The assets were returned in full, with their integrity and packaging verified by Oschadbank representatives.

Photo: European Pravda sources

The shipment consisted of US$40 million, €35 million and 9 kg of bank gold.

The bank also released photos of the recovered valuables.

Yurii Katsion, Chairman of the Board of Oschadbank, who led the bank's team in Hungary, said: "The unlawful detention of the cash-in-transit team and Hungary's seizure of the funds and valuables belonging to a Ukrainian state-run bank which they have held onto for two months constituted a violation of numerous international norms and rules of intergovernmental cooperation. We are now grateful to Hungary for its constructive approach. The handover of the funds was carried out in line with proper European international cooperation practices."

Photo: Oschadbank

On 6 May, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Hungary had returned the seized funds and valuables.

The incident dates back to 6 March, when Hungarian authorities detained Ukrainian cash-in-transit personnel and seized a large amount of currency.

The convoy had been transporting cash and gold worth about US$80 million from Raiffeisen Bank in Austria to Oschadbank in Ukraine.

Hungary later released the personnel but passed a law enabling the confiscation of the assets.

Fedir Shandor, Ukraine's Ambassador to Hungary, previously stressed that it is important not only to return the property but also to ensure that those responsible are held accountable.

The political crisis there is in full swing. The day before, parliament dismissed the pro-European and Ukraine-friendly government of Ilie Bolojan. Notably, the no-confidence initiative was launched by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) – a member of the ruling coalition and currently the largest force in the Romanian parliament.

Its key ally became the anti-Western and Eurosceptic Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). It is currently Romania’s most popular party, supported by 34% of voters.

Speaking to European Pravda, Romanian politics expert Serhii Herasymchuk explained how Romania’s political crisis could develop further and how dangerous it may become for relations between Ukraine and Romania. Read more in the article: Support for Ukraine or a "new Orbán": what Ukraine should expect from Romania's government change.

The most critical scenario for Ukraine would be early parliamentary elections in Romania because AUR would be highly likely to win them.

Lawmakers have two attempts and two months to form a coalition and agree on a new prime minister.

If AUR becomes the largest faction in parliament, its political pull will increase significantly. In that case, one of the other parties might decide to ignore its own taboo against cooperating with the far-right.

In other words, it could join AUR in a coalition.

If, however, parliament manages to form any majority without AUR and the current parliament survives, the situation would be less critical.

In that case, the level of danger would be more "yellow" than "red", meaning moderate risk. It would likely be a situational alliance, implying constant bargaining and political trade-offs.

But support for Ukraine could also become part of those negotiations.

In any case, there will be no ideal outcome for Ukraine.

The main threat for Ukraine is a scenario in which AUR comes to power – whether through coalition deals within the current parliament or through snap elections.

That would mean the end of Romania’s support for Ukraine. AUR representatives have repeatedly promised exactly that.

It would also mean constant bargaining at the EU level whenever sanctions against Russia are discussed.

Romania could also begin exploiting the issue of national minorities again – something previous governments had largely refrained from doing for years.

Problems would emerge for regional cooperation as well, particularly for the trilateral Ukraine-Romania-Moldova format known as the "Odesa Triangle" – a highly practical and useful framework in areas such as energy and infrastructure. For AUR, Ukraine is considered unfriendly, while Moldova is not even seen as a truly independent state.

In essence, Romania could take the place that Viktor Orbán occupied until recently.

Romania’s president has said he will not allow the formation of an anti-European coalition, arguing that the country’s pro-Western course is enshrined in the constitution and that he is its guarantor.

Such statements from Nicușor Dan are understandable: he came to office on a wave of pro-European sentiment and is interested in forming a coalition government without AUR.

Therefore, Dan will pressure all members of the collapsed coalition to rebuild it.

But there is no guarantee he will succeed.

One possible scenario is a minority government, in which the Social Democrats leave the coalition but continue supporting some legislation. At the same time, on sensitive issues, such as cuts to social benefits or pensions or raising VAT, they would refuse to participate, allowing them to preserve their image in the eyes of their voters.

As reported by Latvian public broadcaster LSM, on 7 May, Latvia reported unidentified drones entering its airspace from Russia.

Emergency services later found what may be debris from a drone at an oil storage facility in Rēzekne.

Guntars Skudra, head of the Rēzekne District Council, said one of the drones had struck an empty oil tank.

On 3 May, residents of several regions in Latvia and Estonia were warned of a potential drone threat linked to Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

Around the same time, a drone also violated Finnish airspace near the Russian border.

Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo later stressed to Volodymyr Zelenskyy that such incidents are unacceptable.

"Today [6 May – ed.], the funds and valuables of Oschadbank that were seized by Hungarian special services in March of this year were returned. At the time, the Hungarian side unlawfully detained Ukrainian cash-in-transit officers. We brought our people back sooner, and now both the funds and the valuables are back on Ukrainian territory in full," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wrote on X.

Zelenskyy thanked Hungary for what he described as a constructive and civilised step.

He also expressed gratitude to the Ukrainian team "who fought for a fair decision" and defended Ukraine's interests.

In early March, the National Bank of Ukraine reported that Hungarian authorities had detained Ukrainian cash-in-transit guards and seized a large amount of currency.

The valuables in the seized vehicles amounted to US$40 million, €35 million and 9 kilograms of gold.

Hungary later released the cash-in-transit workers and passed legislation providing for the confiscation of the currency and valuables from Oschadbank's cash-in-transit vehicles.

A senior member of Orbán's government later effectively acknowledged that the incident involving the cash-in-transit guards was a response to Ukraine's "blocking" of the Druzhba oil pipeline.

In April, it was reported that Zelenskyy planned to discuss with Péter Magyar, whose Tisza party won the elections in Hungary, the return of Oschadbank funds allegedly "stolen" by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

What does this mean for Ukrainian business, why the European market is becoming more difficult for our exporters and how Ukraine is trying to balance between European integration and trade restrictions? Read more in the article (as part of a special project) by European Pravda co-founder Yurii Panchenko and Olena Omelchenko of the law firm "Ilyashev & Partners": Trade almost without rules: how EU and Ukraine are responding to chaos that has become Trump’s tool.

After the expiration of the EU’s autonomous trade preferences, the bloc shifted to a more restrictive regime for certain Ukrainian goods, particularly through expanded tariff quotas and new safeguard mechanisms.

As the past year has shown, even these measures have not eased tensions: several EU member states continue to push for stricter controls on imports of Ukrainian products.

Moreover, the issue has expanded beyond agriculture.

Although preferential access for Ukrainian metallurgical products remains, new EU climate tools, especially the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), pose additional risks to the competitiveness of Ukrainian exports.

The mechanism is currently in a transitional phase, but it is already clear that its full implementation could significantly affect Ukrainian producers' positions on the European market.

Ukraine is negotiating with the EU on possible exemptions or special conditions under CBAM, but the outcome remains uncertain.

The situation is further complicated by changes within Ukraine’s negotiating team. Such institutional shifts inevitably affect both the pace of negotiations and internal coordination.

However, the key challenge is not just institutional restructuring.

With limited resources, the government must prioritise and the priority is clear: EU accession talks and fulfilling integration requirements.

According to current plans, Ukraine aims to close most negotiation chapters within the next 12–18 months, laying the groundwork for a future membership agreement.

Within this framework, many current trade problems are viewed as temporary, expected to be resolved gradually through integration into the EU single market.

This also means that some immediate challenges faced by exporters receive less attention in day-to-day trade policy.

Given that the EU sees enlargement as a long and complex process, Ukrainian businesses will continue operating under conditions of partial integration, and all the associated market access limitations, for quite some time.

In this environment, the role of business itself becomes crucial.

Ukrainian companies increasingly need to: systematically communicate market access barriers to the government, consolidate positions at the industry level, propose concrete solutions from trade defence tools to adaptation to new EU regulatory requirements.

Effective use of trade defense instruments and strong cooperation between business and the state are becoming critically important.

The broader takeaway: it is time to systematically defend Ukrainian exports and producers – both domestically and internationally.

On 5 May, the Council of the European Union approved a decision for the EU to sign the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the special tribunal concerning Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The tribunal will target senior Russian political and military leadership, including Vladimir Putin.

The approval means the EU will sign the agreement once it is adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

At a later stage, once a sufficient number of Council of Europe member states have declared their intention to join the Enlarged Partial Agreement, the European Commission will submit a proposal to the Council of the EU to conclude the agreement.

The Council of the EU will then seek consent from the European Parliament.

Following parliamentary approval and ratification, the EU will formally sign the agreement and join the tribunal as a co-founder.

The EU is expected to play a leading role in the tribunal's work and to join its management committee.

The special tribunal will have a mandate to prosecute top political and military leaders for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. It is being established under the auspices of the Council of Europe following a 25 June 2025 agreement with Ukraine.

A total of 24 countries – most recently Belgium – have declared their intention to join the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the special tribunal to investigate Russia's crime of aggression against Ukraine.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said the agreement will be put to a vote at a meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 14-15 May in Chisinau.

In early June 2026, the EU is preparing the seventh tranche of financial assistance to Ukraine under the Ukraine Facility mechanism, amounting to €2.8 billion.

"The Council of the EU is currently considering a proposal regarding the implementation of a decision on providing Ukraine with the seventh tranche of the Ukraine Facility, which provides for a payment of €2.8 billion. The disbursement is planned for the very beginning of June," an EU official familiar with the financing process told European Pravda on condition of anonymity.

They noted that the amount is based on reforms carried out by Ukraine, including commitments that Kyiv had pledged to fulfil in 2025, accounting for €1.2 billion.

As for the seventh tranche – tied to first-quarter 2026 commitments – Ukraine has completed only 11 out of the 20 planned steps, which will still allow it to receive €1.6 billion.

Overall, under the Ukraine Facility mechanism, Ukraine has already received €36.8 billion in six tranches – in the form of budget support, humanitarian and other assistance; mostly as loans but also as grants.

EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos stated that Ukraine had met a number of requirements to receive the new tranche under the Ukraine Facility.

A requirement to carry out tax reform will be included among the conditions for Ukraine to receive future tranches of macro-financial assistance under the EU's €90 billion loan programme.

The EU is setting stricter reform conditions for Ukraine to receive macro-financial tranches, while Kyiv is resisting some of Brussels' demands.

Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre said Norway, working with its European partners, is funding US military aid packages to support Ukraine's defence efforts.

Reporting that Norway is making another important contribution, he said he hopes that more European countries will join efforts to ensure Ukraine quickly receives vital military equipment.

With this new contribution, Norway has provided more than NOK 12.5 billion (US$1.35 billion) through the PURL programme in total.

At an informal summit of European Union member states in late April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that three more countries had joined the PURL programme.

Prior to this, Ukraine's Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated that several countries had announced new contributions to the PURL scheme at a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group.

On 4 May, Canada announced that it will contribute an additional US$200 million to the programme.

Barrot noted that in April, Russian forces were forced to retreat from around 120 sq km of territory in Ukraine – the first such setback in three years. He also pointed to a worsening crisis in the Russian economy.

"It is time for the Kremlin to open its eyes to its failure and put an end to its unjustifiable and ruinous war of aggression," he wrote on X.

Les armées de Vladimir Poutine ont reculé de 120 km2 en Ukraine au mois d'avril, une première depuis 3 ans. L'économie russe s'enfonce dans la crise. Il est grand temps pour le Kremlin d'ouvrir les yeux sur son échec, et de mettre fin à sa guerre d'agression injustifiable et…

– Jean-Noël Barrot (@jnbarrot) May 6, 2026

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys added that Russia has ignored Ukraine's proposal for a truce starting on 6 May, calling it further evidence of Moscow's unwillingness to end the war and of the need to increase pressure.

In response to Russia's unilateral declaration of a ceasefire for 8-9 May, Ukraine called for an immediate halt to hostilities from the night of 5-6 May – a position supported by Kyiv's partners including Germany and Norway.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Air Force reported on the morning of 6 May that Russia has resumed airstrikes from the very first hours of the day.

Oslo said it backs Kyiv's call for an immediate ceasefire with Russia starting from the night of 5-6 May, in response to Moscow's unilateral move.

"There is nothing to wait for. Russia can at any point end this war by ceasing to attack Ukraine and its civilians," the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote on X.

Norway supports @ZelenskyyUa and @andrii_sybiha 's call for immediate ceasefire. There is nothing to wait for. Russia can at any point end this war by ceasing to attack Ukraine and its civilians.

– Norway MFA (@NorwayMFA) May 5, 2026

Germany's foreign minister has also urged Russia to accept Ukraine's ceasefire proposal.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Air Force reported on the morning of 6 May that Russia has resumed airstrikes from the very first hours of the day.

On 9 May, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico is expected to visit Moscow and meet Russian leader Vladimir Putin, although he has said he will not attend the Victory Day military parade.