How Russia buys European politicians to influence Europe
Despite extensive sanctions and growing political isolation, the Russian energy sector still retains channels of influence over politics in the European Union.
According to a new research by the Ukrainian organisation Razom We Stand, one of the key instruments of such influence has become former high-ranking officials, politicians, experts and media commentators who for years worked with Russian companies or lobbied for their interests.
The authors emphasise that the problem is deepened by a lack of transparency in the funding of think tanks and civil society organisations.
Read more about how political parties, high-level politicians and influence networks across Europe help protect Russia’s fossil-fuel export revenues and continue slowing down the rejection of Russian gas in the article by Iryna Ptashnyk of Razom We Stand: Schröder and other ‘friends of Putin’: how a network of former politicians still promotes Russian interests in the EU.
The Kremlin has built an entire system of "golden rotation" over the past two decades, effectively "revolving doors" between European governments and the Russian energy sector.
Former prime ministers, ministers and influential politicians, after completing their terms in office, found themselves on the boards of Russian companies, where their political capital was transformed into a tool of Moscow’s influence in Europe.
Among the most prominent "friends of Putin" are: former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Matthias Warnig (Germany), former Prime Minister of Finland Esko Aho, former French Prime Minister François Fillon, former Austrian Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl and long-time employee of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) Alexander Rahr.
The presence of former European leaders in the media, think tanks and corporate boards is not merely a matter of prestige or a gesture of "friendship" for the Kremlin. It is a carefully designed instrument of influence that provides the Russian authorities with something no official diplomatic channel can offer.
In Moscow’s strategy, these individuals serve as "translators" of Russian interests into the European language of politics and business and that is precisely why they are so valuable.
First, former high-ranking officials provide legitimacy to Russian energy projects. When a familiar European name appears next to a Russian brand, it creates a sense of normalcy.
Second, such figures open doors to informal decision-making networks – conferences, corporate groups, analytical clubs and more.
The third element is a free communication platform. Editorial boards readily give them a voice, seeing them as experts or veterans of the political process. The Kremlin receives a stage lit by Western media spotlights.
Their speeches and comments create the appearance of expert debate, although they often repeat narratives favourable to Moscow: that "interdependence means stability," that "energy should be kept out of politics" and that "Europe cannot withstand a rapid rejection of Russian resources."
These arguments slowed the EU’s move toward energy independence for years.
Despite the European Union presenting itself for decades as a stronghold of democracy, openness and political accountability, it remains vulnerable in the area of transparency regarding foreign-state influence.
Unlike the US, Australia or the United Kingdom, the EU lacks a unified mechanism requiring companies, lobbyists, former politicians or think tanks to disclose cooperation with foreign governments or their state-owned corporations.
This absence of rules creates a huge "gray zone," where financial flows and political connections are easily obscured.
That is why the EU urgently needs a special public registry of influence, covering all three key categories: corporate structures, individuals and organisations or institutions connected to state-owned energy companies from high-risk countries.