"I have been a frequent visitor to Ukraine. I also hope to visit Ukraine in my new capacity as soon as possible. Ukraine is among my one of the first top destinations." Edgars Rinkēvičs, a long-time friend of Ukraine, the newly elected president of Latvia, who will lead this state in less than a month, started our conversation with these words on June 8.

Currently serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, Rinkēvičs is one of the most experienced heads of foreign ministries in Europe, having held this position since 2011.

He witnessed the events in Ukraine during the time of Yanukovych, the Revolution of Dignity, and the Russian aggression from its very beginning in February 2014.

We met in Riga on Friday, and this conversation became one of the first big interviews with Rinkēvičs after his election. EuroPravda offers you both text version of the interview and video in English.

"Not only a disaster, but also a special information operation of the Russian Federation"

- First of all, I want to congratulate you on the victory, and although I do not have official authority to do so, I invite you to Ukraine. Will you come to us?

- Thank you very much for your congratulations. I have been a frequent visitor to Ukraine. I also hope to visit Ukraine in my new capacity as soon as possible. Let me assure you that Ukraine is among my one of the first top destinations. 

- Now the key news, not only for us but for a significant part of the world, is coming from Ukraine. It's about the Kakhovka Dam. You are being harsh in your assessments here, and I want to thank you for that. Do you think the West has realised what happened?

- No.

I think that it is very difficult for many to understand that this tragedy is huge. Ecology environment is something that will come to the realisation a bit later. 

I don't want to compare those two accidents, but it reminds me of what happened with Chornobyl nuclear power plant. In the first days, there was no realisation of what it meant for the world and for you. I do believe it will change. We also see more pictures and videos. So this realisation is going to come soon.

- Media headlines also contribute to the problems that have angered Ukrainians. For example, headlines like "Ukraine and Russia exchange accusations" only escalate tensions. What do you think about how such reports emerge?

- This is not only war on the ground. This is not only a military operation. This is also huge propaganda and information warfare on the part of Russia. We all know the basics of Russian propaganda. They sometimes even don't try to push their narrative.

They just try to cast doubt.

That also works a bit. 

This is not so clear. There are no facts. We need more evidence. That also very well plays for Russian propaganda. I do believe that we also need to look at this not only as an environmental disaster, not only as a huge cost for human beings but also huge informational special operation.

- To remove the issue, what is your position: what happened, who did it, who is to blame?

- It is absolutely clear that this is the Russian responsibility. I tweeted that when the news came and when the first facts emerged. I think most probably. Of course, we need more time for investigation. Most probably, this was part of the kind of military operation simply to counter the offensive of the Ukrainian forces. 

We need an investigative process to establish who was responsible for giving direct orders apart from general responsibility when it comes to Mr. Putin and his cronies in the Kremlin. We now have a two or three-track approach.

First of all, we want to help Ukraine in any way we can. I want to stress that people here when they saw and heard the news, have doubled their efforts to help Ukraine with everything they can. There is a kind of new way of collecting goods, collecting money, and also providing support for Ukraine. The government is deciding on financial contributions. 

But how are we going to address this situation in the long-term reconstruction? Nobody now has a clear assessment of what it means to the environment and what it means in the long term. It is impossible to do that in the coming days. We will see the long-term impacts. 

Talking about political repercussions, my country has always been advocating for much tougher sanctions when it comes to Russia. Not always we are being listened to. Not always that decision-making is as swift as we would love to be. We will keep pressing our EU partners and the globe to react with much stricter sanctions, more weapons, and more ammunition for you. 

"It's not like in the movies with war criminals"

- Is that a war crime?

- This is for lawyers to qualify this part of the genocide war crime. Definitely, it's a crime. Seeing what has happened to people also falls under this definition of genocide. To have a correct legal term in this respect is probably not the main thing.

It is going to be courts and investigations. This is the crime – a war crime, genocide, ecocide. This is clearly a crime.

- Do you believe that international law is still alive and can bring to justice those responsible here and in general? Many people doubt it because in Ukraine.

- I'm rather optimistic that, ultimately, international law is going to prevail. We can look at history. Nazi Germany started war back in 1939, WWII. It took six years to defeat this country. I do hope that this time this is going to be quicker, that Ukraine is going to win much faster than it took. But it took time when Nuremberg Tribunal handed over sentences. 

Second, I do see that those efforts by International Criminal Court declaring Mr. Putin a criminal step in the right direction. Unfortunately, it is not like in a movie or as we sometimes expect in normal life. If somebody has committed a crime, the police come to catch him and bring him to court. 

It takes time. 

Establishing all the facts and work for criminal proceedings requires enormous effort. I do believe that sooner or later – I very much hope sooner than later – those responsible for launching this war, those responsible for committing all kinds of war crimes will be brought to justice. Some will not be able to enjoy nice and comfortable vacations or some kind of holiday in the civilised world.

That's for sure.

"Does anyone doubt the combat capability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine?"

- I have a question about the upcoming NATO Summit in Vilnius. Do you think Ukraine's expectations that this summit will be decisive and historic are correct?

- I would be very, very careful to name each and every summit historic. But I expect – and many others also do – that this is the summit where not only messages will be given to Ukraine. We already had that message since the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine and Georgia were going to become NATO members one day. We need a clear road map with "when" and "how." 

The problem is that we have now 31 members. Such a large organisation has very different views. Latvia has always supported Ukraine as a NATO member as soon as possible. 

What do we currently see? 

There is not going to be a decision to invite Ukraine to NATO and Vilnius. Nobody should have any illusions about that. We are working hard now to get as much practical, very concrete, very detailed how, when, and what would be those things that both the Alliance and Ukraine could and should do so your country can become a full-fledged NATO member very soon.

- Let me check whether we have the same understanding of one detail. You mentioned the decision of the Bucharest NATO summit in 2008. But there is a rule not only that Ukraine and Georgia will one day become NATO members but also that Ukraine must implement the Membership Action Plan, MAP. Now Ukraine emphasises that the path through the MAP is unacceptable for us. Is NATO even aware of this? And what should we do about it?

- This is the permanent process of mutual consultations among NATO allies with Ukraine. You are correct, but it was back in 2008, so 15 years ago. The membership action plan was a tool for applying countries through a certain process. 

We have progressed since that in different ways. There are so many mechanisms within NATO to support Ukraine and consult each other that the membership action plan is no longer envisaged. 

Latvia went through a membership action plan before, but that was a completely different historical perspective. I would not concentrate on MAP or no MAP but on Ukraine's very practical road map.

- Let me explain why I question whether there will be a MAP or not. If we have a road map similar to the MAP, with the requirement to fulfill some tasks, it will give Russia time and opportunity to undermine this process after the victory of Ukraine.

- I have a completely different perspective on this. 

Look, there are two organisations. 

One is the European Union. You have all the criteria and accession talks, and those are really critical. To be part of the single market or part of the EU, you need to reform not only legislation but also all the instruments. 

NATO is a bit different. NATO is a political and military alliance. Ultimately, we are really all interested in the armed forces of a potential NATO member capable.

Nobody doubts the capability of the Ukrainian armed forces.

This is one of the best, if not the best, army in the world at this point. 

There are some political considerations. If we go through the kind of systems and paperwork, I can remind you that back in 1995, there was a study on NATO enlargement that says you don't have to have any territorial disputes. 

Look at Ukraine. You didn't create any territorial disputes. Russia occupied Crimea back in 2014. Russia started its aggression in Donbas back in 2014 and the full-scale invasion, occupying even more territories, in 2022. It's not Ukraine's fault. I wouldn't say that this applies in this circuit. 

I understand that creating some kind of mechanisms and then taking blocks is dangerous. At one point, this is going to be a purely political decision. 

If I look back at the history of the Baltic states, one could say you guys do not have five divisions, or you don't have air defence or nuclear weapons. Obviously, we don't have. So why should we take small Baltic nations into NATO at the end of the day? 

When they saw how well we were progressing with reforms, the decision was ultimately also political. We need some things that you're going to need to do. Some things are relevant - information security and defence. But ultimately, I believe this is going to be political decision.

"No, Russia cannot veto"

- When do you think Ukraine can join NATO?

- I don't want to answer this question when it comes to years or months.

- Can we say: once hostilities have ended? Once Ukraine has won? What can be a milestone?

- We must do everything that we can that Ukraine becomes a NATO member as soon as possible. If I start talking about years, it creates false expectations. The problem is, frankly, not so much Ukraine. The problem is internal NATO discussion.

- As I see it, the problem is that Russia seems to have veto power over NATO expansion.

- No, I don't think that Russia has a veto. 

If that were the case, Latvia would have never joined, and Estonia would have never joined.

- But now they can veto.

- No, they can't. 

I think that there is a bit different approach. 

There is not a very clear understanding in many capitals how you handle the situation when there is a country at war joining the Alliance. And what it means when it comes to Article 5? I'll be blunt; this is the major question. This is the question that many capitals are not able to answer. 

While they haven't answered that question internally, they can't answer that at the table where NATO allies are sitting. 

This is not exactly what I would call Russia's veto, right?

- Meanwhile, we in Ukraine are also afraid of "the elephant in the room" called Hungary. It is very connected...

- If that would come to some final decision-making process, I do believe that each and every ally would agree. I think this is a major question. There is a country at war. There's Article 5. It's not one or two member states. Many member states are trying to contemplate what it means for the Alliance. 

There have not been good answers in many capitals, and we should understand that.

I can only repeat my position:

I do believe that Ukraine belongs to NATO.

 Ukraine will become a NATO member. We will do everything possible in our power for this to happen sooner than later. That's a unanimous decision of 31 or, maybe very soon, 32 member states.

- Let's talk about the EU. You mentioned that Ukraine needs to carry out extensive reforms. That is absolutely true. European Pravda is also working towards promoting these reforms. However, I am also concerned about the fact that Hungary will preside over the Council of the European Union in 2024. We see Hungary not adhering to European rules and openly going against European values. But we hear discussions about postponing Hungary's Presidency. Is this really being considered?

- The Presidency is something that you have as part of EU governance. I'm frankly a bit skeptical about this kind of presidency postponement. If one has full rights within the European Union, one also needs to be treated this way. We have Article 7 for Hungary that we haven't voted on. If we are really a rule of law organisation based on procedures, then we should also allow countries to continue their Presidency. 

When it comes to the enlargement, the Presidency is part of the General Affairs Council. I could only say that after receiving a report from the EU Commission, we need to start accession talks with Ukraine by the end of the year. 

This process definitely is going to be very technical after that. It will be based on a lot of things that need to be checked, whether that or another EU legislation has been enacted. We need to have this kind of political push to start this process.

It's up to the Commission and the Member States, regardless of the presiding country, to make sure this process goes smoothly. It is also Ukraine's responsibility to do a lot of things. It's not only then a political issue.

"Russia will exist, but I do not know if it will be large in size"

- Let's talk briefly about the post-war reality. To begin with, I want to give an example. Latvia also feels the consequences of the war. Russian goods cannot enter Latvian ports. This means no cargo, no port fees, and no money for this important industry. I believe ordinary people may get a little tired of it. Do you think this will change attitudes toward the war? Will this change the desire to restore normal relations with Russia? For example, immediately after the war.

- I don't see this tendency. 

Well, we do have a significant Russian community. Some opinion polls have shown that 1/4 support Ukraine, and 1/4 support Mr. Putin and Russian aggression. And then some people simply don't want to answer this question. Most probably, they don't want their answer to be kind of recorded

- Among Russian speakers?

- Yes. At the beginning of our interview, I said there had been another wave of support for Ukraine after Kakhovka's destruction. 

When it comes to the economy, frankly, we already had some decrease in transit before the war. It happened not only because of COVID. Russia was deliberately trying to relocate goods from Latvia to their own ports. The process has already started. 

I do hope, and that's also part of my job as the Foreign Minister and the new President, to somehow keep this on the agenda. Frankly, I do see that Latvians still have a very strong emotion and feel positively for your pain. 

- How do you see post-war Russia? Is there even a place for Russia on this planet after the war?

Russia is going to exist. I don't know how big it will be. Maybe it will be even more imperialistic, more aggressive, or more democratic. I don't know. What I see, unfortunately, doesn't give me a very optimistic outlook. I see that the majority of Russians are backing aggression. I see that, at this point, there are no signs that the power of the current leadership is somehow eroding. 

With the Ukrainian counteroffensive, a feeling in Russia that they are losing that war and someone is responsible will flourish. We will probably see consequences. But we do not know if that means Russia will seek revenge. To regroup and to take revenge would mean the destruction of Russia, as we know, in smaller parts. 

- Don't you believe it?

- I'm not sure. 

They are still open to many scenarios. I will be very, very careful to predict anything.

I would say that my job would be trying to prepare for all kinds of scenarios.

Defeated, humiliated Russia that seeks revenge is a very dangerous scenario. Disintegrating Russia is a dangerous scenario as well. What is going to happen with nuclear weapons?

What is going to happen with people and some internal conflicts within Russia? Like civil war or breaking up entities fighting each other. We are still bordering Russia. It is also a dangerous scenario.

A great scenario would probably be if Russia goes the same post-war path as Germany with gradual democratic change. 

Do I believe it? I am skeptical, as always.

I think that in that case, you need to have also the same kind of situation that Nazi Germany went through. We are not also there. So I would not exclude any scenario. I would say that we have to be very, very cautious. All these scenarios will force presidents and prime ministers in bordering countries and not only bordering countries with Russia to stay awake days and nights.

Interviewed by Sergiy Sydorenko

"European Pravda", Editor, from Riga