Why Türkiye’s interests regarding a war against Iran diverge from the US course
Türkiye is beginning to face the consequences of the American-Israeli war against Iran.
Both countries share an understanding of regional geopolitics that goes back centuries. Theirs is among the oldest continuously recognized shared borders in the Middle East and they have been at peace with each other since 1639.
To be sure, Türkiye and Iran are far from allies.
Read more about whether Ankara could become militarily involved in an operation against Iran and what to expect from Türkiye in the column by Sinan Ulgen of the EDAM think tank (Türkiye): War of bases, fall of the ayatollahs: to what extent Türkiye can support US actions in the Middle East.
The author of the column reminds readers that their interests have often diverged sharply, particularly since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and they have often engaged in a zero-sum contest for regional influence.
"While the two sides have often sought to shape regional dynamics in their favor, they have actively avoided direct confrontation," the expert explains.
He adds that today, Türkiye is so committed to avoiding a direct confrontation with Iran that it even played down Iran’s ballistic-missile attack this week, which would allegedly have struck the Incirlik Air Base in southern Türkiye were it not for NATO air defenses.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government is skeptical about the feasibility of regime change in Iran – particularly if the process is led by the United States.
"Even if the US does manage to topple the Iranian regime, an orderly transition is unlikely, to say the least. For Türkiye, state collapse in Iran is the worst-case scenario, followed closely by a Syria-style cycle of violence pitting a desperate regime against an opposition that is empowered to fight, but not strong enough to win quickly," Sinan Ülgen notes.
According to him, Türkiye is seeking to help end the violence as quickly as possible – before the Iranian regime collapses.
But while avoiding a protracted conflict and the fracturing of Iran is vital to Türkiye’s interests, so is ensuring that the war’s outcome does not represent a victory for the regime.
"A victorious Islamic Republic would undoubtedly be emboldened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and accelerate its effort to become a nuclear-weapons state, or at least a nuclear-threshold state," the director of the EDAM think tank explains.
Türkiye’s preferred outcome would thus be a managed degradation of Iran’s ambitions and capabilities.
The Venezuela precedent might be useful here. When the US removed President Nicolás Maduro, it did not install an opposition government; instead, it allowed a pliable leadership cadre from within the existing regime to take over.
"In the coming weeks, Türkiye’s state and intelligence resources are likely to focus on identifying and contacting key players within Iran who fit the bill.
Then, when the time is right, Türkiye could seek to connect these figures to relevant international players, setting the stage for an early and sustainable agreement to end the conflict," the expert concludes.