What Ukraine finds problematic in EU's plan for frozen Russian assets
In 2022, the UN recognised that Russia bears responsibility for its aggression against Ukraine and must pay for all the damages it has caused.
Last year, the first element of an international compensation mechanism, the Register of Damages, was launched under the Council of Europe. It has begun accepting initial applications.
Next year, the second element of the mechanism, a Compensation Commission, is expected to be formally established. It will review the claims submitted to the Register and award compensation.
The third element will be the creation of a fund that could be filled with Russia’s $300 billion in frozen assets.
In this context, the European Commission’s initiative, supported also by the United Kingdom, to introduce a "reparations credit" is seen as the next logical step toward using frozen Russian assets in a practical way.
Read more about this initiative in the column by Iryna Mudra, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine: Not a confiscation, but a step toward it: why the EU’s decision on Russian assets will only be an interim one.
According to Mudra, the "reparations credit" could significantly strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities, directly affecting the situation on the front line.
However, she emphasises that this initiative is not only about defence.
"The reparations credit can and must become a bridge toward the creation of a future compensation fund, from which payments will be made to people who have lost their homes, businesses, property or livelihoods," writes Mudra.
Currently, according to her, the Register of Damages has received its first 60,000 applications, but millions more are expected once all categories are opened.
Mudra urges Ukrainians to submit their claims: "This must be done, if not for yourself, then for others, because the Register is also a tool of pressure, an argument in our negotiations that demonstrates the scale of Russian destruction. It’s our weapon against sceptics who keep claiming that our war is not as terrible as it is, and that Russians don’t target civilian sites," she notes.
At the same time, she stresses that the reparations credit is not actual reparations, since it is still not Russia’s money.
According to Mudra, European partners are discussing the possibility of replacing frozen Russian funds with their own bonds, which would later be repaid once Moscow compensates Ukraine for the damages it caused.
Under this plan, Russian assets would remain frozen until Russia, in some form, pays Ukraine real reparations.
"That’s why we clearly communicate: this is only an interim solution, and we continue to demand the full transfer of Russian assets into the compensation mechanism for Ukraine. We will not allow Russia to be released from even part of its responsibility under such a scheme," Mudra writes.
She also underlines Ukraine’s position on the credit: it must come with no conditions, since otherwise it would impose additional obligations on the victim of an aggressive war.
Mudra adds that her team is also working to expand the geographic scope of the reparations credit decision.
"The next step must be involving the G7 countries and the rest of the world, because Japan alone holds about $30 billion in Russian assets. There are about $15 billion more in Canada, $26 billion in the United Kingdom and several billion in a dozen other countries," she reports.