Anti-corruption rollback? Ukraine revises its five-year strategy, cutting some EU commitments

This is about the updated Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026-2030, which Ukraine is required to adopt as one of its EU accession commitments.

The Strategy relates to several EU-mandated criteria according to which Brussels will assess Ukraine’s readiness for membership. It will also determine whether Kyiv is truly making progress on its journey towards European integration.

The Strategy must be approved by the Verkhovna Rada [Ukrainian parliament] via a separate law.

But it isn’t just the fact of its adoption that matters: its content is equally important.

This is where the problems are arising – problems that even some in the ruling party acknowledge.

On 18 May, Anastasiia Radina, an MP aligned with the Servant of the People party who chairs the parliamentary anti-corruption committee, wrote on Facebook: "The government headed by Yuliia Svyrydenko has ignored key European integration pledges from the Kachka-Kos communiqué [the 10 key reform priorities outlined in the Joint Statement by EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos and Ukraine’s deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Taras Kachka]. The government is acting contrary to the interim benchmarks for Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations, which are official requirements. Unless these benchmarks are met, there will be no accession to the EU."

Even before Radina’s emotional post, the situation had gradually become unclear, even threatening.

Briefly, this is how the story unfolded.

The EU started emphasising last year that the adoption of this Strategy, which Kyiv had been slow to develop, was one of the key criteria. This set the process in motion. The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and experts in the field drafted a document that aligned with what had been agreed with the EU, and it was submitted to the government on 2 April to be introduced to parliament.

And then the process ground to a halt. The government was in no hurry to move towards approval.

On 13 May, Radina decided to seize the initiative and registered in parliament the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy that the NACP had previously submitted to the government. And just two days later, on 15 May, the government submitted its own draft "in pursuit" – as an alternative to the first one. There are several critical differences between the two documents.

There are even grounds to speak of a new attack on Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions.

In particular, the government proposes to remove key provisions from the Strategy concerning the independence of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and competitive selection procedures for top-level positions.

These proposals contradict the government’s own commitments as set out in the Kachka-Kos plan. They also contradict the EU’s benchmarks – a list of the criteria Ukraine must meet on its path towards accession.

What the Svyrydenko government has changed

After a significant delay, the government submitted a draft law approving the Anti-Corruption Strategy to parliament. It is a detailed document that runs to well over a hundred pages.

After the six weeks the NACP’s draft proposal spent under government review, most of its content remained unchanged. But the few provisions that have been amended are among the most sensitive.

Notably, in some sections the government draft is more ambitious. But this is mainly in the sections that contain broad, declaratory statements.

For example, instead of Ukraine committing to "continuous monitoring of the status and dynamics of Ukraine’s fulfilment of international obligations in the field of preventing and combating corruption, and the compliance of Ukrainian anti-corruption legislation with EU law", the government now proposes that parliament guarantee the "gradual alignment of Ukraine’s anti-corruption legislation with EU law" and the "implementation of recommendations provided to Ukraine by international institutions".

In other words, instead of merely "monitoring", Kyiv now wants to commit itself to implementing changes, and that sounds positive.

But the subsequent list of proposed changes casts doubt on that impression.

The government has acknowledged in the Anti-Corruption Strategy, just as in the original NACP draft, that an "insufficient guarantee of the independence and institutional resilience of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) reduces its effectiveness". Yet it then goes on to remove two instruments intended to ensure that independence from the list of objectives – Ukraine’s pledge to grant SAPO the authority to "enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations regarding the possible commission of a criminal offence by a Member of Parliament of Ukraine and approve applications considered by an investigating judge", and to "carry out other necessary investigative and procedural actions in all criminal proceedings that fall under the jurisdiction of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, without the involvement of the Prosecutor General".

The state’s acknowledgement of the politicisation of the procedure for appointing and dismissing the prosecutor general, as well as proposed ways to resolve this problem, have also been completely expunged from the Strategy.

Also deleted is any reference to competitive selection procedures for appointing the heads of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and the National Police. The original draft had proposed changing the current SBI selection procedures and introducing a competitive process for the National Police, the objective being to create a merit-based selection system.

Several changes outside the anti-corruption infrastructure were also proposed.

The original proposal had envisioned drafting and adopting a comprehensive code to regulate urban development, but that ambition has now been reduced to making piecemeal amendments.

The proposal had suggested that constitutional amendments be made to regulate the work of the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities, but the government, while still acknowledging the problem, has dropped any mention of seeking constitutional changes even by 2030.

Finally, the section dealing with corruption problems in the tax system has undergone dramatic revision. The government has removed all references to the problem of "manual control" (overriding the usual procedures) in ordering arbitrary tax inspections, as well as a section that acknowledges the problem of "the tax authorities’ practice of asking certain taxpayers to artificially inflate their profits so that planned tax revenue targets can be met". It is as if this problem – one familiar to the entire business community – simply does not exist.

Protection for MPs and control over investigations

It’s worth examining Anastasiia Radina’s claims that the government’s amendments are contrary to Ukraine’s path towards EU membership. Is this really the case? What exactly is the contradiction?

In July 2025, the authorities launched an open attack on the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), triggering protests in Ukraine and causing enormous problems in Kyiv’s relations with its international partners. The resulting lack of trust in the sincerity of the Ukrainian authorities’ anti-corruption rhetoric has still not faded, and it may flare up again now with renewed force.

To address the problem of the lack of trust in Ukraine, Brussels proposed a creative solution – the approval of the Kachka-Kos plan.

The plan comprises 10 points that Kyiv has promised to implement by the end of 2026, including commitments to enhance NABU and SAPO’s independence and expand their jurisdiction to cover "all high-risk positions based on an existing independent assessment".

Another key document is the EU benchmarks – the indicators that EU member states use to evaluate whether Ukraine is fulfilling the requirements for EU accession. These benchmarks also cover the institutional strengthening of the anti-corruption bodies.

They specifically state that NABU and SAPO must be granted the necessary powers to initiate criminal proceedings against Members of Parliament without prior approval from the Prosecutor General (Benchmark IBM 23.6.3).

Thus, the government has refused to implement a mandatory criterion for EU accession.

The provision on the independence of NABU/SAPO’s investigative and procedural actions from the will of the Prosecutor General does not have an exact equivalent in the Benchmarks, but it does correspond to the requirements of the Kachka-Kos plan regarding the independence of the anti-corruption institutions in carrying out their activities.

The other deleted provisions also contradict commitments made to the EU.

Preserving the Prosecutor General

The role of the Prosecutor General was central during last year’s attack on NABU and SAPO. After that, the EU’s demand that the appointment procedure had to change became even more insistent.

In December 2025, the Kachka-Kos plan injected new optimism regarding this issue.

The plan includes a commitment to "conduct a comprehensive review of the selection and dismissal procedure of the Prosecutor General, with a view to aligning it with European best practice with the involvement of the Venice Commission".

Another EU benchmark criterion is "rendering the selection and dismissal procedure for the Prosecutor General and high-level prosecutors more transparent and merit-based" (Benchmark section IBM 23.2).

This goal, as mentioned earlier, was reflected in the initial NACP draft registered by Anastasiia Radina.

Yet there is nothing in the government’s draft law about a competitive selection procedure for the position of Prosecutor General.

This entire section has been removed, including the acknowledgement that a problem exists at all.

There are, however, references to other competitive procedures within the Prosecutor General’s Office, specifically regarding appointments "to positions of prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General and regional prosecutor’s offices in accordance with European Commission recommendations".

The government’s draft contains no explanations for these amendments. Supporters of the government’s approach usually argue that Ukraine cannot amend the Constitution during martial law. However, the strategy covers the period until 2030, and the NACP’s initial draft included other constitutional changes – for example, regarding the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities. But the government has removed all such references.

This raises the question of whether this "clean-up" reflects the government’s need to avoid addressing the politically sensitive issue of the Prosecutor General’s position, particularly given its importance for the authorities and the president.

A phobia of transparent competition

The government’s amendments to the Anti-Corruption Strategy suggest that it has developed a phobia of competitive selection procedures for key leadership positions.

It’s not just the Prosecutor General – provisions introducing or reforming competitive selection processes to appoint the heads of the National Police and the SBI have also been removed from the draft Strategy.

The NACP’s draft had envisaged the introduction of a "transparent, merit-based and predictable selection procedure for the position of Chief of the National Police of Ukraine, involving independent experts nominated by international partners…"

In the government version, this has been removed and replaced with a gradual transition to "occupying the positions of heads in central and territorial bodies" of the National Police, which would be carried out "solely on a competitive basis".

It’s worth mentioning that neither the Kachka-Kos plan nor the EU benchmarks contain provisions that specifically require a competitive process to appoint the Chief of the National Police.

But there are explicit references regarding the SBI.

The Kachka-Kos statement mentions, albeit in a somewhat general form, "conducting an independent comprehensive review of the SBI's institutional framework, integrity mechanisms, and oversight functions to assess the necessity and feasibility of further reforms in line with best European practices…"

The EU benchmarks, however, are much more specific. The EU requires Ukraine to "develop, adopt and start implementing a comprehensive reform law of the State Bureau of Investigation with the meaningful involvement of independent experts nominated by international partners" (IBM 24.3.1), and Brussels has made it clear that it expects the introduction of just such a competitive selection process, involving international experts and drawing on examples from best practice.

The government’s draft law effectively ignores this obligation.

So Radina appears to be entirely justified in her criticism that the government’s amendments are contrary to Ukraine’s path towards EU membership.

The question of why the government made these changes remains open.

As does the question of whether parliament will have enough political courage to keep Ukraine on its path towards European integration and adopt a draft that actually meets the EU’s requirements.

Because in the end, these reforms will still have to be implemented if Ukraine wants to stay on its European trajectory.

Anatolii Martsynovsky, Sergiy Sydorenko

Editors, European Pravda