Ukraine rejects "associate membership". What should EU offer instead?
Last week, Merz’s idea of a special format for Ukraine’s EU integration caused quite a stir. It drew criticism, including from European Pravda, but also some positive reactions.
It may have seemed that President Zelenskyy put an end to the discussion when, at the end of the week, he rejected Merz’s proposal in its current form in a detailed letter to EU leaders. His main message in the four-page letter can be summed up as: "There can be no complete European project without Ukraine, and Ukraine’s place in the European Union must be full and equal."
However, this does not mean that Merz’s initiative is "dead".
The German Chancellor has energised discussions within the EU about what to do with Ukraine and there are already several alternative proposals, including one from the Lithuanian government, which certainly cannot be accused of acting against Ukraine’s interests.
Moreover, despite criticism from Kyiv, it is also in Ukraine’s interest that Merz’s idea does not disappear, but instead evolves.
The key question is that it should develop into forms that are beneficial both to European and Ukrainian political actors, as well as to Ukrainian society.
And this is a completely realistic task.
Indeed, Merz’s proposal contains both certain dangerous elements and some positive elements that could be useful for Ukraine.
Thus, the German Chancellor did in fact make several critical mistakes in his letter to EU leadership, and these should be analysed separately in order to draw red lines, crossing which would create risks for Ukraine. But if these are corrected, steps by the EU are entirely possible that would not yet mean full membership, but would still be beneficial for Ukraine.
Moreover, Kyiv should fight for such formats and for the refinement of Merz’s idea into acceptable forms. And this work must be done without delay, because the time window for creating a new framework will remain open for only a few more weeks.
Membership, not a substitute
First, it should be emphasised as a fundamental point: full accession to the European Union is Ukraine’s goal.
And this is not only a question of the fact that this course is enshrined in the Constitution. It is not only the course supported by the country’s current leadership.
EU accession has unequivocal support from Ukrainian society. This provides a significant level of confidence that this goal will be maintained under future governments as well, because it will be a demand of voters. Even more important is the fact that Ukraine’s accession to the EU is a geopolitical necessity. Geography and the proximity of Russia, which is unlikely to lose its desire to destroy Ukraine, leave no alternative to European integration. Moreover, from a security perspective, this is also necessary for the European Union itself.
Therefore, the main problem with Merz’s letter is that the integration scheme he proposed, if implemented in its current form, calls Ukraine’s ultimate goal into question.
Merz’s proposal decouples Ukraine and Moldova. For Chișinău (as well as for Balkan states that are more advanced in integration matters), Merz suggests finding ways to accelerate accession, while for Ukraine he proposes introducing a new special status. As a result, the letter was perceived in official Kyiv as an attempt to create a pretext that could lead to replacing Ukraine’s EU membership with an alternative (and moreover, an empty alternative without substantive content).
European and German sources have assured European Pravda that Merz did not intend this.
He still sincerely, just as stated in his letter, aims to bring Ukraine into the EU.
But regardless of intentions, for official Kyiv, the decoupling of Ukraine’s and Moldova’s integration paths is seen as a red flag. If decoupling is carried out now, it could be used precisely to pull Ukraine away from the leading group of enlargement countries and "relegate" it to the laggards, whose accession would be discussed only much later. Even if the initiators of this idea do not actually have such intentions.
Therefore, even without this element, Merz’s idea would be received much more positively.
A path to accession, not a special status
The second idea that will definitely not find support from Kyiv and will also not receive unanimous positive reception from the Ukrainian expert community is the special status that Merz proposed calling "associate membership".
European Pravda already explained in a previous article why such a proposal sounds politically meaningless and communicatively harmful for Ukraine: for a state that has had an Association Agreement signed and ratified with the EU for nearly nine years, this sounds like an attempt to "sell" Ukraine something it has obtained. Therefore, any future "creative" ideas offering Ukraine "another association" are destined to be received negatively.
In Berlin, however, they insist that for Merz this term is not essential. Several European Pravda sources assure that the Chancellor’s team is already aware of Kyiv’s negative perception of the name, and that it would not be a problem to drop references to "associate membership" in all further reflections on Ukraine’s path to accession.
That is good. But the problem is not only this specific name.
Ideas that Ukraine could gain greater access to EU institutions and be more actively present in European discussions are worth considering. But attempts to formalise them as an official status raise a legitimate question in Kyiv – could this turn into a substitute for membership?
The way Merz’s proposal was framed pushed precisely towards that interpretation.
This is also how Zelenskyy appears to have read it, which is reflected in his emotional response letter to European leaders (European Pravda has seen the text of this document). The president describes the German Chancellor’s ideas as "half-measures", and the proposed status for Ukraine as "semi-membership", insisting that Ukraine "deserves a fair approach and equal rights with Europe".
So what should the EU actually propose for Ukraine to agree?
First, it is worth considering whether this should be a formal status at all. Interim initiatives that help Ukraine’s integration do not always need to be framed as a special legal status. Otherwise, it creates grounds for debate about whether such a step could one day become an alternative to full integration.
The logic would be: you have received "intermediate membership" (whatever it may be called), so there is no need to rush towards formal accession.
Kyiv will inevitably take such a risk into account, knowing that there are actors within the EU (by the way, Merz is not among them) who would welcome such an outcome.
However, there is an alternative: a new formal EU status for Ukraine that would not raise such concerns from the outset. This is possible if the status is clearly defined as a stage on the way to accession and has no alternative interpretation. Put simply, a status of a country negotiating an accession treaty (as is currently the case with Montenegro), or a country that has signed an accession treaty but is awaiting ratification (normal and even desirable for Kyiv).
In search of a hybrid solution that takes these considerations into account, Lithuania, through dialogue with other EU countries, is proposing to formally establish a status for Ukraine called an "acceding state", meaning a country in the process of joining the EU. As you can see, this is a fundamentally different concept from the "associate member" status suggested in Merz’s letter.
But it is not only the name that matters. It is also the substance.
Why the issue has become urgent
It is also worth briefly addressing what was mentioned at the beginning of the article: the next few weeks are decisive for shaping the future architecture of EU accession.
On 18–19 June, at the end of the Cypriot presidency, an EU summit is set to be held in Brussels. Formally, its agenda has not yet been set, but in practice the meeting is expected to focus largely on the emerging new balance of power within the European Union.
This is the first official EU summit after Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat and the first meeting of leaders with the new Hungarian leadership under Péter Magyar. Orbán was a source of problems far beyond Ukraine. He openly worked to undermine European unity, publicly questioned shared values and the weakening of EU unity on Ukraine was only one element of this broader pattern.
Although Magyar presents himself as "anti-Orbán", not all capitals are fully convinced. He still has to prove it and that has not yet happened.
For now, the EU has a significant leverage tool over Magyar’s government: blocked funds left over from the Orbán era, which are about to expire. Therefore, Brussels must decide before the end of summer on the release of billions of euros that are critically needed by the Hungarian government. During this period, Péter Magyar will have the strongest incentive to align with common EU policies.
The only EU summit in this period will take place in about three and a half weeks, in June.
So Ukraine is interested in ensuring that ambitious and acceptable ideas regarding its European integration are put on the agenda of this summit.
However, it would be naïve to expect Ukraine to be offered EU membership at that summit. This is impossible even in theory. After all, the obstacles to faster progress are not limited to Hungary, and not even primarily Hungary. There is also Ukraine’s own assessed lack of readiness, according to Brussels and key capitals; insufficient reform momentum, particularly in the "Fundamentals" cluster; and unresolved questions about the EU’s own functioning, including its Common Agricultural Policy and other institutional issues.
But beyond that, we should extract as much as possible from this moment of shaping a new European vision of Ukraine.
Even without "voting rights", one can still be loud
Despite criticism of several important elements of Friedrich Merz’s initiative, Ukraine should in fact be grateful for his letter. It has triggered a discussion within the EU about what to do with Ukrainian accession.
The standard path to EU membership is clearly not suitable for Ukraine, and the German Chancellor also emphasises this. It is too long, because this path was designed for completely different realities in Europe. And it is too dangerous because even European leaders now understand that for Russia, Ukraine’s success and its accession to the EU are unacceptable outcomes.
That is why Europe is trying to find ways that do not threaten the destruction of the European Union, but would allow Ukraine to reach membership more quickly.
As a result, creative ideas are emerging about how to help Kyiv, including in the area of reforms (which ultimately cannot be avoided).
Not all of these ideas have received support from Ukraine. In particular, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in his letter to the EU, expressed criticism of Merz’s proposal, saying that, under the framework of "associate membership", Ukraine would receive the right to send representatives to all EU institutions (from the Council of the EU to the Court of Justice of the EU), but without voting rights.
His arguments are understandable, but not all of them are convincing.
In fact, participation in the Council of the EU would be very useful for Ukraine itself.
And this is not about the political level.
Meetings of the Council of the EU take place almost daily in different sectoral configurations, with ministers from various countries travelling to Brussels every day. In this context, it is arguably not essential for Ukrainian ministers to constantly travel to the EU capital, especially given that each trip takes two days – significantly longer under wartime conditions from Kyiv than from most other European capitals.
Moreover, these ministerial meetings are often more ceremonial in nature – countries arrive with already agreed positions.
Therefore, it would be much more interesting to participate in the Council’s working bodies, where those positions are actually shaped. So that Ukrainian representatives would be present in all internal EU discussions without exception; receive information and be able to report back to the capital if something goes wrong.
And, ultimately, be able to express Kyiv’s position.
Because even without voting rights, Ukraine does not have to remain silent. Even in an observer role, Ukrainian representatives would have the right to present the Ukrainian government’s position, explain it, warn against decisions that could undermine EU–Ukraine relations and point out consequences that may not be obvious in Brussels, among other things.
There is much less sense, however, in Ukraine being represented in the European Parliament without voting rights. That is a political body where influence matters greatly. And if the discussion is about electing "non-MEP MEPs", then which Ukrainian politicians would compete for such a position with only symbolic weight?
The same applies to the EU Court of Justice (appointing a judge from Ukraine who would not have voting power but would simply sit in Luxembourg – an idea that may be interesting, but not groundbreaking), and so on.
And finally, the timing of this development is crucial.
Let us recall a basic principle: Ukraine’s goal is full membership. And it would be entirely normal, even desirable, for there to be an intermediate status that serves as a transitional stage on the way to accession. For example, a "status of a state in the accession process", as proposed by the Lithuanians.
Therefore, if the European Union offers a substantive, concrete status that truly functions as such a transitional stage, it could help Ukrainian reforms. It would also demonstrate to EU member states, their politicians, Ukrainians, and ultimately also the Kremlin, that Ukraine’s accession to the EU is a truly inevitable and irreversible European decision, and that full membership is only a matter of time.
In the ideal scenario, the EU could decide to grant this status in exchange for Ukraine fulfilling the requirements of the first "Fundamentals" cluster, which includes rule of law, anti-corruption measures, human rights and more.
Within the EU, the benchmarks have been agreed – criteria used to assess Ukraine’s compliance – and there is also a mechanism for such evaluation for candidate countries, known as IBAR.
From there, the question becomes one of creativity.
When to sign the accession treaty and when to ratify it; how to define possible timelines for Ukraine to enjoy the benefits of membership; how to make the process legally irreversible – these are all issues that can and must be considered.
And if Merz’s letter, despite its initial shortcomings, leads to such an agreement, it will become a historic milestone on Ukraine’s path to EU accession.
After all, diplomacy is always the art of the impossible. And Ukraine has more than once shown mastery of that art.
Sergiy Sydorenko,
Editor, European Pravda