Why Europe can't afford to keep the Druzhba oil pipeline running
The southern branch of the Druzhba oil pipeline has become the last major channel for the systematic supply of Russian oil to the European Union.
Energy dependence is increasingly revealing itself as a tool of political influence.
The Hungarian government regularly links the issue of sanctions against Russia to its own energy interests and delays decisions on diversifying oil supplies, invoking national sovereignty.
This approach creates additional points of tension within the EU and reduces the effectiveness of its sanctions and energy policy.
Read more about the dangerous dependence of Hungary and Slovakia on Russian oil and what the EU should do in the article by Olena Lapenko of DiXi Group: Toxic "Druzhba": why EU must close the last channel for purchasing Russian oil.
The share of Russian oil in Hungary’s imports increased from around 60% in 2021 to more than 90% in 2025. Although the total volume of imports decreased during this period, the share of Russian crude grew. Similarly, Slovakia is now almost entirely dependent on imports from Russia.
This indicates a concentration of supplies from a single source and a deliberate choice, as alternative routes do exist. Moreover, claims that the "Croatian route" is too expensive are not supported by factual data.
Meanwhile, Hungary explains its position on economic grounds, allegedly to protect citizens’ welfare and maintain stable fuel prices.
Indeed, Russian oil is sold at a discount to Brent, creating an additional margin. It is also possible that, as payment for loyalty, the Kremlin provides an additional "political" discount.
Discounts on Russian oil generate financial gains for refiners. Savings for Hungary’s MOL Group were estimated at approximately €47.3 million per month. As a result, in 2024 the company’s operating profit increased by around 30% compared to the pre-war period.
However, this model has not created benefits for end consumers. Last year, fuel prices in Hungary exceeded Czech prices by 10-18%, depending on the petroleum product; in Slovakia they were 6-7% higher.
For Russia, Hungary’s and Slovakia’s energy dependence is not so much about maintaining a stable revenue channel as it is a means of influence within Europe.
The EU has adopted a regulation requiring the gradual phase-out of Russian gas imports by 2027-2028.
However, no deadline has yet been set for Russian oil delivered through Druzhba to Hungary and Slovakia. The legislative proposal promised by the European Commission a year ago for a full ban on oil imports from Russia has still not appeared.
As in the case of gas, a forced halt of Ukrainian transit could become an opportunity to accelerate this process.
While some Central European countries are trying to preserve the previous model of cooperation with Russia, based on political "rent" and short-term commercial gains, a more strategically minded part of the continent is building a system focused on resilience and reducing strategic risks.
Keeping Druzhba as an active supply channel means continuing financial flows to Russia’s budget and sustaining a model of political dependence.
A pipeline that once symbolised integration within the "socialist bloc" has today become a test of Europe’s strategic maturity.