What risks does Nawrocki’s presidency pose for Kyiv and can they be avoided?

The election of Karol Nawrocki as Poland’s new president has sent shockwaves through Polish politics.

The defeat of the pro-government candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, has derailed the ruling coalition’s plan to consolidate power and push through long-stalled reforms that were repeatedly blocked by presidential vetoes.

Instead of consolidation, Polish politics is now set to be dominated by political infighting, with the stakes rising ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections.

Read more about what this means, including how it might affect Polish-Ukrainian relations, in the article by Edwin Bendyk, head of the Stefan Batory Foundation (Poland): Ukraine at the heart of Polish politics: how Nawrocki’s victory will shape relations with Kyiv.

Karol Nawrocki will take office in early August.

Little is still known about the specific agenda of his presidency. However, early appointments to the presidential chancellery indicate that the Law and Justice party (PiS) will wield strong influence in the presidential palace.

Though Nawrocki ran as an independent, he was backed by the now-opposition Law and Justice party led by Jarosław Kaczyński.

Kaczyński’s strategy is clear: to win back power in the 2027 parliamentary elections after losing it in October 2023. But simply winning the most votes again, as PiS did in 2023, won’t be enough. Without a coalition partner, they were unable to form a government.

Currently, there's no sign of a surge in voter support that would enable PiS to govern alone. That makes a future coalition necessary, and the most viable partner is the far-right, often openly anti-Ukrainian, Confederation party.

However, it’s too early to conclude that a PiS-Confederation coalition is inevitable. Both parties compete for dominance on the right and are deeply mistrustful of each other’s leadership.

At the same time, tension is growing within the ruling coalition. As elections draw closer, some parties appear increasingly willing to sacrifice good relations with Ukraine to shore up support from their own base.

An example is the Sejm’s recent approval of a bill designating 11 July as a day of remembrance for Polish victims of the "genocide committed by the OUN-UPA on the eastern borderlands of the Second Polish Republic" – a move seen in Ukraine as hostile.

Such unfriendly rhetoric toward Ukraine is likely to continue at least until the 2027 elections, as Polish politicians respond to changing public sentiment.

But will pandering to public opinion jeopardise Poland’s long-term strategic interests?

Here, the outlook is more stable. Poland’s major political forces – the Tusk government, the Law and Justice party and even the newly elected president – view Russian aggression as the country’s greatest security threat.

That explains the continued rhetorical support for Ukraine’s war effort and for building a future European security architecture.

Still, uncertainty remains over whether Ukrainian membership in NATO and the EU should be part of that architecture. The pillars of this new system are not yet clear, especially given the unpredictable role of the United States.

In short, Nawrocki’s victory is unlikely to improve Polish-Ukrainian relations in the near term. But it doesn’t necessarily signal their deterioration either.

The real risk lies in how it has emboldened the Polish far right’s ambition to return to power in 2027.