recipients of the Order of the White Eagle have returned it, including Petro Poroshenko, a political opponent of the current president, and Leonid Kuchma, who is certainly not dependent on Zelenskyy.

There was probably no other way to send the message that Nawrocki’s decision crossed a red line for Ukraine.

That he had offended not Zelenskyy, but the Ukrainian people.

After all, the order awarded to Zelenskyy in 2023 was rightly perceived as an award to the brave Ukrainian people and to the Ukrainian soldiers who are defending Europe, including Poland, from the Russian invasion. So Nawrocki’s "punishment" was not directed at Zelenskyy alone, but at all Ukrainians.

And most importantly, pressure from the Polish president demanding that Ukraine abandon its interpretation of history is unlikely to succeed. Opposition to this approach is broad and includes representatives of all political camps.

However, while defining red lines is important, it is certainly not all that needs to be done. Ukraine’s leadership must also seek a way out of this deadlock.

And the worst possible option right now would be to burn bridges with Nawrocki.

The stakes are too high for Ukraine to leave grievances to heal on their own after this level of escalation.

Therefore, Zelenskyy should not only attend the URC in Gdańsk, but also seek opportunities to meet Nawrocki. For this reason, sending the order back via Nova Poshta rather than trying to deliver it personally may not have been the best idea – although the editorial board of European Pravda has differing views on this point as well.

Six months ago, in a similarly challenging context ahead of the Hungarian elections, Kyiv chose to burn its bridges with Viktor Orbán in anticipation that Péter Magyar would win. That bet paid off, and Ukraine now has a new partner in Hungary – not always an easy one, but one with whom agreements are possible.

But repeating that strategy with Poland is not possible right now.

Nawrocki’s current term has only just begun and is set to last until 2030. There is no certainty that the right wing will not regain both parliament and government in the 2027 elections. So there is no alternative to negotiating, while respecting the red lines of both sides. Zelenskyy must seek a path to such agreements even when no path is visible.

Options must be proposed that allow Nawrocki to claim an electoral victory and to sell the decision to right-wing voters.

And for that to happen, bridges with Poland, including with the Polish right wing, must not be burned. There are still many friends of Ukraine there, but in the current climate they are forced either to remain silent or to join the chorus of critics.

The trip to Gdańsk (and possibly also to Warsaw) should be the first step on this difficult path.

Editorial Board of European Pravda