Who is the new Hungary? Why Ukraine's EU accession talks are still stalling and what comes next

Ukraine wants to open the first cluster in its EU accession talks as early as 26 May, and the other five shortly afterwards.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha shared this with the media after the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Brussels on 11 May. This point was even included in the official statement by Ukraine's Foreign Ministry.

Given such optimism, EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos appeared uncharacteristically restrained in her expectations. According to Kos, the first cluster should be opened before the end of Cyprus's presidency of the Council of the EU (by 30 June) and all the remaining clusters should open in July 2026.

But the diplomats in Brussels who spoke to European Pravda off the record are even more cautious. They say the opening of the final clusters could be delayed until the autumn, or even later.

So whose forecast is correct, and when will the EU begin opening clusters for Ukraine?

And is there any truth in rumours that two new countries have allegedly emerged as blockers of Ukraine’s progress, effectively taking over the role previously played by Viktor Orbán?

The post-Orbán era

European Pravda has explained in previous reports that Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations are divided into six negotiating clusters. But to recap: the most important is Cluster No. 1, Fundamentals, within which Ukraine must demonstrate compliance with EU requirements in areas such as the rule of law, anti-corruption policy and related reforms. Under the negotiation rules, the Fundamentals cluster is opened first and closed last.

Ukraine is fighting specifically for this cluster to be opened.

The EU was technically ready to take this step as long ago as March 2025. But the process stalled because Hungary blocked Ukraine’s path to EU membership by refusing to approve the EU’s common negotiating position for opening the cluster – the document that lists the criteria Ukraine must meet during the negotiations. This step, like many others in the EU enlargement process, requires unanimous support from all 27 member states.

By the end of 2025, Ukraine had completed the screening procedures, and discussions could have moved towards opening negotiations on all the clusters. But former Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán, citing the results of a survey of Hungarians whose fairness was widely questioned, continued to oppose any advancement of Ukraine on its path to EU membership.

After spending several months attempting first to persuade Orbán and then to find a way around his veto, the European Commission proposed a mechanism called "frontloading". This is an entirely new format for the EU, designed specifically for Ukraine, that would allow accession negotiations to proceed at a technical level without negotiating clusters being formally opened.

At the same time, the European Commission and the member states drafted negotiating positions for each cluster. Moreover, these documents were even handed over to Ukraine (three clusters in December and three more in March).

Officials in both Kyiv and Brussels reiterated that they wanted to open all the clusters at once as soon as Orbán's veto had disappeared.

The necessary preparations have been completed.

"Everything is ready for opening the clusters," one European Commission official recently assured European Pravda. Both the draft negotiating positions and the benchmarks have been submitted to the Council of the EU for consideration. They received preliminary approval from 26 member states (all except Hungary) back in winter, which made it possible to launch technical negotiations through "frontloading".

But politically, there has been no progress whatsoever.

And Orbán’s defeat has not changed the situation so far.

Moreover, there is no discussion underway at the level of member states' ambassadors about officially giving Ukraine the green light even with regard to the first cluster – and it cannot be put to the vote without technical and procedural preparation at the diplomats' level.

So what is the obstacle now?

Who is against Ukraine, and does a "Franco-Polish veto" exist?

On 12 May, Brussels was outraged when Rikard Jozwiak of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty claimed that the countries most opposed to all the negotiating clusters for Ukraine being opened at once are France and Poland. According to Jozwiak, they are lobbying for the opening of the remaining clusters to be postponed until around autumn.

But by the following morning, Jozwiak had cast doubt on his own publication. He stated that Poland and France had denied his assessment. At the same time, he was in no hurry to admit he had been wrong.

"We'll see what happens in June," he added.

Jozwiak’s persistence is understandable, because if you look not at the formal signs (indeed, no vote on Ukraine has taken place), but at the substance of events, he and his sources do not appear to be mistaken about the positions of France and Poland.

Indeed, Paris and Warsaw have every reason not to rush this process and to compel Kyiv to meet certain conditions first instead.

Poland and France are both countries with powerful farming lobbies that fear competition from Ukrainian farmers – and not without reason. In both countries, there are also concerns that Ukraine's accession to the EU would undermine the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy fund, which currently provides generous annual financing from the EU budget to their agricultural sectors.

And there is something else that unites these two countries.

Another factor is that both will hold major elections in 2027: presidential elections in France and parliamentary elections in Poland. Strong farmers' movements represent large blocs of voters who could become a serious political problem during the upcoming campaigns.

But it’s important to emphasise that France and Poland are not alone in having such reservations. There is similar distrust and concern regarding Ukraine’s agricultural integration into the EU in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and elsewhere. However, since no formal vote on the issue has taken place, there is no definitive list of "Ukraine-sceptics". We can only speak about expectations.

Even more importantly, there is absolutely no indication that anyone intends to take over Hungary's role.

It’s this implication that appears to have triggered the outrage from the French and the Poles.

The issue is not that any one country is prepared to veto Ukraine’s progress towards EU membership. Likewise, even though Poland and France's actions are influenced by the approaching elections, neither country is considering freezing Ukraine's progress until after their own elections. That scenario is not even part of the discussions.

But ideas about changing the approach to future negotiations with Kyiv are indeed being discussed.

Under Hungary's cover

There is no shortage of issues, and Ukraine has difficult points in its relations with almost every EU member state. It appears that if the countries were forced right now to vote either for or against the immediate opening of all negotiating clusters for Ukraine, objections could arise from nearly a dozen EU states.

"Previously, all potential opponents used to hide behind Hungary's back while it blocked Ukraine's progress towards EU accession. With the change of government in Hungary and the shift in its position on this matter, you could be in for many surprises soon regarding the positions of some of Ukraine's friends on eastern enlargement," one of European Pravda's sources said.

However, this remains theoretical, because no open vote is being discussed.

Besides, the opponents’ position is not a flat "no". The situation is much more nuanced.

European Pravda has information that about a month ago, when it became increasingly clear that a change of power in Hungary was indeed likely, some countries began suggesting that the recently approved conditions for negotiations with Ukraine might need to be revised. These are the negotiating positions that the Danish and Cypriot EU presidencies handed over to Ukraine (first in December and then in March).

And it's reportedly the French and the Poles who have put forward the most ideas for changing the EU's common negotiating position with Ukraine – for example, in farming.

The most interesting developments began after Orbán's defeat became a reality.

It was then that the voices grew louder arguing that the draft negotiating position (the criteria for Ukraine) had been developed and agreed upon without Hungary's participation, and therefore it could – and should – now be changed.

And this is despite the fact that Hungary itself is not demanding such changes now. It looks as if Hungary is being used as a convenient cover. But the struggle is not over yet. There are also many friends of Ukraine among the EU member states who remind their colleagues (not only the French and Poles) that they themselves voted for the previous criteria, and that there should be consistency in the process.

As a result, several European Pravda sources involved in the process agree that it is indeed likely that the criteria will change. This could include adjustments meant to satisfy the member states that are worried about their farmers. But there is no question of fundamentally rewriting the conditions for Ukraine, and the chances of that are extremely small. Nor is there any question of a Hungarian-style blockade – the chances of that are effectively zero.

One more detail: the discussions inside the EU about possible changes to Ukraine’s criteria primarily concern two clusters: Cluster 5 (Agriculture) and Cluster 4 (particularly the chapters related to transport, where Poland effectively has a monopoly on freight transportation).

More broadly, the various areas of the negotiations with Ukraine give rise to significantly different levels of controversy. That is why officials in Brussels are increasingly advising against expecting all the clusters to open simultaneously.

So when will Ukraine open the clusters – and how many?

Traditionally, the Intergovernmental Conference at which negotiating clusters are opened takes place alongside the EU General Affairs Council (a meeting of the EU ministers for European affairs). The next such meeting is scheduled for 26 May, which is why Ukraine's Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha referred to that date.

But according to numerous Brussels sources cited by European Pravda, it is now impossible for even the first cluster to be opened by that date, and no one in the EU institutions is even working towards it.

Even setting politics aside, the technical and bureaucratic preparations alone would take time, and only 12 days remain until the date in question. Moreover, clusters must be opened not only for Ukraine, but also for Moldova, with which Ukraine is "coupled". That effectively doubles the necessary preparatory effort.

But beyond all of this, the key obstacle remains the Hungary factor.

This is the central political problem preventing the EU from even considering preparations for a 26 May launch.

With Orbán resignation, a new era in Kyiv–Budapest relations has indeed begun. The unprecedented summoning of the Russian ambassador over the strike on Transcarpathia is a clear illustration of that shift. However, this does not mean that all issues have been resolved.

Publicly, the new Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar has not yet stated whether he agrees to the opening of clusters for Ukraine. If so, how many of the six he would support, and under what conditions.

But Brussels is aware that Budapest is not yet ready for such a step. As early as late April, before his inauguration, Magyar visited the EU capital, where he told the President of the European Council that opening clusters should be preceded by steps from Ukraine. According to this position, progress would only be possible after a meeting between Magyar and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which may take place in early June, when Hungary would formally present its position to Ukraine.

Until then, there is simply no sense in putting the issue to a vote.

Diplomatic sources also believe that Hungary's position will become clearer after official meetings between Magyar and EU leadership scheduled for the last week of May.

So the first cluster could open no earlier than mid-June.

And it is already possible to roughly anticipate when this might happen.

The earliest likely date is 16 June, at the next EU General Affairs Council meeting. On that day, the first cluster for Ukraine (and Moldova) would most likely be opened, in the presence of representatives of both countries.

Another possibility is that Kyiv may want to turn the event into a more high-profile political moment – for example, involving the president – which could push it to 18-19 June, during the EU leaders' summit in Brussels. However, EU interlocutors remain sceptical about this scenario.

In any case, the EU does retain some flexibility regarding the exact day.

Either way, the first cluster is likely to remain the only open one for some time.

According to the European Pravda sources, Péter Magyar has signalled an intention to initially allow only one negotiation cluster to be opened, after which he would take a pause to wait for reforms from Ukraine in the area of minority rights.

Ukraine is expected to adopt amendments to several laws, and this process will take some time. The first cluster could be opened "on the basis of trust" in President Zelenskyy's assurances. Subsequent clusters would depend on the implementation of commitments made in agreements between Zelenskyy and Magyar.

As for the next steps, no final decision has yet been taken within the EU. Moreover, the timing of further cluster openings will depend on when Ukraine fulfils the future agreements reached with Magyar.

However, multiple conversations with the European sources indicate that one, two or even three clusters, specifically Cluster 6 (External Relations), Cluster 2 (Internal Market), and possibly Cluster 3 (Competitiveness), could be opened in July 2026, at the start of the Irish EU Council Presidency.

Clusters 4 and 5, which are already subject to discussions about possible changes in the EU's position, may take longer. The process could potentially stretch into autumn 2026. Some sceptics even suggest that the agricultural cluster might be delayed until 2027, when Lithuania holds the EU Council presidency. However, nothing has been decided yet.

Ukraine and its allies are working to ensure that 2026 becomes the year of a full and formal launch of accession negotiations and under the conditions already communicated to Ukraine.

And the chances of that are considered fairly good.

Tetiana Vysotska, Brussels correspondent,

Sergiy Sydorenko, Editor, 

European Pravda