How Denmark could overcome Orbán’s veto and open accession talks for Ukraine

On 1-2 September, ministers from all the EU member states gathered for an informal meeting in Copenhagen, the capital of Denmark, which currently holds the EU Council presidency. The key topic was EU enlargement, and representatives of key candidate countries were also invited to join the discussion.

Everyone emphasised publicly that the conversation was about principles and not specific countries. But in reality, the main obstacle to the enlargement process is Hungary’s politically motivated veto, which is blocking Ukraine’s progress toward accession (and with it Moldova’s as well).

Nevertheless, the EU still lacks both agreement and a clear path for circumventing Hungary’s veto. Earlier options have been discarded, and new ones have yet to be agreed on.

Read more about the challenges and concerns of the main players in the EU and in Ukraine and how the stalemate might be broken in the analysis by Sergiy Sydorenko, European Pravda's editor: Getting round Orbán: how to unblock Ukraine's road to the EU.

Although EU officials have begun to speak more openly about the possibility of "bypassing" Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s veto, the idea faces resistance within the EU for several reasons – explained in the full article.

The EU is now searching for a way forward that can overcome these key obstacles. The understanding that something must be done is stronger than ever, but a concrete decision is still far off – partly because no workable scenario is yet on the table.

The European Union, however, already has a similar, though largely forgotten, precedent worth revisiting.

There is nothing in EU law to prevent the Danish presidency from convening an intergovernmental conference to approve two identical decisions for Ukraine and Moldova – say, "Approval of roadmaps as indicators for opening the first cluster toward readiness for EU accession". Hungary could and should be invited to that conference. But unanimity would not be required there – perhaps a Commission decision would suffice.

The official "opening of the cluster" would then be the second stage of this two-step process, just as in 2014. And that stage, of course, would still require unanimous approval, with Hungary’s vote included.

In this way, Ukraine would gain almost everything it needs at stage one. Roadmaps approved by the EU are the key element required for real accession talks under the Fundamentals cluster.

And given that Budapest is unlikely to lift its veto before the Hungarian elections in April 2026, such a strategy would enable Ukraine not to waste precious time, but to conduct de facto accession talks without waiting for Orbán’s consent. The same approach could then apply to Cluster 2 (Internal Market) and beyond.

This scheme would not violate EU rules, nor undermine the veto mechanism, nor create the risk of decoupling that Kyiv seeks to avoid.

All that is needed is political will.