How a far-right victory in France could reshape EU
National Rally's Jordan Bardella has emerged as the frontrunner in France's presidential race, confronting the European Union with the prospect of a far-right Euroskeptic in the Elysée.
The far-right National Rally’s (RN) Jordan Bardella is the frontrunner ahead of next year’s presidential election.
Read more about whether Bardella’s victory could trigger a new eurozone crisis or put the European project itself at risk in the column by Brigitte Granville of International Economics and Economic Policy at Queen Mary University of London: After Macron: would the victory of the far-right's Jordan Bardella become a threat to the EU?
According to the author, once in the Elysée Palace, Bardella would have every incentive to exploit these structural advantages rather than challenge them. His interview last November with The Economist, in which he called for the ECB to buy French government bonds, certainly points in that direction.
Brigitte Grenville notes that the European Commission, tasked with policing the bloc’s fiscal rules, has consistently been lenient toward France despite its chronic violations, largely for political reasons.
"As a cornerstone of the monetary union – and, by extension, the wider European economic system – France is effectively untouchable, enabling it to expand deficits and debt without a meaningful increase in borrowing costs," the professor writes.
Lecornu’s maneuver diminishes the already-slim chances of even a modest reduction in the budget deficit, which is projected to reach 5.4% of GDP in 2026.
"But since the European Commission is unlikely to enforce the EU's fiscal rules, bond markets see little risk that political turmoil could prevent the ECB from stepping in if needed.
That helps explain why French sovereign bonds rallied after the budget was pushed through," the author explains.
A Bardella presidency would not be without risks. His recent book, Ce que veulent les Français ("What the French Want"), contains the genre’s familiar elements, including an account of his hard-scrabble upbringing in the poor Parisian suburb of Saint-Denis, raised by an Italian immigrant single mother. But it also offers some insight into how he might approach economic policy.
Perhaps most revealing is the refrain that closes each chapter, in which Bardella depicts the daily struggles of French people in different walks of life and proposes how to raise living standards: reindustrialize under the guidance of a protectionist state, cut bureaucratic red tape, and reduce wasteful government spending.
"But Bardella’s protectionist ambitions will be constrained by the EU’s institutional framework," Brigitte Grenville emphasizes.
According to her, the only way for France to pursue Donald Trump-style protectionism outright would be to leave the bloc.
Short of a "Frexit," the professor believes Bardella is far more likely to work within the EU’s existing arrangements, which already operate in France’s favor.
For example, a substantial share of the EU’s recent €90 billion ($107 billion) loan to Ukraine will be used to procure military equipment from European manufacturers. As the EU member state with the largest and most diversified defense industry, France is well-positioned to become a major beneficiary of this and subsequent rearmament initiatives.
The London-based academic argues that Bardella's message to French voters is one of reassurance rather than rupture. His rhetoric casts him as a savvy opportunist seeking to exploit the system’s existing advantages, not an arsonist bent on dismantling the EU.
The problem, she adds, is that the system itself is brittle. Whichever path he chooses, troubling uncertainty seems a given.