What EU problems the Berlin blackout revealed and how Ukraine can help
Europe is gradually becoming aware of its own fragility in the face of threats of hybrid and physical attacks on energy systems and critical infrastructure.
For many years, the European model of governance and development of energy systems was shaped under stable conditions with a low level of physical threats. What in peacetime was considered efficient, economically viable, and safe is becoming a source of additional risks and vulnerabilities in the new reality.
The Berlin incident, in which five high-voltage power lines (110 kV each) and about a dozen lower-voltage lines (10–30 kV) were damaged simultaneously, clearly demonstrated elements of infrastructural fragility typical of European countries.
Read more about the weak points of the European energy system and how Ukrainian experience can help address them in the article by Maria Tsaturian of the Ukraine Facility Platform: Europe fails the resilience test: what the Berlin blackout revealed and how Ukraine can help.
For decades, Europe’s energy infrastructure was built on the assumption that no one would ever attack it.
Russia’s war against Ukraine and the massive attacks on Ukrainian energy facilities became an "ice-cold shower" for Europe.
The geopolitical unpredictability of the United States has only intensified this effect.
What weaknesses of the European energy system did the Berlin terrorist attack of 3 January reveal?
First, the absence of real backup power transmission lines capable of quickly restoring power to a city after an emergency.
Second, the vulnerability of underground urban networks in certain scenarios. They are indeed more resilient to weather disasters and drone attacks than overhead lines, but they have a critical weak spot – ground-level access.
Third, if one moves from the level of urban networks to that of trunk (backbone) infrastructure, the number of "bottlenecks" is only increasing. High-voltage substations in many European countries remain poorly protected.
At the same time, in recent years the situation has been gradually changing: France, Poland, the Baltic states and Northern European countries are investing in the physical protection of energy infrastructure. However, this approach is still not uniform across Europe.
Europeans understand well what exactly needs to be changed.
That is why the European Commission is promoting the strategic logic of the Preparedness Union – a system-wide readiness of states, communities and critical infrastructure operators to function under conditions of crises, attacks and large-scale disruptions.
This logic is also enshrined in the CER Directive (Critical Entities Resilience), legislation binding for EU countries that requires operators of vital infrastructure to identify vulnerabilities, prepare business-continuity plans, maintain reserves, protect personnel and regularly demonstrate the system’s ability to function during incidents.
Key lessons that Ukraine has learned during the war, together with an honest understanding of the limits of what is possible, can become the basis for strengthening European resilience: the energy system is guaranteed to be a target for the enemy; practicing crisis scenarios plays a decisive role; relying solely on protection is a strategic mistake, because 100 percent protection does not exist in the world; and so on.
Ukraine can offer Europe preparation for real-world crisis scenarios that can be directly used for stress tests, with a clear understanding of what fails first and why.
Ukraine can also be a partner in real, cross-sectoral training exercises.
At the same time, Europe can provide Ukraine with the capacity to systematically carry decisions through to concrete results.
Europe can help Ukraine accelerate a qualitative transformation of the energy system’s architecture toward a decentralised system that is more resilient to Russian attacks and better prepared for integration with the European market.