Will Orbán "veto" sanctions against Russia and can Ukraine expect progress in EU accession talks?
Today in Brussels, ahead of the EU leaders' summit, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union is taking place.
On the agenda are not only the 18th package of sanctions against Russia but also the extension of all previously approved sectoral economic sanctions.
Read more about whether the EU will succeed in extending existing sanctions and approving new ones and whether Ukraine can expect progress in opening negotiation clusters in the article by Tetiana Vysotska, a European Pravda journalist: The EU between Orbán and Trump: what Ukraine should expect on sanctions and EU membership.
As is known, every six months, EU member states must unanimously agree to renew existing sanctions against Russia. Each time, what’s at stake is a "mega-package" that includes sanctions introduced before 2014 as well as those imposed after the full-scale invasion.
The next deadline for this decision is 31 July 2025, so at first glance, the situation doesn’t appear urgent. There is still more than a month left.
However, the EU is keen to reach an agreement with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in advance.
So what gives hope that Viktor Orbán won’t impose a hard veto on the sanctions?
Brussels’ optimism is largely based on… expectations from the United States.
This was admitted by diplomats from various EU countries in conversations with European Pravda.
According to them, on the issue of sanctions, the Trump administration and Brussels officials are practically in sync: both sides of the Atlantic believe the sanctions must be extended and strengthened, as they serve as leverage in negotiations with the Kremlin (the same "cards" Trump often refers to).
While there is reason for optimism about extending current sectoral sanctions, introducing new ones has faced an additional obstacle – Slovakia.
However, European Pravda’s sources were confident that Bratislava could be appeased and the 18th sanctions package would be approved.
The 18th sanctions package, as reported by European Pravda, will include measures against Russian banks and even banks from third countries, new actions against Russia’s shadow fleet, a total ban on any development of the Nord Stream projects, a ban on importing petroleum products into the EU that were refined from Russian crude and new export restrictions on Russian companies across several industries (machinery, metals, plastics, chemicals), among others.
At the same time, there is one form of pressure on Russia that the EU has abandoned – the oil price cap.
This measure did not receive support from the United States at the G7 summit.
Furthermore, Brussels considers the current price cap to be adequate in light of rising oil prices due to the escalating war in the Middle East.
Meanwhile, at the EU summit, Ukraine hopes to receive a "positive signal" – a statement from 26 leaders (all but Hungary) that Kyiv is ready to open the first negotiation cluster, Fundamentals, in its EU accession talks. However, this political declaration will not result in any legal changes.
As for the possibility of Moldova proceeding separately from Ukraine on its EU path, beginning accession talks independently while Ukraine remains blocked by Orbán, Brussels is sending Kyiv positive signals. As of June 2025, this issue has been taken off the table, and no decision on it will be made at the summit.
Regardless, Brussels is preparing for the possibility that Orbán will maintain his veto on Ukraine’s progress toward the EU.
If that becomes reality, the EU will look for compensatory measures.
In that case, the EU’s Plan B to support Ukraine would be its gradual integration into the EU’s single market, which would proceed regardless of whether any negotiation cluster is formally opened.